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THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: A GUIDE TO THE RENAISSANCE OF U.S. NAVAL STRATEGIC IN THE 1980s

REVISED EDITION

by

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with JAMES J. TRITTEN, Principal Investigator

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This is the second revised and expanded edition of the Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s. This report expands upon bibliographic resources first published, in part, in the U.S. Naval Institute's Maritime Strategy 'White Paper' of January 1986. It includes approximately 200 new annotated entries in a new, alphabetized order.

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THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: A GUIDE TO THE RENAISSANCE OF U.S. NAVAL STRATEGIC THINKING IN THE 1980s

Revised Edition

by

Capt. Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy, and
Jan S. Breemer, Bibliographers
and James J. Tritten, Principal Investigator

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This bibliography remains the "brainchild" of Capt. Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy and much of the material newly included in this work was made available by Capt. Swartz from his extensive holdings of maritime strategical writings. Others who contributed to this work by making their files available or by pointing the bibliographer to important sources that otherwise would have been overlooked, include Roger W. Barnett of National Security Research, Inc., Floyd 'Ken' D. Kennedy, Jr. of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), James L. George of the Hudson Institute and Ger Teitler of the Royal Netherlands Naval Institute (KMI). Dr. Teitler was particularly helpful in directing the bibliographer's attention to recent European writings on maritime strategy.

Jan S. Breemer is responsible for the selection and annotation of newly included reference sources.

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Notes On Revised Edition

This is the second revised and updated edition of The Maritime Strategic Debates: A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s. The original version, prepared by Capt. Peter M. Swarz, U.S. Navy, first appeared in part in the U.S. Naval Institute's special "White Paper" supplement to the January 1986 issue of the Proceedings. The first revised edition was published in the spring of 1988 by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School as "Technical Report NPS-56-88-009," again authored by Capt. Swarz. This revision continues to build on Capt. Swartz' pioneering work. Key changes from the first two editions include the following:

- annotated entries alphabetized by author's last name;
- approximately 200 additional entries, including, in particular, an extensive sample of overseas views and commentary.

Since the publication of the bibliography's first edition, the volume and range of written commentary on maritime strategical issues has grown by leaps and bounds. Accordingly, the 200 new entries in this document barely scratch the surface of the recent literature on the subject. It is hoped that a later revision will "catch up."

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General Introduction

This is a bibliography with a point of view. It takes as a departure point the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, as enunciated by the civilian and military leaders of the U.S. Government, especially the Department of the Navy. It includes criticism of and commentaries on that strategy, as well as items relating the Maritime Strategy to overall national and allied military strategy, and to historical precedents. In addition, it covers both how the Strategy was developed and who developed it, and the important role of wargaming.

The Maritime Strategy has generated enormous debate. All sides and aspects of the debate are presented here. The focus, however, is on that Strategy. Absent are discussions of naval affairs which do not have as their points of departure—explicitly or implicitly—the contemporary Maritime Strategy debate.

In order to trace the ebb and flow of ideas and events over time, items are listed chronologically, by occurrence or publication date, rather than merely alphabetically. Authoritative official statements of the Maritime Strategy are indicated by an asterisk (*). Explicit direct commentaries on the Maritime Strategy are indicated by a double asterisk (**). The other items listed deal implicitly with various antecedents.

Publications on Sister Service and Allied contributions to the Maritime Strategy are listed separately, to aid the reader/researcher. (Admittedly, this and other artificial topological devices run against a central theme of the Maritime Strategy—its global, "seamless web" character. Also, only cursory attention is paid to pre-1981 Navy strategic thinking on global war, a structural shortcoming that cannot legitimately be cited as evidence that such thinking was lacking.

I. MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATES: 1979-1985

American military strategy and its maritime component have been debated since the foundation of the republic. Following World War II, maritime strategy concerns centered around peacetime presence, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and the Navy's role in nuclear strike warfare against the Soviet Union. During the late 1950s and 1960s the focus shifted to limited war and deterrence through nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) operations. In the early 1970s, the debate centered on then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo R. Zumwalt's formulation of the "Four Missions of the Navy": strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, and peacetime presence. A major body of literature began to be created then on presence. In the mid-1970s, sea control seemed to dominate discussions.

In 1978, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward became Chief of Naval Operations. His views on strategy had been heavily influenced by his experience as Seventh Fleet Commander and Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief in the post-Vietnam environment. Admiral Hayward's focus was on flexible offensive forward power projection, conducted globally and in conjunction with allies and sister services, especially against the Soviet Union and its attacking forces. Much of this was a return to concepts familiar to U.S. naval officers of the first post-World War II decade. That era's focus on nuclear strikes, however, now broadened to encompass a much wider range of options, primarily conventional.

Admiral Hayward outlined his views publicly in his initial 1979 testimony before Congress, and subsequently in the pages of the Proceedings. The naval strategic renaissance and the resultant debate he and others sparked continues to this day, fueled by the statements and policies of the Reagan Administration, especially its first Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., who served from February 1981 to April 1987.

The initial public Maritime Strategy discussion of the early 1980s had largely taken the form of a debate on the pages of American public and foreign affairs and national security periodicals. This debate has focused on two themes: the general forward strategic principles (and certain highly publicized Norwegian Sea examples) enunciated repeatedly by Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. and a perceived "Maritime Strategy versus Coalition Warfare" dichotomy incessantly alleged by former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer and others.

At the same time, however, the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in conjunction with officers of their sister services and allied, had been asked to develop for internal use a detailed description of the Maritime Strategy component of U.S. national military strategy. This Maritime Strategy rigorously integrated into one clear, consistent document a number of long held views of Navy and Marine Corps senior officers, certain newly refined concepts developed in the fleet and at the Naval War College, agreed national intelligence estimates, the strategic principles articulated by Secretary Lehman and other Reagan Administration officials, and a thoughtful discussion of the variety and range of uncertainties inherent in the strategy.

Concepts developed by the Navy's warfare communities and fleets, as well as by Army, Air Force, joint and allied commanders, were examined and incorporated as appropriate. Where inconsistencies appeared, hard choices were made. Uncertainties and limitations were identified. Properly, the job was spearheaded by the Strategic Concepts Group on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-603).

The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Maritime Strategy was codified initially in 1982 to focus Navy program development efforts more tightly. Its basic premises already had been underlying Navy planning, gaming, and exercises. Subsequently, congressional testimony in 1983 released an initial edition of the Maritime Strategy to the public. A classified revision to the strategy statement was approved by the Navy's Program Review Committee (chaired by then Vice Admiral Carlisle Trost) in October 1983 and signed and distributed Navy-wide by Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, in 1984.

Various unclassified elements of the strategy began to find their way into naval affairs journals, especially the Proceedings. Writings on naval strategy that did not take the Maritime Strategy as a starting point began to fade. By 1985, enough authoritative congressional testimony, speeches, op-ed pieces, journal articles, and letters-to-the-editor, penned by senior naval officers and well-placed civilian commentators, had appeared for the essential elements of the Maritime Strategy to be accessible to the public. Public commentary gradually shifted from exegeses on the press conferences, speeches, and articles of Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer to discussions on aspects of the actual Maritime Strategy developed largely by military officers from national and alliance guidance and approved by civilian leadership.

Promulgation of the Maritime Strategy fostered increasing public and government discourse. Within the Navy, the interplay among the Maritime Strategy, force-level planning, fleet plans and operations, and professional education and training became a governing dynamic. In the open literature, the number of writings on the strategy rose from a handful of newspaper and journal articles in 1981 to an avalanche of government documents, books, and articles in 1986, including over 145,000 copies distributed of the Proceedings' watershed "The Maritime Strategy" January 1986 supplement alone. This quantitative leap was accompanied by qualitative changes in both the background of the commentators and the sophistication of their arguments.

Contrary to much uninformed external criticism of the early 1980s, the Maritime Strategy was presented by the Navy as only one, albeit a vital component of the national military strategy. It was not presented as a recommended dominant theme of that national strategy. Also contrary to earlier uninformed criticism, the strategy embodied the views of unified and fleet commanders as well as Washington military and civilian planners and Newport thinkers. The Navy Department and the fleet were now speaking with one sophisticated voice to, and increasingly for, the nation and its allies.

Ackley, R.T., "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2," Proceedings, April 1985, pp 42-47. Also "Comment and Discussion," May 1985, pp 14-17, July 1985, p 112. More on the anti-SSBN mission.

Arkin, William M. and Chappell, David, "Forward Offensive Strategy: Raising the Stakes in the Pacific," World Policy Journal, Summer 1985, pp 481-500. Forward operations in the Northeast Pacific seen as "provocative and destabilizing." Similar in tone and political coloration to Barry Posen 1982 critique of Norwegian Sea operations.

Arkin, William M., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1983, pp 6-7. Sees U.S. Navy theater nuclear weapons under development as destablitizing, despite Soviet theater nuclear naval programs.

Ball, Desmond, "Nuclear War At Sea," International Security, Winter 1985-86, pp 3-31. Argues against anti-SSBN operations and for more U.S. Navy focus on the escalatory dangers of theater nuclear war at sea. Not particularly accurate.

Betts, Richard K., Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics, Washington: Brookings, 1981, pp 537-540. See discussion of carrier penetration of Soviet waters as "peacetime deterrent rhetoric" about risky "missions that could turn into a naval Charge of the Light Brigade."

Bond, Larry, and Ries, Tomas, "Controversy: A New Strategy for the North-East Atlantic?" International Defense Review, 12/1984, pp 1803-4. USN and NATO naval strategy.

Bowling, Capt. R.A., USN (Ret.), "Keeping Open the Sea-Lanes," Proceedings, December 1985, pp 92-98. Argues for a return to SLOC protection focus for the U.S. Navy.

Breemer, Jan S., "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," RUSI Journal, March 1985, pp 18-26. Includes useful review of literature.

** Brooks, Capt. Linton F., "Escalation and Naval Strategy," Proceedings, August 1984, pp 33-37. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1984, pp 28-29; November 1984, pp 18, 24; December 1984, p 174. On Maritime Strategy and nuclear weapons by an important articulate contributor to development of the Strategy. Focus of public debate begins to shift to the Strategy as it actually is, rather than the Strategy as it is alleged to be.

Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World, Boulder CO: Westview Press

1983. By the 1977-1981 Secretary of Defense. Mildly critical of forward carrier operations. More strongly critical of the 600-ship Navy build-up. See especially pp 100-101, 121-123, 171-187.

Caldwell, Hamlin, "Arctic Submarine Warfare," Submarine Review, July 19892, pp 4-13. Develops further the arguments in his 1981 article.

Caldwell, Hamlin, "The Empty Silo—Strategic ASW, Naval War College Review, September-October 1981, pp. 4-14. Call for anti-SSBN operations in Soviet home water bastions.

Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, Challenges for U.S. National Security: Assessing the Balance: Defense Spending and Conventional Forces: A Preliminary Report, Part II, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1981. Chapter 3, pp 99-148, assesses the naval balance and identifies key issues. No policy recommendations. Comprehensive and even handed. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, purely budget-oriented.

Cohen, Eliot A., "The Long-Term Crisis of the Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/3, pp 325-343. A Naval War College faculty member argues for strengthening the U.S. Navy, creation of a "Fifth Fleet," global U.S. military focus and increased European military responsibilities in NATO. Seeks to bridge the "Atlanticist vs navalist" debate.

Collins, Col. John M., USA (Ret.), U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985. Compares strategy and policy as well as force levels. See especially Chapter 11. Also Chapters 9, 12 and 16.

Corddry, Charles W., "Navy Grows Toward 600-Ship Fleet, But Sustaining It May be a Problem," Baltimore Sun, May 22, 1985, p 1. Cites Congressional Budget Office (CBO) skepticism that the 600-ship fleet goal may not be sustainable with the anticipated decline of defense budget growth.

Corry, James, "Strategy of the Navy for the War of the Future," New York Times, May 17, 1984, p C-25. Preview of "The Return of the Great White Fleet," broadcast on television on May 17, 1984. Finds that the program's portrayal of the large vs. small carrier debate was "stacked against" John Lehman's 15-carrier battlegroup plan.

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William O., USA, Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate (Washington Paper #107), Washington: CSIS, 1984. Expands arguments made in their Foreign Policy article.

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William O., USA, "Strategy for Survival," Foreign Policy, Fall 1983, pp 22-41. Also Komer and Dunn and Staudenmaier letters, Winter 1983-84, pp 176-178. The "Carlisle School" again. Seeks to synthesize all points in the maritime-continental debate.

Dunn, Keith A., and Staudenmaier, Col. William O., USA, "The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," Survival, May-June 1985, pp 108-118. Shows Maritime Strategy similarities to Samuel Huntington proposals to adopt retaliatory offensive strategy on the ground and in the air in Europe. Argues against both.

Epstein, Joshua M., "Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme," International Security, Winter 1983/84, pp 19-31, especially pp 23-25. Also reprinted in Art, Raymond and Waltz, Kenneth (eds.), The Use of Force (second edition), 1983, and updated as Chapter 3 of Epstein's Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf, Washington: Brookings 1987. Critique of 'Horizontal Escalation,' not only as a counter to a Soviet invasion of Iran, but also apparently as a function of maritime forces in a global war with the Soviets. Sees Soviet-Chinese wartime relationship as unaffected by naval considerations, and regards Soviet ground force numbers as virtually limitless. No discussion of possible Soviet air force redeployment, however.

* Fogarty, Como. William, "Navy Maritime Strategy Moving on Offensive," Navy Times, August 20, 1984, pp 25-26. Fogarty outlines maritime Strategy.

* Foley, Adm. Sylvester R., Jr., "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," Proceedings, August 1985, pp 34-38. Retiring PACFLT Commander-in-Chief discusses his task in context of overall Maritime Strategy. Shows one component commander's view of the Strategy.

** Friedman, Norman, "A Survey of Western ASW in 1985," International Defense Review, 10/1985, pp 1587-97. Maritime Strategy and the North Atlantic ASW campaign: Open ocean vs close-in vs convoy campaigns.

Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," International Defense Review. 7/1985, pp 1071-1075. A prominent civilian naval affairs commentator analyzes rationale for USN Maritime Strategy.

** George, James L. (ed.), The U.S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Papers delivered at a Center for Naval Analyses conference, Fall 1984. See chapters by Dov Zakheim on "Land Based Aviation and Maritime Warfare," Robert Wood and John T. Hanley, Jr., on "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," and "Commentaries," by retired Admirals Robert Long

and Harry Train. Admiral Long's Pacific Command"Concept of Operations: and his Pacific Command Campaign Plan were important building blocks for the Maritime Strategy.

Getler, Michael, "Too Late to Stop Fleet Buildup, says Navy Secretary," Washington Post, December 2, 1982, p 16. Reports on a Brookings Institution seminar on military budgets, including SECNAV Lehman's rejection of calls for reduced Navy spending as "too late to stop it."

Getler, Michael, "Lehman Sees Norwegian Sea as a Key to Soviet Naval Strategy," Washington Post, December 29, 1982, p 4. Reports Lehman's call for a navy and strategy to fight a *global* war at sea, involving *simultaneous* operations in multiple theaters. U.S. pressure against the Kola Peninsula (which Lehman denied meant taking the carriers close to the Soviet mainland) will afford "a tremendous bit of leverage because (the Soviets can't afford to lose that...They'd lost their whole strategic submarine fleet if they lose Kola."

Geyelin, Philip, "Mr. Lehman's Dream Navy," Washington Post, October 2, 1981, p 29. Question's the Navy's need and ability to fight a "global Trafalgar conveniently confined to blue water and conventional weapons."

Glenn, Senator John, Carter, Barry E., Komer, Robert W., Rethinking Defense and Conventional Forces, Washington: Center for National Policy, 1983. Two ex-Army officers, Carter, pp 33-35, and Komer, pp 46-48, attack the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy.

Gordon, Michael R., "Lehman's Navy Riding High, But Critics Question Its Strategy and Rapid Growth," National Journal, September 21, 1985, pp 2120+. Wide-ranging review of many aspects of the debate.

Hamm, Manfred, "Ten Steps to Counter Moscow's Threat to Northern Europe," Backgrounder (The Heritage Foundation), No. 1356, May 30, 1984. Calls for rather modest U.S. and allied maritime counters to a greatly increased Soviet threat.

** Harris, Cdr. R. Robinson, and Benkert, Lcdr. Joseph, "Is That All There Is?" Proceedings, October 1985, pp 32-27. Surface combatants and the Maritime Strategy.

Hart, Senator Gary, "Can Congress Come to Order?" Franck, Thomas, (ed.), The Tethered Presidency, New York: New York University Press, 1981, pp 242-3. A call for a national maritime-only strategy and "obvious and indisputable naval superiority." The U.S. Navy certainly shares the second goal, but not the first.

Hayward, Adm. Thomas B., "The Future of U.S. Sea Power," Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1979, pp. 66-71; Also Zumwalt, Adm. Elmo R., Jr., "Total Force," pp. 103-106; and "Comment and Discussion," July 1979, pp. 23-24; August 1979, pp. 87-89; September 1979, pp. 89-91; October 1979, p. 21; December 1979, p. 88; January 1980, pp. 82-86. Public debate on the new era of U. S. Navy strategy begins. Hayward, Zumwalt, Bill Lind, Norman Friedman, et al. See also Hayward "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1979-1982.

* Hayward, Thomas B., Adm. USN, Untitled remarks before the annual convention of the Association of Naval Aviation, Wings of Gold, Summer 1982, pp 57-60. The former CNO and one of the "founding fathers" of the maritime strategy of the 1980s takes on the "convoy syndrome" that he claims was being foisted upon the U.S. Navy in the 1970s. The key principles of the Navy's strategy today (1982), he says, are superiority, rejection of the "short war" theory, forward operations, and "to take the fight to the enemy at the time we want to, where we want to, at our option and not his."

Healy, Melissa, "Lehman: We'll Sink Their Subs," Defense Week, May 13, 1985, p 18. Reports the SECNAV's oft-publicized comment, made on April 19, 1985, that U.S. submarines will attack the Soviet SSBN fleet "in the first five minutes of the war."

Holloway, Adm. James L., III, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy—A Functional Appraisal," Oceanus, Summer 1985, pp 3-11. Reformulation of pre-Maritime Strategy USN positions by Adm. Hayward's predecessor as CNO. Similar to the Navy's 1978 Strategic Concept of th U.S. Navy (NWP-1). Focus on sea control and on Soviet Navy as anti-SLOC force.

Huntington, Samuel P., "The Defense Policy, 1981-1982," in Greenstein, Fred I. (Ed.), The Reagan Presidency, An Early Assessment, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 82-116. Initial Reagan overall defense policies and strategy, the contest of the Maritime Strategy.

Ikle, Fred Charles, "The Reagan Defense Program," A Focus on the Strategic Imperatives," Strategic Review, Spring 1982, pp 11-18. By the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Especially good on administration requirements for naval forces to provide options to fight on a variety of fronts.

* International Combat Arms, May 1985, Interview with SECNAV John F. Lehman, Jr., pp 12-13. The SECNAV explains why the Navy's 600-ship goal must be based on the "worst case" scenario of a general conventional war with the Soviet Union. Automatically

embedded within this scenario, claims Lehman, is "every conceivable peacetime crisis (as) a subset."

Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ... to Support the Land Battle," Naval War College Review, November-December 1984, pp 4-12. Also "In My View," March-April 1985, pp 96-97; July-August 1985 p 83. Mainstream U.S. Navy thinking.

Jenkins, Ronald Wayne, "Coalition Defense vs. Maritime Strategy: A Critical Examination Illustrating a New Approach to Geopolitical Analysis," unpublished PhD. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1985. A political geographer's take. Buys into categorization of "Schools" popularized by Komer, Dunn and Staudenmaier. Recognized irrelevance of much of the pre—1984 literature to "real-world" USN planning and programming problems. Includes a study of the views of Naval War College officers on geography and Maritime Strategy.

Kaufman, William W., The1985 Defense Budget, Washington: Brookings, 1984, especially pp 29-34. A snide critique of U.S. Navy strategy and force level requests. Naval power projection forces seen as only needed in Third World areas during a global war with the Soviets. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-oriented document. See also Kaufmann chapters in earlier 1982 and 1983 Brookings annuals edited by Joseph Pechman, Setting National Priorities: 1983 and 1984, and his 1981 Defense in the 1980s.

Kaufmann, William W., The 1986 Defense Budget, Washington, Brookings, 1985, especially pp 32-35. Another sarcastic Kaufmann budget-oriented critique, including an unduly sanguine view of allied naval capabilities.

Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "Tailor military Strategy to the Economy," Philadelphia Inquirer, May 26, 1982, p 25. Sees the Reagan Administration as building a new maritime strategy on top of an old continental strategy. Considers the Soviet Far East as the key Soviet vulnerability for naval forces to exploit.

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "From SLOC Protection to a National Maritime Strategy: The U.S. Navy under Carter and Reagan, 1977-1984," in Hagan, Kenneth J., (ed.), In Peace and War, (Second Edition), Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. (Mostly on operations and shipbuilding. Sees Secretary Lehman's contribution as a reorientation of national strategy rather than simply an enhancement of its maritime elements).

Klare, Michael T., "Securing the Fire Break," World Policy Journal, Spring 1985, pp 229-247. Sees forward offensive operations for ships with both nuclear and conventional capabilities as eroding the

firebreak between nuclear and non-nuclear combat and raising the likelihood of nuclear war.

Koburger, Capt. C. W. , USCGR, "Pitts' Choice: An Alternative NATO Strategy for the USA," Navy International, December 1981, pp 730-731. Like that of Sen. Hart, one of the very few real examples of a call for a "pure" *national* maritime strategy, a position often falsely attributed to proponents of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy.

Komer, Robert, Maritime Strategy of Coalition Defense, Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1984. Also review by Dr. Dov Zakheim, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1984-85, pp 721-722. Ambassador Komer's last salvo before November 1984 elections, with administration retort.

Komer, Robert, "Maritime Strategy vs. coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1982, pp 1, 124-1, 144. Also Turner, Adm. Stansfield, and Thibault, Capt. George, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Fall 1982, pp 125-135; "Comments and Correspondence: Maritime Strategies," Winter 1982/3, pp 453-457. The debate jumps to a wider arena: Komer vs. Turner vs. Lehman. Ambassador Komer had been a leading Carter Administration Defense Department official from 1977 to 1981.

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Nine Principles for the Future of American Maritime Power," Proceedings, February 1984, pp 47-51. Refinement of Secretary Lehman's thought after three years in office.

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy," Strategic Review, Summer 1981, pp. 9-15. For more than two years, the basic Navy public statement on Maritime Strategy. See also Lehman "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1981-1987, especially regarding linkages among operations, strategy, and programs.

* Lehman, John F., Jr., "Talking Surface with SECNAV," Surface Warfare, September-October 1985, pp 2-10. SECNAV ties the strategy, surface warfare and procurement issues together.

* Lehman, John, Remarks before the Jewish War Veterans of the USA, Washington, D.C., August 31, 1984. Reaffirms the need for a forward strategy to "throw the Soviets on the defensive."

* Lehman, John, "Support for Defense is Still Strong," Washington Post, December 16, 1982, p. 23. "The Navy is working to do its part in a team effort of forward-based air, land, and naval power. Navy strategy is part and parcel of the national strategy of deterrence, not a substitute for it".

Martin, Ben L., "Has There Been a Reagan Revolution in Defense Policy?" World Affairs, Winter 1985-86, pp 173-182, especially 175-6.

Sees Maritime Strategy as the basis for horizontal escalation doctrine, and both important only as U.S. Navy budget rationales. "The idea of horizontal escalation itself is too inherently implausible to find an enduring place in American strategic doctrine."

Martin, Laurence, NATO and the Defense of the West, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985, especially pp 30-35 "Flanks," 51-56 "Warning, Mobilization and Reinforcement"; and 57-67 "The Maritime Battle." Features graphics rivaling those in the official US Navy Maritime Strategy testimony in their explanatory power and often their complexity.

Maze, Rick, "CNO, SecNav in Agreement on Strategy, Lehman Says," Navy Times, June 20, 1983, p 9. Disputes media reports that the CNO and SECNAV are at odds over the early forward deployment of carrier battlegroups into the Barents Sea.

* McDonald, Adm. Wesley, "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, October 1985, pp 46-53. By the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Actually on relationship of Maritime Strategy to NATO fleet strategy in the Atlantic with emphasis on mine warfare.

Miller, Steven, "The Northern Seas in Soviet and U. S. Strategy," in Lodgaard, Sverre and Thee, Marek, (eds.), Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, London: Taylor and Francis, 1983, pp 117.137. Comprehensive analysis, especially of tie-in between U.S. Naval Strategy and Reagan administration policy.

Moorer, Adm. Thomas H. USN (Ret.) and Cottrell, Alvin J. "Sea Power and NATO Strategy," in Myers, Kenneth A., NATO: The Next Thirty Years, Boulder CO: Westview , 1980, pp 223-236. Detailed arguments on the necessarily global nature of any major future war with the Soviets and the need for forward carrier operations off the Kola, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, by the 1970-1974 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 1967-1970 Chief of Naval Operations. Arguments against a "swing" strategy from the Pacific are also echoed in "For Want of a Nail: the Longistics of the Alliance" by Adm. Isaac Kidd USN (Ret.), former U.S. Navy and NATO commander in both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in the same volume, pp 189-205.

Morland, Howard, "Are We Readying a First Strike?" The Nation, March 16, 1985, p 297. Written by the "disarmament coordinator" of the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, this article charges that the deployment of the Trident D-5 will upset the "stability" of MAD, and "could provoke the Russians to launch a pre-emptive strike." Urges cancellation of the MX, D-5 and Midgetman

missile programs, and the establishment of mutually-agreed SSBN "sanctuaries."

** Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective," Proceedings, October 1983, pp 66-81. By a former Under Secretary of the Navy and the first Director of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies. See especially pp 70 & 74 on the maritime strategy and the role of the Naval War College. "You have to discard the term 'naval strategy,' and even the slightly more modern variant, 'maritime strategy' and talk instead about the naval contribution to national strategy...Newport is not, of course, the planning center for the Navy. It is, however, one place where naval officers get together and try to produce better ideas."

Nagler, V.Adm. Gordon, USN (Ret.), (ed.) Naval Tactical Command and Control, Washington: AFCEA International Press, 1985. See the articles in Chapter III: "Tactical Space Assets" and Chapter IV, "EW: A Force Multiplier" on how the US Navy uses space and electronic warfare systems to resolve a variety of operational problems inherent in implementing the Maritime Strategy.

Nathan, James A., "Leaky Naval Strategy," New York Times, January 26, 1983, p 23. Portrays the Reagan administration's "new naval strategy" as a "useless military adventure and an "excessive pursuit of glory."

Nathan, James A., "The Return of the Great White Fleet," The Nation, March 5, 1983, pp 269-71. Invokes the wrong numbers and the wrong arguments to inveigh against the "current wager on naval power (as) a dangerous and costly gamble" that "makes nuclear war more likely."

* "NATO Forces Flex Muscles in Norwegian Sea," Virginian-Pilot, September 9, 1985, pp 1+. Another fleet view of the strategy. V.Adm. Henry C. Mustin, U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander, on exercising and implementing Maritime Strategy in his theater. See also "Protection of Convoy Routes a Key Objective for Ocean Safari 85," Jane's Defense Weekly, October 5, 1985, pp 749-753.

* Norton, Capt. Douglas M., "Responding to the Soviet Presence in Northern Waters: An American Naval View," in Archer, Clive (ed.), The Soviet Union and Northern Waters, London: Croom, Helm, 1987. A paper presented in October 1985 at Aberdeen, Scotland as part of the dialogue between U.S. Navy strategists and allied civilian and military leaders and defense specialists.

Nunn, Senator Sam, The Need to Reshape Military Strategy, Washington: Georgetown University CSIS, March 18, 1983, p 7.

Advocates choke point defense, vice carrier-based airpower, vs. the Soviet homeland.

** O'Donnell, Maj. Hugh K., USMC, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive," Proceedings, September 1985, pp 42-57. USN/USMC global Maritime Strategy as applied to one region, comprehensive commentary on the Maritime Strategy debate. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1985, pp 16, 20; December 1985, pp 20-23. See especially January 1986, p 19 letter discussing complementary Norwegian Navy operations; and February 1986, pp 19-25 letter by Dr. Norman Friedman elaborating on and endorsing the Maritime Strategy and placing it in historical context.

O'Leary, Jeremiah, "Reagan Affirms Goal to Build Navy," Washington Times, December 29, 1982, p 6. President Reagan reaffirms the necessity for U.S. maritime superiority on the occasion of the recommissioning of USS New Jersey in Long Beach, CA on December 28, 1982.

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy," Navy International, February 1987, pp 118-122. A thoughtful essay on the evolution of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy during its formative years, including a discussion of the "mix of the new and the old" in the Navy's strategic thinking, and the relationship between strategy and force sizing. O'Rourke makes the important point that rejection of the strategy's forward component in favor of reliance on "defensive" operations could result in a requirement for *more* than 600 ships.

Oakland Tribune, March 22, 1984, "Reagan's Navy." Editorial attack on the U.S. Navy's "preference for big, vulnerable, World War II-style fleets," and SECNAV Lehman's "dream of steaming the fleet to victory in Soviet home waters."

Oakland Tribune, March 23, 1984, "A Strategy of Suicide." Compares the U.S. Navy's forward strategy with the charge of the light brigade during the Crimean War. Cites retired Adm. Stanfield Turner and others to the effect that sending the carriers into Northern waters would likely result in a "major catastrophe."

Ownes, Lt. Col. MacKubin Thomas, USMCR, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform," International Security, Winter 1985-86, pp 98-111, especially pp 106-109. Links the strategy debate to the contemporaneous debate on JCS "reform": "The JCS reorganization debate is really a debate about strategic doctrine." Cf Best and Donatelli February 1987 articles, cited below.

Perry, Robert, Lorell, Mark A., and Lewis, Kevin, Second-Area Operations: A Strategy Option (Publication R-2992-USDP), Santa

Monica CA: Rand Corporation, May 1984. Pros, cons, risks and uncertainties associated with multi-theater war and "horizontal escalation." Historical and analytical survey.

** "Phoenix," "The SSN-21 and U.S. Maritime Strategy" Submarine Review, October 1985, pp 27-31. Discusses linkages between threat, strategy and ship design. See also letter by Ulmer, Capt. D.M., April 1986, pp 58-60, questioning using estimated Soviet intentions, vice capabilities, to drive strategy and programs. Cf McGruther article cited in Section XI below.

Pincus, Walter, "Our Carrier Armadas Could Sink the Budget," Washington Post, March 25, 1984, pp C-1, C-4. Standard critique of the "cost" and "vulnerability" of large-deck aircraft carriers.

** Polmar, Norman and Truver, Scott C., "The Maritime Strategy," Air Force Magazine, November 1987, pp 70-79. A good account of the indebtedness of the Maritime Strategy to Adm. Hayward's tenure as CNO, and a bleak prognosis for the Navy's "overall capabilities to carry out the operational plans, the 'contingency operations" that underpin the Maritime Strategy."

Posen, Barry A., "Inadvertent Nuclear War?" Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 28-54. Claims forward U.S. Navy operations in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere are a bad thing.

Posen, Barry, and Van Evera, Stephen, "Reagan Administration Defense Policy: Departure from Containment," in Oye, Kenneth A., Lieber, Robert J. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.), Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, Boston: Little Brown, 1983, pp 67-104. Critical of all aspects of Reagan Defense policy and strategy, including offensive conventional warfighting, especially with naval forces. "Overall, a counteroffensive strategy is a bottomless pit, since it generates very demanding missions that cannot be achieved without huge expenses, if they can be achieved at all...a counteroffensive strategy defeats the basic purpose of American conventional forces--the control of escalation." Advocates a 10-carrier force.

** Powers, Capt. Robert Carney, "Commanding the Offense," Proceedings, October 1985, especially pp 62-63. Central strike warfare theme of the Strategy is criticized, along with the tactical organization evolved thus far for its implementation.

Prina, L. Edgar, "Budget Increased Reflect 'A Major Change in Naval Strategy,'" Sea Power, April 1981, pp 13-22. Best coverage of Secretary Lehman's press conference of March 3, 1981, when he unveiled his "major change." See also page 1 of the Wall Street

Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, and Baltimore Sun, March 4, 1981, and George, James L. "US Carriers—Bold New Strategy," Navy International, June 1981, pp 330-335. Compare with Hayward and Mooer/Cottrell pieces above.

Record, Jeffrey, and Hanks, R.Adm. Robert J., USN (Ret.). U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads, Washington Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, July 1982. Two different arguments for a shift to a national maritime strategy, including one by a prominent U.S. Navy strategist of the mid-1970s.

Record, Jeffrey, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," International Security, Winter 1983/84, pp 3-18. Also "Correspondence," Summer 1984, pp 217-221. Echoes Komer's and Turner's stated positions.

Record, Jeffrey, Revising U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. An argument for a national maritime strategy, but without the offensive forward operations characteristic of the U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy. See especially pp 83-86.

Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," Baltimore Sun, March 26, 1985, p 7. Warns that a US attack against the Kola Peninsula could trigger Soviet retaliation in kind against the continental United States, possibly leading to nuclear escalation. See Adm. Watkins' response, "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward," in the April 16, 1985 issue of the Baltimore Sun.

Rivkin, D.B., "No Bastions for thde Bear," Proceedings, April 1984, pp 36-43. Also "Comment and iscussion," June 1984, pp 14-15; July 1984, pp 14-20; August 1974, p 101; September 1984, p 164; October 1984, pp 97-100; January 1985, p 129, The anti-SSBN mission debate.

* Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY85; Part 8, Washington: GPO, 1985, pp 3851-3900. SECNAV and CNO jointly describe Maritime Strategy as component of national military strategy, March 1984. Further exposure of the Strategy presented by COMO Carolson a year earlier.

Staudenmaier, Col. William, USA, "One if by Land - Two if by Sea: The Continental - Maritime Debate," Army, January 1983, pp 30-37, Opening salvo of the "Carlisle School." A leading Army War College faculty member contributes to the mispreceptions that the central U.S. naval strategy debate is about Maritime Strategy vs. Continental Strategy, and that it is driven solely by budgetary considerations.

Stewart, Maj. Richard A, USMC, "Ships That Can Deliver," Proceedings, November 1984, pp 37-43. Amphibious vs. prepositioning issues.

Stockman, David, The Triumph of Politics: How the Reagan Revolution Failed, New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp 280-281. Anonymous "experts" ridicule "the theory of 'getting in harm's way'" in mid-1981 to President Reagan's gullible budget director.

"The Defense Budget: A Conservative Debate," Policy Review, Summer 1985, pp 12-27, especially pp 20-21. Prominent conservatives line up, pro or con, on the 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy as they understand it.

Thomas, Cdr. Raymond E., "Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare: Matching Strategy and Capability," in Essays on Strategy, Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985, pp 39-51, especially p 50. Criticizes US Naval strategy for not addressing theater nuclear warfare adequately; disagrees with forward carrier operations in high threat areas.

* Tighe, Eugene, Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret.), "We Have a Winning and Survivable Navy: Admiral Watkins, CNO," Defense Systems Review, June 1983, pp 12-16. Interview with the CNO, covering a wide range of mostly procurement-related issues. The Falklands War reportedly demonstrated the need for the U.S. Navy to make a greater investment in electronic warfare and sealift capabilities.

Tritten, Cdr. James J., "It's Not Either Or," Wings of Gold, Spring 1983, pp 49-52. Argues Mahanian concept of U.S. seapower is necessary to support U. S. forward defense continental strategy.

Tritten, Cdr. James J., "Strategic ASW: A Good Idea?," Proceedings, January 1984, pp 90, 92. Argues for procuring anti-SSBN systems without declaring an anti-SSBN policy. See also his "Strategic ASW," Submarine Review, January 1984, pp 52-55, and "The Concept of Strategic ASW," Navy International, June 1984, pp 348-350.

Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.) "Thinking About the Future of the Navy," Proceedings, August 1980, pp. 66-69. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1980, p. 101; November 1980, pp 124-127; January 1981, p 77. Adm. Turner questions role of power projection in general war strategy.

Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "A Strategy for the 90s." New York Times Magazine, May 6, 1984, pp 30-40, etc. Argues for focus on USN Third World intervention role, amphibious warfare, and more/smaller ships.

Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "U.S. Naval Policy," Naval Forces, No III/1985, pp 15-25. Update of Turner's thought, emphasizing amphibious interventions and North Atlantic SLOC protection.

U. S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, Nomination of John F. Lehman, Jr., to be Secretary of the Navy, January 28, 1981, Washington: USGPO, 1981. "I think the major need of the Navy today is the establishment by the President and the Congress of a clearly articulated naval strategy, first and foremost."

* U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Ninety-eighth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY84; Part 4, Washington: GPO, 1983, pp. 47-51. COMO Dudley Carlson publicly unveils a version of the U.S. Navy's "first cut" Maritime Strategy, February 1983, published later that year.

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, Report of the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee on the 600-Ship Navy, November 18, 1985, Washington: USGPO, 1986. The House Seapower Subcommittee endorses the Maritime Strategy. Essentially the same report is in Bennett, Rep. Charles E., "The 600-Ship Fleet: Is it Necessary?" Naval Forces, II/1986, pp 26-38.

* U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
** Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials subcommittee, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session. Hearings: The 600-Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy, Washington: USGPO, 1986. June and September 1985 graphics-laden testimony by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. and several critics and commentators, notably retired Admirals Turner and Carroll. With the Proceedings January 1986 Supplement and related "Comment and Discussion" letters, the most comprehensive public statement and discussion of the Navy's official views on the Maritime Strategy, although lacking in the in-depth discussion of uncertainties which characterized internal Navy Maritime Strategy documents.

** U.S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference: 17-8 September 1985, Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-OOK), 1986. On relationships among the Maritime Strategy and U.S. Navy long-range planning, program development, and research.

Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "The Pacific and U.S. Naval Policy," Naval Forces, VI/1985, pp 36-48. Sees U.S. Navy Pacific

experience as a primary driver of Maritime Strategy. Especially good as the role of Adm. Thomas Hayward as Pacific Fleet Commander, originator of the "Sea Strike" study, and Chief of Naval Operations.

Ullman, Cdr. Harlan, USN (Ret.), Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime Industries and National Security, Washington: Georgetown CSIS, 1984. Pp 4-7 give a good quick summary of the basic opposing viewpoints on U.S. naval strategy, eschewing the extraneous elements usually dragged in by unknowledgeable would-be analysts.

** Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H. Future Imperative: National Security and the US Navy in the Late 1980s. Washington: CSIS, 1985. See especially Ullman's critique of Maritime Strategy, pp 20-21, and 67. Contrast with Ullman riposte to Turner, Proceedings, January 198, p 77.

Vlahos, Michael, "Maritime Strategy vs. Continental Commitment," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp 583-589. Argues that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive.

Vlahos, Michael, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Geopolitical Needs and the Soviet Maritime Challenge," in Taylor, William J., Jr., et al. (eds.), Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s, Lexington MA: D.C. Health, 1984, pp 427-432. 1982 views of a former Naval War College faculty member. Especially good on late 1970s internal U.S. Navy strategy debates, and as critique of trying U.S. naval strategy too closely to the Soviet naval threat. Cf approach taken by McGruther, cited in Section XI below. This volume also contains some of Ambassador Komer's early and retrospectively most lucid arguments, at pp 196-199.

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Current Strategy of U.S. Navy, " Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1984, p 22 USN rebuttal to Komer, Robert, "Carrier Heavy Navy is Waste-Heavy," Los Angeles Times, May 16, 1984, especially to alleged maritime vs. continental and Navy vs. Europe dichotomies. See also Watkins "Posture Statement" testimony before Congress, 1983-1986.

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Maritime Strategy: Global and Forward," Baltimore Sun, April 16, 1985, p 15. USN rejoinder to a variety of critics, especially Record, Jeffrey, "Sanctuary Warfare," Baltimore Sun, March 16, 1985, p 7.

** Watkins, Adm. James D., "Reforming the Navy From Within," Defense 85, November 1985, pp 18-20. The CNO on the role of the Maritime Strategy within the Navy, and its basic characteristics. "We lean heavily on our unified commanders-in-chief and Navy fleet commanders to help strengthen, modernize, and then put into

practice our naval strategy. This plurality of perspective and the resulting competition of ideas have made for a robust dynamic strategy that recognizes and reflects the complexity of strategic issues as viewed by all key U.S. military leaders worldwide, not as viewed by a parochial naval bureaucracy in Washington."

** Watkins, Adm. James D., "The Greatest Potential Problem: Our National Willpower," Sea Power, October 1985, p 71. CNO describes utility and development process of the Maritime Strategy.

* Watkins, James D., Adm., USN. "Alliance Maritime Power and Deterrence of War." Remarks at the International Seapower Symposium, Newport, RI, October 21, 1985. A plea and agenda directed at an audience made up largely of allied naval representatives for "bringing our common perspectives to bear on a common problem" i.e. the integration of U.S. an dallied maritime deterrence and war-fighting capabilities and plans into a "global coalition deterrence strategy." The CNO's proposed "building blocs" toward this goal are: (1) bilateral navy-to-navy talks, (2) mutually-supporting bilateral maritime strategy agreements, (3) joint regional maritime strategies, (4) war-gaming, and (5) a global coalition strategy aimed at maritime deterrence.

* Watkins, James, D., Adm. USN, "We Are The Real Reformers." Remarks at the Current Strategy Forum, Newport, RI, June 19, 1985. Declares the Maritime Strategy the centerpiece of contemporary Navy strategic thought, tactical developments, force planning, and systems procurement. The Maritime Strategy is, reports Watkins, the Navy's "strategic vision," initiated and sustained "from within," and "without much hoopla and without the help of self-appointed military reformers..."

** West, F.J. "Bing" Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," Naval War College Review, September-October 1985, pp 5-19. By a former Reagan Administration Assistant Secretary of Defense, naval strategic thinker, and principal author of "SEAPLAN 2000," a 1978 progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Excellent discussion of conventional protracted war and deterrence concepts underlying the strategy.

* Wings of Gold, Winter 1981, "CNO Discusses Current Issues." Outgoing CNO, Adm. Thomas B. Hayward discusses the need for a 600-ship and 15-carrier navy that will "make them worry about our being the threat in a very significant way." He predicts that the new Reagan administration's "new direction" will make his successor "much more able to create havoc in the Kremlin (make Gorshkov worry more) which is just what we want to do."

Wood, Robert S. and Hanley, John P., Jr., "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," Naval War College Review, November-December 1985, pp 5-18. The Naval War College faculty begins to weigh in heavily in the public debate.

Zakheim, Dov S., "The Role of Amphibious Operations in National Military Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1984, pp 35-39. (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense explains Marine missions and programs in context of overall administration strategy.)

Zakheim, Dov., "The Unforeseen Contingency: Reflections on Strategy," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1982, pp. 158-166. (Reagan administration maritime strategy in overall military context, by a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense.

Zimm, LCdr. Alan D., "The First Salvo." Proceedings, February 1985, pp 55-60. Also"Comment and Discussion," April 1985, p 16; June 1985, p 132; July 1985, p 106. See especially for timing fo forward carrier battle group moves and for strategy issues.

Zumwalt, Adm. Elmo R., Jr., USN (Ret.) "Naval Battles We Could Lose," International Security Review, summer 1981 pp 139-155. (By the 1970-1974 U. S. Navy CNO. Argues for more stress on the U.S. Navy as "geopolitical cavalry" for low-to-middle-level conflict, and for a "distributed force" building program as optimum for the full spectrum of naval warfare requirements, including nuclear war at sea).

NOT REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE

II. THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATE: 1986: THE WATERSHED YEAR

In late 1985, Secretary Lehman, Admiral Watkins, and General Kelley, having ensured that the Maritime Strategy met their requirements and represented both their thinking and that of their superiors, submitted manuscripts containing the strategy's basic tenets (less its uncertainties and limitations) to the Naval Institute. following the publication of "The Maritime Strategy," a special supplement to the January 1986 Proceedings, public discussion of the strategy took on a new, sophisticated tone, more relevant to the actual requirements of U.S. national security decision making. Subsequent statements by President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and others confirmed for the public that the strategy was consistent with higher civilian and military defense guidance.

In the United States and abroad, discussions ranging from global warfare with the Soviets to naval history, fleet balance, and peacetime and crisis operations became suffused with the vocabulary and concepts of the Maritime Strategy. Much of the writing was now done by senior military officers. Most notably, a spate of broad-gauged articles by naval aviation, surface, and submarine warfare specialists appeared, transcending narrow "unionism." Knowledgeable civilian strategic thinkers and historians also offered their cogent commentary on the Strategy.

Proceedings now served as the primary forum, along with the Naval War College Review, Sea Power, and Naval Forces. The arena, however, also broadened to include more newspapers and popular magazines. The public affairs and national security journals rediscovered the Maritime Strategy, but now in a manner that brought together not only academics, pundits, and military retirees, but also serving naval professionals. By 1987, the uniformed naval officer corps once again, as in the days of Alfred Thayer Mahan or of the pre-World War II War Plan Orange, had captured the high ground and catalyzed thinking about the Navy's role in national an alliance strategy.

"Aircraft Carriers Use Technology, speed to Stage Vanishing Acts on High Seas," Baltimore Sun, August 17, 1986, p 16. Discusses U.S. Navy countermeasures to Soviet intelligence and targeting at sea, a key element in carrying out the Maritime Strategy.

Archer, Clive and Scrivener, David (eds), Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues, Totowa NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1986. A series of survey papers focusing on the Norwegian Sea. See especially Geoffrey Till on Strategy, David Hobbs on Military Technology, and Steven Miller on Reagan Administration Strategy. The Miller piece is essentially an update of his 1983 paper, cited in Section I above.

** Ausland, John C., Nordic Security and the Great Powers, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. Comprehensive and detailed treatment of the

Maritime Strategy in peace and war within the overall context of Nordic military security. See especially Chapter 20, "The Battle for the Norwegian Sea," the author's "climax."

** Ausland, John, "The Silence on Naval Nuclear Arms Should Be Broken," International Herald Tribune, March 12, 1986, p 25. A critical look at naval theater nuclear weapons and war fare and the Maritime Strategy.

Bagley, Adm. Worth H., USN (Ret.), "U.S. Military Power in the Pacific: Problems and Prospects," in International Security Council, National Security in Northeast Asia, New York: CAUSA Publication, April 13-15, 1986. Reverses the usual argument by treating NATO as a "second front threat" diverting the Soviets from the Far East.

** "Bridge Over Troubled Waters," Defense and Foreign Affairs, May 1986, pp 38-9. On the U.S. Navy's efforts to link technology and weapons acquisition to the Maritime Strategy.

** Brooks, Capt. Linton, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," International Security, Fall 1986, pp 58-87. One of the Strategy's contributors definitively expands on its basic elements and on its rationale. Especially useful in discussing the rationale for anti-SSBN operations and the Strategy's inherent uncertainties, integral aspects of the Maritime Strategy often slighted in public official U.S. Navy discussions.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan: The Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.—Soviet Contest, Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986. Views role of the Navy as one of "Sea Control" and projecting American power into "distant local conflicts," rather than carrier strikes on "Soviet home ports" or "strategic nuclear warfare." See pp 183-4, 191-2.

Bunting, Glenn F., "Navy Warms up to Idea of Presence in Cold Bering Sea," Los Angeles Times, August 31, 1986, p 3. Maritime Strategy as reflected in increased U.S. Navy peacetime North Pacific presence.

Canby, Steven L., "South Korea's Defense Requires U.S. Air Power, Not Troops," Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1986, p 24. Sees limited utility of Pacific Fleet carriers in a war with the Soviets. Advocates naval force level cuts.

Chicago Tribune, February 1, 1986, "The 600-Ship Mistake," p 3. Worn out argument that the Navy is building the "wrong" fleet for the "wrong" problem, and should concentrate instead on building "cheap" diesel submarine for offsetting the Soviet Union's 3:1 underwater advantage.

Clancy, Tom, Red Storm Rising, New York: Putnam, 1986. Fiction. Wartime Maritime Strategy implemented under drastically changed assumptions, some plausible and some fanciful, to suit the storyteller's needs. Soviet fear of global forward pressure leads to pre-emptive seizure of Iceland, SSN surge to the Atlantic, but operations are somehow limited to Central and Northern Europe only. Inherent flexibility and lethality enables NATO navies to adapt rapidly and successfully, but with heavy losses. In this vein, see reviews by Capt. David G. Clark in Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 139-141, and Adm Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.) in Proceedings, March 1987, p 164. Cf Hackett and McGeorch et al, The Third World War: The Untold Story, cited in Section V below; and Hayes et al, American Lake, below, Chapter 19, which addresses the Pacific in a hypothetical global war, although probably not in a manner in which Capt. Clark or Adm. Hayward would agree.

Cohen, Eliott A., "Do We Still Need Europe?" Commentary, January 1986, pp 28-35. A Naval War College faculty member views NATO flanks and the Far East as of increasing importance. Sees little utility in discussions of stark strategic alternatives, e.g. "Europe vs. the Pacific, going it alone vs. having allies, keeping resolutely to the sea vs. preparing to engage the Red Army on the continent.

Connell, John, The New Maginot Line, New York: Arbor House, 1986, pp 71-81. Another journalist, this time British, for whom the strategy debate is largely between Secretary Lehman and Ambassador Komer, and solely driven by budgetary considerations. Arguments totally derivative from other journalists. It would have been news four years earlier.

* Cropsey, Seth, "Forward Defense or Maginot Line? The Maritime Strategy and its Alternatives," Policy Review, Fall 1986, pp 40- 46. An excellent restatement of the Navy's arguments by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. Particularly useful on the historical background of the Maritime Strategy.

Daniel, Donald C., Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability, Champagne IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986. An excellent survey by a Naval War College faculty member. Concludes that "It seem(s) implausible the U.S. could so reduce the number of Soviet SSBNs that the U.S.S.R. might be pushed into using the remainder." See especially pp 151-157.

** Defense Choices: Greater Security with Fewer Dollars, Washington: Committee for National Security, 1986. The Committee's annual attack on the Maritime Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy. "There is no need to ask the U.S. Fleet to take on high risk missions close to Soviet shores." Advocates a "return to a more sensible naval strategy."

Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document. This study achieved a certain notoriety due to its endorsement by Dr. Larry Korb, a former Reagan Administration defense official and earlier advocate of a 600-ship Navy.

* Demars, V.Adm. Bruce, "The U.S. Submarine Force," Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 18-30 and "Speech at the Submarine Symposium, Lima, Peru," Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 5-12. By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare. See especially pp 20-21 of the former and 8-11 of the latter on the role of U.S. and allied submarines in the Maritime Strategy: "We dare not go it alone."

** Doerr, Capt. P.J., "CWC Revisited," Proceedings, April 1986, pp 39-43. Organizing the Battle Force to implement the Maritime Strategy. Contrast with Capt. Powers' October 1985 Proceedings views.

** "Dossier: U.S. Report," Naval Forces, VI/1986, p 132. Alleges there is current "indecision about what a U.S. Maritime Strategy should comprise. A remarkable piece of reportage for October 1986, there's always 10 percent who don't get the word.

** Drury, F., "Naval Strike Warfare and the Outer Air Battle," Naval Forces, IV/1986, pp 46-52. Sees the Maritime Strategy as merging the two concepts, which he feels had grown apart, into one coherent plan to defeat the Soviet air threat.

Elliott, Frank, "Exon Says Maritime Plan Could Trigger War," Defense Week, December 8, 1986, p 16. Senator Exon opposes the anti-SSBN aspects of the maritime Strategy. "There are good elements in that strategy, but much of it concerns me."

** Epstein, Joshua M., The 1987 Defense Budget, Washington: Brookings, 1986. Brookings' annual attach on the Maritime Strategy. Pp 13, 41-45 and 55-58 reject the Maritime Strategy as "inefficient and potentially escalatory: and recommend U.S. Navy force posture cuts accordingly. Sees defense of Norway as not requiring significant U.S. naval forces. Arguments derived from Kaufmann, Komer, Posen, and the Congressional Budget Office. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, a purely budget-driven document.

** Fouquet, David, "NATO Soldiers March Into Autumn, Testing Tactics, Equipment, Systems," Defense News, September 15, 1986, p 14. The Allies test the Maritime Strategy on the Northern Front.

** Friedman, Norman, "U.S. Strategy and ASW," Jane's Defense Weekly, November 19, 1986, pp 1269-1277. An update of Dr. Friedman's thought on the Maritime Strategy, ASW, and the SSN-21.

** Gordon, Michael R., "Officials say Navy Might Attack Soviet A-Arms in Nonnuclear War," New York Times, January 7, 1986, p 1. See also (New York) Daily News, January 8, 1986, p C-10; The Oregonian, January 9, 1986, p C10; Los Angeles Times, January 10, 1986, p 4; Boston Globe, January 11, 1986; New York Times, January 12, 1986, p E-1; and The Times (London), February 26, 1986. Initial press comment on publication of "The Maritime Strategy" by the Naval Institute. Ignores all strategy issues except the anti-SSBN operations debate.

* Gray, Colin S., "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked: Geostrategy for a Maritime America," The National Interest, Summer 1986, pp 24-36. Masterful discussion of the relationships between geopolitics and the Maritime Strategy.

** Gray, Colin S., Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West, New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1986. An extension of his classic 1977 work on geopolitics, focusing on implications for U.S. national military strategy. The footnotes include some excellent rebuttals to the arguments of Ambassador Komer. A new classic.

** Gray, Colin, "Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, February 1986, pp 34-42. Supportive commentary by a top-ranked civilian geopolitician and strategist. Especially helpful in untangling arguments regarding "horizontal escalation."

Greeley, Brendan M., Jr., "Third fleet Increases North Pacific Operations to Counter Soviet Activity," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 22, 1986, pp 28-29. On V.Adm. Diego Hernandez and the Third Fleet North Pacific buildup, especially joint and allied coordination.

** Halloran, Richard, "A Silent Battle Surfaces," New York Times Magazine, December 7, 1986, pp 60, 94-97. On the anti-submarine warfare component of the Maritime Strategy.

Hampton, L.Cdr. J. P., "Integrated Air Defense for NATO," Proceedings, September 1986, pp 114-116. On integrating U.S. Navy carrier battle groups with U.S. and allied air force aircraft to counter the Soviet air threat on the NATO Southern Front: an essential component of the maritime Strategy too often overshadowed in the public debate by discussion of the Northwest Pacific and especially the Norwegian Sea.

** Hart, Senator Gary, with Lind, William S., America Can Win: The Case for Military Reform, Bethesda MD: Adler & Adler, 1986, pp 77-81. Criticizes the Maritime Strategy for its linkages to the land war in Europe, its early forward focus, and its relationship to current force

structure. Major concern, however, seems to be with the semantics of the term "Maritime Strategy."

** Hayes, Peter, Zarsky, Lyuba, and Bello, Walden, American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific, New York: Penguin, 1986. Thorough and extensive analysis of the Maritime Strategy and much else, but in a shrill, leftist, Australian context. See especially Chapters 8 and 16, and Chapter 19, a fictional scenario. They understand that "What appeared a mere budget battle was in fact a conflict over military strategy."

Hinge, Lt. A., RAN, "The Strategic Balance in the Asia-Pacific Region: Naval Aspects," Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, August 1986, pp 31-50. Poses important questions regarding USN force posture requirements in each oceanic theater, and potential naval roles of Pacific allies, China, and ASEAN. Very sanguine regarding Western maritime superiority in the Pacific.

* Huges, V.Adm. Thomas J., Jr., "Logistics Became Legitimate," Sea Power, May 1986, pp 17-24, especially p 22. By the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics. "The logistics of the Navy are matched to our maritime strategy."

Hughes, Capt. Wayne P., Jr., USN (Ret.), Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. By a Naval Postgraduate School faculty member. Shot through with important insights on naval strategy and its relationship to tactics. See especially Chapter 1 on the relationship between war at sea and war ashore, and Chapter 9 on the relationship between peacetime and wartime naval missions.

Isherwood, Julien, "Russia Warns Oslo on U.S. Base," Daily Telegraph, August 13, 1986. Cites major Soviet propaganda offensive against forward battle group operations in the Norwegian Sea, the so called "Lehman Doctrine."

* Jervell, Sverre and Nyblom, Kare (eds.), The Military Buildup in ** the High North: American and Nordic Perspectives, Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1986. 1985 Harvard conference. Eliot Cohen, Robert Weinland, Barry Posen, V.Adm. Henry Mustin and a number of distinguished British and Nordic officials, military officers, and thinkers debate the Maritime Strategy and much else.

Kaufmann, William W., A Reasonable Defense, Washington: Brookings, 1986, especially pp 72-92. Kaufmann's annual attack on his own highly personal interpretation of the Maritime Strategy, ceding the Mediterranean totally to indigenous allied naval forces but sailing a major fleet into the Indian Ocean. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely aimed at influencing legislative budgetary decisions.

* Kelley, Gen. P.X., "The United States Marine Corps Today," Sea Power, April 1986, pp 82-97. See especially pp 83-86 for an overview of the Maritime Strategy from the Commandant of the Marine Corps perspective.

Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "New NE Asian Geography?", Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 91-92. An extreme view of the role of Pacific operations. Calls for a North Pacific Maritime Strategy to split the Soviet Far East from the rest of the country at the Urals.

Landersman, Capt. S.D., USN (Ret.), "Naval Protection of Shipping: A Lost Art?" Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 23-34. By a member of the initial U.S. Navy Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Excellent critique of U.S. Navy attitudes and practices regarding Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) as well as Naval Protection of Shipping (NPS), essential but too-little-discussed aspects of the Maritime Strategy which are often overshadowed by discussion of concomitant forward operations. See also his "I am a...Convoy Commodore," Proceedings, June 1986, pp 56-63.

** Lapham, Lewis H., "Notebook: Pictures at an Exhibition," Harper's, March 1986, pp 8-9. A bizarre, overwritten exposition on the Maritime Strategy as propaganda and the U.S. Navy as incompetent.

* Lehman, Hon. John F., Jr., Maritime Strategy in the Defense of NATO, Washington: CSIS, September 25, 1986. His 1986 views: "No maritime strategy can be a successful strategy without an effective land deterrent on the continent of Europe. The forward strategy articulated by the Reagan administration is, in fact, orthodoxy of the oldest sort, conforming precisely to NATO alliance doctrine. In summary, we have a maritime strategy in the defense of NATO that is universally accepted by the maritime forces of Europe and the United States."

* Lehman, John F., "The U.S. Secretary of the Navy: Towards the 600-Ship Fleet," Naval Forces, No. 1/1986, pp 14-23. Update of Lehman's thought.

Liska, George, "From containment to Concert," Foreign Policy, Spring 1986, pp 3-23, and "Concert Through Decompression," Summer 1986, pp 108-129. U.S./Soviet rivalry seen as "fed primarily by its own momentum and, at bottom, by the timeless asymmetry between land and sea powers." Argues, however, for a "land-sea power concert" by the two. "The salience of sea-over land-based power has diminished as the principal maritime power finds it increasingly difficult to maintain clear naval superiority."

* "Maritime Strategy Seminar," Proceedings, August 1986, pp 8-**10. Former SACLANT/CINCLANT Adm. Wesley McDonald, former Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Bing West, and then-U.S. Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander V.Adm. Henry Mustin debate the Maritime Strategy. For more details, see the excellent Maritime Strategy Seminar Transcript, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1986.

** Mather, Ian, "NATO Row Over Boundary Shift," Sunday London Observer, June 16, 1986. Sees Secretary of Defense Weinberger's call for an expanded NATO reach beyond Europe as derived from the Maritime Strategy.

* Matthews, William, "Marines Would Storm by Air, Not Sea if NATO Attacked," Navy Times, December 1, 1986. Despite the misleading headline, an otherwise generally accurate rendering of the views of the principal USMC global strategist, B. Gen. Michael Sheridan, on the role of the Marines in North Norway as part of the Maritime Strategy.

** Mearsheimer, John, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International Security, Fall 1986, pp 3-57. Despite its biases, distortions, and misleading discussions of the development of the Maritime Strategy over time, probably the most important piece of writing critical of the Strategy to date. Faults the Maritime Strategy for its "elastic quality," actually regarded by U.S. naval officers as one of its great deterrent and warfighting strengths. This West Point graduate and former U.S. Air Force officer's bottom line: "The key to deterrence is not the Navy, but the forces that will be fighting on the Central Front. Those forces would be given first priority when deciding how to allocate defense budgets."

* "Message to Moscow: Be My Guest," The Navy," Newsweek, February 3, 1986, pp 16-17. V.Adm. Henry C. Mustin on U.S. Second Fleet implementation of the Maritime Strategy.

** Morring, Frank, Jr., "Navy Chief: 'Forward Defense' Doesn't Mean Kamakazi Missions," Nashua (NH) Telegraph, November 26, 1986. First reported public discussion of the Maritime Strategy by the new CNO, Adm. Carlisle Trost, with a critique by Brookings Institute researcher Joshua Epstein.

* Mustin, V.Adm. Hebry C., "Maritime Strategy from the Deckplates," Proceedings, September 1986, pp 33-37. U.S. Navy Second Fleet/NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander's positive views on the utility of the Maritime Strategy to an operational commander. See also "Comment and Discussion," November 1986, p 14.

* Mustin, V.Adm. Henry C., "The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea," Naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 2-6. The NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic Commander on U.S. and NATO Maritime Strategy in the Norwegian Sea. See also "In My View...," Autumn 1986, pp 101-2.

** O'Neil, W.D., Capt., USNR, "Executing the Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1986, pp 39-42. Argues that Soviet technological strides in submarine quieting, anti- submarine warfare, and air defenses will make the execution of an anti-SSBN bastion offensive increasingly difficult. The "solution" for the U.S. Navy, concludes the author, will lie especially with the further development of "stealth" technologies.

O'Rourke, Ronald, "Tomakhawk: The U.S. Navy's New Option," Navy International, July 1986, pp 394-398. Good coverage of the benefits and problems associated with integrating sea-launched cruise missiles into the Maritime Strategy.

** O'Shea, James, "U.S. Sink Billions into New Attack Sub," Chicago Tribune, July 20, 1986, p 1. On the role of the SSN-21 Seawolf in the future Maritime Strategy.

** "Ocean Safari '85: Meeting the Threat in the North Atlantic," All Hands, January 1986, pp 20-29. Publicizes close-in convoy defense, coastal defense, and mine countermeasures aspects of the strategy, as well as strike warfare and tactical innovations.

Oliver, James R. and Nathan, James A. "Concepts, Continuity and Change," in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed), The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 1-22. See Reagan Administration naval strategy and force planning as derived essentially from concepts and goals developed by the Navy in the late 1970s.

Parry, Don, "U.S. Navy's Role in Space," Navy International, August 1986, p 477. Quotes Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for C^3 and Space Ann Berman on the role of space in the Maritime Strategy.

* Pendley, R.Adm. William, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, June 1986, pp 84-89. This ostensible response to an earlier "Comment and Discussion" item is actually an important official amplification of the Maritime Strategy by the 1985-86 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist.

** Polmar, Norman, "600 Ships-Plus or Minus?," Proceedings, August 1986, pp 107-108. The author's views on the relationship between the Strategy and the 600-Ship Navy force level goals. "While

some would argue with specific components of both the strategy and the ships that Lehman seeks, it is a coherent and long-term plan... one that Congress has long demanded from the Navy and the other services."

** Polmar, Norman, "The Soviet Navy: Nuclear War at Sea," Proceedings, July 1986, pp 111-113. See also "Comment and Discussion," Proceedings , September 1986, p 90. "The Maritime Strategy must be challenged for its lack of definition in how we are to deter nuclear war at sea."

** Reed, Fred, "Soldiering: Navy's Sensitivity Works Against It," Washington Times, March 27, 1986, p 2. Criticizes U.S. Navy explanations of the strategy as lacking in "strategic substance," a rather ironic criticism given the author's own arguments.

"Rust to Riches: The Navy is Back," U.S. News and World Report, August 4, 1986, pp 28-37. SECNAV John Lehman's influence on naval strategy seen as paramount.

Ryan, Capt T.D., "SUBDEVRON TWELVE: In the Global War Games," Submarine Review, July 1986, pp 39-40. Good examples of uses of Naval War College Global War Games to test the Maritime Strategy and to identify problems needing new technological and tactical solutions.

* "Sailing the Cold Seas," Surface Warfare, May-June 1986, pp 6-8. On the steps being examined and taken to increase U.S. Navy ability to operate in northern latitudes as required by the Maritime Strategy.

* Samuel, Peter, "State Dept., Navy Agree on Opening Pacific Front in
** Case of War in Europe," New York City Tribune, June 23, 1986, p 1. State Department's Director of Policy Planning espouses views congruent with the Maritime Strategy, especially regarding global nature of war with the Soviet Union and early anti-submarine operations. For an updated version of these views, see Solomon 1987 article cited below. See also Bedard, Paul, "Pacific Waters Boil With American and Soviet Warships," Defense Week, June 23, 1986, p 1; and Elliott, Frank, "U.S. Looks to Pacific Fleet to Help Europe" and "Soviet Power Grows," Navy Times, July 7, 1986, pp 29 & 32.

* Schoultz, V.Adm. Robert F., "Strikefleet: Cost-Effective Power," Armed Forces, October 1986, pp 446-448. Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe and former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare on the role of the Carrier Battle Group in Maritime Strategy.

Smith, Lee, "How the Pentagon Can Live On Less," Fortune, July 21, 1986, pp 78-85. See especially p 87. Fortune and ex-Reagan

Administration official Richard DeLauer oppose as misguided the "Lehman developed forward strategy," construed as carrier strikes on Murmansk, Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk. For more on DeLauer's negative views, see "Interview: Richard DeLauer on Defense," Technology Review, July 1986, pp 58-67.

** Stefanick, Tom A., "America's Maritime Strategy—The Arms Control Implications," Arms Control Today, December 1986, pp 10-17. Appears to favor the Maritime Strategy more than he did in July. "The implicit threat to Soviet ballistic missile submarines during a conventional naval conflict would be likely to yield an advantage to the U.S. Navy in the conventional balance at sea...The likelihood of widespread escalation of the use of nuclear weapons as a direct result of threats or even attacks on Soviet SSBNs in their home waters appears to be low."

** Stefanick, Tom, "Attacking the Soviet Sea Based Deterrent: Clever Feint or Foolhardy Maneuver?", F.A.S. Public Interest Report, June-July 1986, pp 1-10. The author seems to lean more to the "foolhardy maneuver" persuasion. "The U.S. must reduce the current emphasis on submarine operations in waters heavily defended by the Soviet Union." But cf his December article, below.

* "Surface Warfare: What Does The Future Hold?" Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series Transcript, February 12, 1986, pp 19-20. R.Adm. Dennis Brooks, COMCARGRU 7, on the Maritime Strategy. Another Admiral whom Stansfield Turner never met.

** Tellis, Ashley J., "The Soviet Navy, Central America and the Atlantic Alliance," Naval Forces, IV,1986, pp 54-60. Endorse the Maritime Strategy for its geopolitical logic, especially regarding forward operations.

* "The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy," Proceedings, December 1986,
** pp 11-12. The Director of U.S. Navy Attack Submarine Programs, the Naval War College Professor of Submarine Warfare, and two noted civilian naval analysts debate the role of the U.S. submarine force in the Maritime Strategy. For more than this brief summary, see "The Future Mix of Subs and Strategy," Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Professional Seminar Series, September 25, 1986.

** "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave," The Economist, April 19, 1986, pp 49-65. Strategy and programs.

** Train, Adm. Harry, USN (Ret.), "Seapower and Projection Forces," in American Defense Annual, 1986-1987, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1986, pp 128-129. This former Sixth Fleet and Atlantic Theater Commander updates his views on the Maritime Strategy. Book also

contains routine arguments by Ambassador Komer. More detailed and controversial views by Adm. Train can be found in George, James L. (ed), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986, pp 283-287.

** Truver, Scott C., "Can We Afford The 15-Carrier Battle Group Navy?", Armed Forces Journal International, July 1986, pp 74-81. On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy and carrier force levels.

* U. S. House of Representative, Committee on Appropriations, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriations for 1987: Part 1, February 26, 1986, pp 500-504 and 547-550. Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman respond to congressional questioning by Rep. Les AuCoin on the Maritime Strategy. "The decision to go after an SSBN in time of conflict would be a presidential decision."

* U. S. Navy Appears to Expand Operations in Pacific Ocean," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 17, 1986, pp 1474-1475. Interview with V. Adm. Hernandez on new peacetime measures to more successfully deter war or, should deterrence fail, conduct wartime operations in the North Pacific in accordance with the Maritime Strategy.

** "U.S. Maritime Strategy for the 1980s," Security Digest, The Wilson Center, November 1986. Capt. Linton Brooks and Prof. John Mearsheimer debate the Maritime Strategy.

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Part 1, February 5, 1986, Washington: USGPO, 1986, pp 82-83. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify on the budget and, in response to questioning from Senator Nunn, on anti-SSBN operations. A key Maritime Strategy element enunciated by the highest Defense Department officials. See also Wilson, George C. and Weisskopf, Michael, "Pentagon Plan Coldly Received," Washington Post, February 6, 1986, p A14; Weinberger, Caspar, "U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986, p 695; and Andrews, Walter, "Weinberger Warns of 'Hollow Strategy,'", Washington Times, July 30, 1986, p 4.

** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Precept for Tomorrow: A Busy Agenda Awaits the Next CNO," Sea Power, May 1986, pp 48-51. Sees a need for the new Chief of Naval Operations to examine the future maritime environment as well as the reactions of U.S. and foreign political and military leaders to the Maritime Strategy.

** Watkins, Adm. James D., "Laurels, Accomplishments, and Violent Peace," Sea Power, April 1986, pp 6-20. See especially pp 9-10, on the rationale for publishing the Maritime Strategy.

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "Power Projection—Maritime Forces Making a Strategic Difference," NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 102-106. CNO discusses Maritime Strategy within a NATO context. N.B. This annual special issue contains articles signed by most of NATO's naval chiefs.

* Watkins, Adm. James D., "The Maritime Strategy," Kelley, Gen. **P. X., and O'Donnell, Maj. Hugh, "Amphibious Warfare Strategy," and Lehman, John F., Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy," Proceedings, January 1986 "The Maritime Strategy" Supplement. Also "Comment and Discussion," February 1986, pp 26-28; March 1986, pp 18-21 by Col. John Collins USA (Ret.) raises 20 questions; May 1986, p 25; June 1986, p 83 questions nuclear aspects of the strategy; and pp 84-89, by R.Adm. William Pendley answers Collins' questions and elaborates on the strategy; July 1986, pp 24-27, posits significant Soviet forward submarine operations; August 1986, p 10, still more questions from the insatiable Col. Collins; January 1987, pp 25-30, argues for new role for PHMs in the Maritime Strategy; and April 1987, pp 22-27, another response to Col. Collins by the indefatigable R.Adm. Pendley.

* Weinberger, Casper, "The Spirit and Meaning of the USS Theodore Roosevelt," Defense Issues, Vol 1 No 76, November 24, 986. The Maritime Strategy as a component of national military strategy by the Secretary of Defense. 'The greatest value of President Reagan's maritime strategy is that it focuses on the crucial issue of how we can best use our maritime forces and those of our allies to achieve the basic goal of deterrence, and deny the adversary his preferred warfighting strategy." Summarized in Wilson, George, "USS Theodore Roosevelt Joins Active Service as 15th Carrier," Washington Post, October 26, 1986, p A21; and Mathews, William, "Carrrier Theodore Roosevelt 'Charges' to Life," Navy Times, November 10, 1986, pp 33 & 37.

** West, Francis J., Jr., et al., Naval Forces and Western Security, Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986. Contains two essays: "U.S. Naval Forces and NATO Planning" by West, pp 1-9; and "NATO's Maritime Defenses" by Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, R.Adm. Robert J. Janks USN (Ret.) and Charles M. Perry, pp 10-53. West restates his 1985 Proceedings article assertion that there is a profound divergence between U.S. and West European prespective, on the purpose and potential contribution of naval forces in NATO contingency planning, although it is sometimes difficult to understand *which* Americans and Europeans he is talking about.

The other essay offers an overview of current issues regarding the role of naval forces in NATO strategy.

** Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay," Navy International, May 1986, pp 304-308. Endorsement of the Maritime Strategy by a prominent British naval affairs writer. Questions, however, whether SLOC interdiction remains as low a Soviet priority under Adm. Chernavin as it did under Adm Gorshkov.

Williams., Cdr. E. Cameron, USNR, "The Four 'Iron Laws' of Naval Protection of Merchant Shipping," Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 35-42. An argument for convoying. Sees the SLOC protection debate as between convoying and "sanitized lanes." Oblivious, however, to the debate between either or both of these options and forward defense, the more topical issue. See also "In My View," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp 108-109, and Spring 1987, pp 91-92.

** Winkler, Philippa, "A Dangerous Shift in Naval Strategy," Oakland Tribune, July 7, 1986. Decries the Navy's "forward offensive strategy" for going "beyond legitimate defense purposes."

** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Topgun: Getting It Right," Proceedings, October 1986, pp 141-146. The Navy Fighter Weapons School seen as a key contributor to the Maritime Strategy's execution, by the School's training officer, one of the new generation of naval officers for whom the Maritime Strategy is truly the cornerstone of his profession.

** Wood, Robert and Hanley, John, "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Summer 1986, pp 133-144. Latest incarnation of this oft reprinted article by two Naval War College faculty members.

** Wood, Robert S., "Maritime Strategy for War in the North," Journal of Defense & Diplomacy, September 1986, pp 17-20. Portrays the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy as a conventional long-war alternative to NATO's avowed reliance to early recourse to nuclear weapons.

III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES: 1987 AND BEYOND

The first half of 1987 saw the Maritime Strategy firmly in place as an acknowledged vital element of U.S. and allied military strategy. President Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Defense Secretary Taft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Crowe, all publicly cited its importance and utility. Likewise, James H. Webb, Jr. (John Lehman's successor as SECNAV), Admiral Carlisle Trost (Admiral Watkins' successor as CNO), and a number of other top flag officers provided numerous examples of the extent to which it had become the common strategic framework of the naval leadership. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon was, however, the July 1987 issue of the Proceedings. Therein, the Maritime Strategy formed the baseline for a wide range of discussions of specific U.S. and allied peacekeeping and warfighting issues: by active duty U.S. Navy junior officers, senior officers, and admirals; by naval aviators, surface warfare officers, submariners and a Marine; and by officers concerned with inter-allied relations, regional strategic objectives, fleet operations, and weapons system employment and development.

** "Analysis: U.S. Carriers," RUSI, March 1987, pp 1+2. Drags out yet again the false choice between a Continental or Maritime Strategy as an issue. Claims West Germany "would object strongly if moves were made to convert the Maritime Strategy into the U.S.'s general war strategy." It is, in part, and they haven't at all. Cf Bonn's actual White Paper 1985, cited in Section V below.

Arkin, William, A., "Our Risky Naval Strategy Could Get Us All Killed," Washington Post, July 3, 1988, p C-1. A "sampling" of recent U.S. Navy exercises that Arkin claims "prove" the deliberately provocative nature of the Navy's maritime strategy. He concludes with a call for an investigation of the Navy's "practices and strategies (that) threaten international peace in a way that land-based military activity does not."

Arkin, William, "Troubled Waters: The Navy's Aggressive War Strategy," Technology Review, January 1989, pp 54-63. Contrary to appearances, charges Arkin, the Navy has not abandoned its "actual war plans" which, he says, are "belligerent, dangerously ambiguous," the "most likely avenue for escalation all the way to nuclear war," and too "provocative" and "de-stabilizing" to be left to an "intransigent naval bureaucracy." Arkin proposes that maritime strategy be replaced with an all-encompassing arms control strategy that, if consummated, would, in fact, relegate the U.S. Navy to a chapter in history.

** Baer, George W., Manila Bay to the Norwegian Sea: Dimensions of U.S. Naval Strategy Since 1890 (forthcoming in 1988). By a Naval War College faculty member.

** Barnett, Capt. Roger W., USN (Ret.), "The Maritime Continental Debate Isn't Over," Proceedings, June 1987, pp 28-34. Still more on the two famous alleged "mindsets," by one of the most prominent crafters of the Maritime Strategy. Also, see "Comment and Discussion," August 1987, p 30.

** Barnett, Capt. Roger, USN (Ret.), Bernstein, Alvin, and Gray, Colin (eds.), Maritime Strategy: A Textbook (forthcoming in 1987). Collaboration by a former pre-eminent U.S. Navy strategist, a Naval War College Strategy Department head and a distinguished civilian strategic thinker.

** Barnett, Roger W., "U.S. Maritime Strategy: Sound and Safe," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1987, pp 30-33. Written as a contribution to the Bulletin's special issue on "Superpower Arms Race at Sea," this is one of the best *strategic* explanations of the maritime strategy. Barnett makes the point that the maritime strategy's principal value is its contribution to the *deterrence* of Soviet-initiated war. The maritime strategy's value as a deterrent, he explains, rests with its escalatory *options*—vertical, horizontal, or temporal. Barnett points out that the maritime strategy addresses coalition warfare against the Soviet Union, and not "other conflict possibilities or adversaries."

** Beatty, Jack, "In Harm's Way," The Atlantic, May 1987, pp 37-53. Having listened to naval leaders and to college professors, Beatty sides with the college professors. His criticisms, however, place beside Theo Rudnak's sensationalist artwork. See also August 1987, pp 6-10, for retorts by Norman Friedman, Richard Best, Mark Jordan, Bing West and Colin Gray, and a final rejoinder by Beatty, who apparently believes the Maritime Strategy calls for carrier operations in the Black Sea.

** Bennett, Charles E., "The Maritime Strategy" in "Comment and Discussion," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1988, pp 91-92. A spirited rebuttal by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee's Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee to key critics of the maritime strategy, including Mearsheimer, Gould, and Beatty. Rejects their arguments that (a) the 600-ship fleet is being built at the expense of Army and Air Force needs in the NATO area, (b) a "static" defense of the North Atlantic is preferable to a forward offensive, and (c) war can be won with a defensive strategy. The Navy's failure to prepare against mines in the Persian Gulf is blamed on "leadership, either in the White House or in the Pentagon," not the Maritime Strategy.

** Best, Richard, "Will JCS Reform Endanger the Maritime Strategy?" National Defense: February 1987, pp 26-30. "The passage of JCS reform will provide a future administration with a handle on defense

policy that will allow it to override previous strategic conceptions, including the Navy's maritime strategy, (which) will come under heavy criticism by those using arguments derived from the approach of the systems analysts." Best decries this since "only the Navy has thought through the implications of the continuum of operations in a way which will not cause civilian populations to shrink in horror."

Bliss, Elsie, "Fleet Hardening: Responding to the Nuclear Threat," All Hands, April 1987, pp 30-31. On USN efforts to "harden" its ships, aircraft, and equipment against nuclear attack.

** Brooks, Capt. Linton, "Conflict Termination Through Maritime Leverage," in Cimbala, Steven and Dunn, Keith (eds.), Conflict termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War, Boulder CO: Westview, 1987. Actually written a year before his 1986 International Security article, for a 1985 Naval War College conference on war termination.

** Brooks, Capt. Linton, "The Nuclear Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, April 1987 pp 33-39. A major contributor to the Maritime Strategy thinks it through under the highly unlikely conditions of nuclear war at sea. An important and prize-winning essay. See also "Comment and Discussion," May 1987, pp 14, 17, and August 1987, pp 27-28.

Brooks, Linton F., Capt. USN, and Miller, Franklin, C., "Nuclear Weapons at Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1988, pp 41-45. A thoughtful analysis of the political and military value to the U.S. Navy and its strategy of (non-SLBM) nuclear weapons. Brooks and Miller conclude that, although the deterrent value of naval capabilities in and of themselves is small, the Navy must retain at least *selected* nuclear warfare area (e.g., ASW, AAW) assets in order to: (a) influence the Soviet pre-war calculation of the correlation of forces, and (b) shore up its war-fighting capabilities. In any event, report the authors, strong nuclear forces are an important ingredient in international perceptions of military power.

** Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1988, "Maritime Strategy Submerges," p 55. Claims that budget cuts and public criticism have forced the U.S. Navy to lower the profile of its forward operations in the northern Pacific and Atlantic, and emphasize the use of submarines in place of carrier battlegroups.

Byron, John L., Capt. USN, "No Quarter for Their Boomers." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1989, pp 49-52. The author reiterates the deterrence value and war-fighting importance of placing the Soviet SSBNs at risk, but recommends against committing more than a fraction of the U.S. SSN fleet to this purpose. An American assault on the Soviet SSBN bastions, says Byron,

should have the appearance of an "apparently large" strategic ASW campaign, yet holds back most of the SSNs for other missions.

** Caldwell, Hamlin A., Jr., "A Flaw in the U.S. Maritime Strategy," National Defense, July/August 1987, pp 48-51. A sharp critique of plans to carry out offensive SSN operations in Soviet "bastion" waters. Calling the idea a possible "blueprint for disaster," Caldwell enumerates what he believes are the Soviet submarine fleet's important tactical and logistical advantages in home waters. He concludes that a "more realistic opening move must be selected that insures that U.S. naval power would truly influence the outcome of any war with the Soviet Union."

** Cimbala, Stephen J., Extended Deterrence: The U.S. and NATO Europe, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books (forthcoming in 1987). Has a thoughtful chapter on the Maritime Strategy and the Defense of Europe.

* Connors, L.Cdr. Tracy, "Northern Wedding '86," All Hands, January 1987, pp 18-26. See also "Cape Wrath Feels Iowa's Fury," "Nimitz and Northern Wedding," and "Alaska," in same issue. V.Adm. Charles R. Larson, Commander Strikign Fleet Atlantic: "We went north to test tactics designed to support NATO's maritime strategy of forward defense. I am proud to report those tactics worked."

** Cross, Lt. Col. Michael J., USMC, "No More Carrier Debates, Please," Proceedings, April 1987, pp 79-81. Relates the Maritime Strategy's requirements to the CVN-CVV debate.

* Crowe, Adm. William J., "Statement on National Security Strategy," U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-Hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security-Strategy, January 21, 1987, Washington: USGPO, 1987 (forthcoming). Solid concurrence in the Maritime Strategy by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "In recent years we have benefited from some excellent conceptual thinking by the Navy about global maritime strategy—how to phase operations in a transition from peace to war, clear the way of submarines opposing military resupply or reinforcement shipping and use our carrier battle groups for either offensive strikes or in direct support of such allies as Japan, Norway, Greece and Turkey. It is imperative, of course, to fold these concepts into our larger military strategy and that is exactly what we are doing."

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** Cushman, John H., Jr., "A Dialogue: What King of Navy Does the U.S. Need?" New York Times, May 31, 1987, p 4-3. V.Adm. Joseph Metcalf III vs. Dr. William W. Kaufmann on the Maritime Strategy and other naval issues.

** Cushman, John H., Jr., "Navy Warns of Crisis in Anti-Submarine Ware," New York Times, March 19, 1987, p 19, Outgoing Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Engineering and Systems Melvyn Paisley on need for increased Navy ASW research: "We are faced with a crisis in our anti-submarine warfare capability which undermines our ability to execute maritime strategy." For context, however, see actual Paisley statements before congressional committees, 1987.

** Daggett, Stephen and Husbands, Jo L., Achieving an Affordable Defense: A Military Strategy to Guide Military Spending, Washington: Committee for National Security, March 10, 1987. The annual CNS attack, using the usual W.W. Kaufmann "data" and arguments. Unlike the Maritime Strategy, solely designed to influence the U.S. legislative budget process. A summary is in Korb, Lawrence J. and Daggett, Stephen, "A 15-Carrier Navy: Is it Really Necessary?" Defense News, March 30, 1987, p 27, reprinted as "15 Carrier Navy Leaves Forces Out of Balance," Navy Times, April 6, 1987, p 32, and criticized by R.C. Mandeville in "Experts Only," Navy Times, April 27, 1987, p 22.

** Daniel, Donald and Wood, Robert, Presuppositions of the Maritime Strategy, Elmsford, NY: Pergamon-Brassey's (forthcoming in 1987). By two Naval War College faculty members.

Daniel, Donald C., "The Future of Strategic ASW," Paper presented at the Dalhousie University Conference on "The Undersea Dimension of Maritime Strategy," Halifax, N.S., Canada, June 24, 1989. One of the most respected American commentators on the subject of strategic ASW concludes that, despite contrary declaratory policies, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will be capable within the next ten years, of threatening the other's SSBNs with sufficient credibility to make the costs, risks and possible pay-off worthwhile. Daniel proposes that the only possible benefit of an American anti-SSBN campaign would be to tie up defending Soviet general purpose forces. But he warns that the U.S. effort ought to be "modest," and that it must guard against the possibility that the Soviets use their bastioned SSBNs as "bait" to "trap" the most capable Western ASW assets.

** Daskal, Steven E., "Added Sealift Protection in Time of War," National Defense, March 1987, pp 38-41. Recommends a variety of merchant ship self protection measures for wartime, given the realities of the Maritime Strategy and U.S. allied force levels.

* Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Naval Strategic Perspectives in the Context of Arms Control," Washington, DC, February 1989. This OPNAV "white paper"

summarizes the U.S. Navy's current (early 1989) position on the various naval arms control proposals and "trial balloon" that have emanated from the Soviet Union during the Gorbachev years. It recommends that a public strategy of "damage control" will not suffice, and that the service embrace instead a "pro-active approach" with the aim of educating the public and allies on the necessity that naval arms control calculations be guided by *strategic* considerations rather than the wishful urge for controls for their own sake.

** Doerr, Capt. Peter J., USN (Ret.), "Comment and Discussion: Large Carriers: A Matter of Time," Proceedings, February 1987, p 78, on the "defense within an offense within a defense" nature of the putative Battle of the Norwegian Sea and, by implication, other potential wartime operations implementing the Maritime Strategy globally.

** Donatelli, Thomas, "Go Navy," The American Spectator, February 1987, pp 31-33, on the linkages between defense reorganization and the maritime elements of the national military strategy. Supports the Maritime Strategy, and fears for its future under the new Defense Department set up.

* Dorsey, Jack, "NATO Navy Called A Constant Source of Price," Virginian Pilot, March 28, 1987, p 133. Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV: It is "naive and dangerous to believe that strong naval forces are merely expensive competitors to ground forces in Europe, an argument that has become fashionable in recent years for critics of naval programs and maritime strategy."

* Dunn, V. Adm. Robert F., "NANiews Interview," Naval Aviation News, March-April 1987, p 4. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare comments on "today's maritime strategy in terms of its effects on Naval Aviation: Tactical commanders must deal with the strategy on a day-to-day basis. From that derives a new tactical awareness."

Freedman, Lawrence, "Arms Control at Sea," paper presented at the Royal. Naval Staff College Conference, "Decade of the '90s: Response to Change," Greenwich, UK, February 14, 1989. Finds that the characteristics and capabilities of naval forces are far more complex than those on land, and are, therefore, much less amenable to "traditional" arms control "solutions" (cooperation, predictability, parity, and stability). Freedman concludes that naval arms control "will remain a not-very-good idea whose time has not yet come."

** Friedman, Norman, "The Maritime Strategy and the Design of the U.S. Fleet," Comparative Strategy, No. 4, 1987, pp 415-35. Emphasizes the role of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy as an interactive force-sizing methodology. Most post-World War II naval planing, reports Friedman, proceeded (inappropriately) on the basis of narrowly

defined scenario-dependent systems analytical measures of effectiveness, and ignored the hallmark of naval force—flexibility and ambiguity. Urges that naval forces cannot and should not be optimized to a given scenario—"flexibility, or ambiguity, rather than actual striking power is (their) great virtue." Most controversial is Friedman's idea of using the carrier battlegroup for a "bait-and-trap" strategy whereby Soviet submarines and bombers would be deliberately drawn into a (losing!) shoot-out within carrier strike range of the Soviet homeland. The skeptic is reminded of Den, Bien Phu!

Friedman, Norman, "The U.S. Navy, 1990-2010: Prospects and Problems," paper presented at the Royal Navy Staff College Conference, "Decade of the '90s—Response to Change," Greenwich, UK, February 15, 1989. A wide-ranging prognosis of the possible implications of East/West political change, technological progress, and budgetary and manpower pressures for the foreseeable size and structure of the U.S. Navy. Among Friedman's "predictions" are the following: (1) larger, self-maintaining combatants may become more economical to buy in the long run, (2) ships should be built for longer life expectancies than is presently the norm, (3) cheaper electronics may lower the cost of ships, and (4) a smaller military-age population will force a heightened degree of shipboard automation.

** Froggett, S.J., CDR, USN, "Tomahawk's Roles," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1987, pp 51-54. Posits that the Tomahawk SLCM is the material linchpin to the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy.

"From the Editor," Submarine Review, January 1987, pp 3-5. Challenges some of the basic strategic concepts of the Maritime Strategy regarding the employment of SSNs.

Gaffney, Frank, Jr., "Navy Steers Risky Course on Tac-Nukes," Defense News, June 12, 1989, pp 31-32. Strong criticism of the U.S. Navy's recent announcement that it will phase out and not replace obsolete shipboard nuclear weapons. Warns that a "non-nuclear" navy could tempt the Soviet Union to start a nuclear war at sea, and worse that West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, "who has made a career of weakening Western security," will use the Navy's decision to advance his own campaign at eliminating short-range nuclears from West German soil.

** George Lt. James L., USN (Ret.), "INNF," Proceedings, June 1987, pp 35-39. A Center for Naval Analyses staffer on the effect on the Navy and its Maritime Strategy should European Intermediate Nuclear Force arms control be achieved.

** George, James L., "La nuova strategia navale degli Stati Uniti (The U.S. Navy's New Maritime Strategy)," Revista Marittima, November

1987, pp 17-32. An explanation of the U.S. Maritime Strategy and the principal criticisms against it in the prestigious Italian "Maritime Review."

** George, James L., "Maritime Mission or Strategy?" Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 47-55. Proposes that the purposes of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy might be better understood if its three "phases" were explained in "traditional" mission terminology—deterrence, presence, sea control, and power projection.

** Glaser, Charles L. and Miller, Steven E. (eds.), The Navy, the Maritime Strategy and Nuclear War, (forthcoming in 1988). Examines whether the strategy might cause escalation and the results if it did.

* Goodman, Glenn W. Jr. and Schemmer, Benjamin F., "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H. Trost," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 76-84, especially p 79. The Chief of Naval Operations discusses his views on the Maritime Strategy, including forward pressure, anti-SSBN operations, and relations with the NATO allies. "Our intent is to hold Soviet maritime forces at risk in the event of war. That includes anything that is out there."

** Gray, Colin S., and Barnett, Roger W., "Geopolitics and Strategy," Global Affairs, Winter 1989, pp 18-37. Offers a geo-strategic prescription for the hierarchy of American national security interests and military force allocation (strategic nuclear, land, maritime). Rejects a deterministic view of the continental-maritime divide, while arguing its long-term (frequently subconscious) *conditioning* effect on national security policy *choices*. The American geo-political "window" on the world, say the authors, mandates that a NATO-Warsaw Pact war be seen in *campaign* terms, and that the U.S. contribution emphasize (maritime) access to the Eurasian land mass first, and only indirectly a commitment of forces on land.

** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO," Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 8-19. A thoughtful, wide-ranging, and often provocative article examining linkages, especially between continental and maritime power, between the European and Pacific theaters, and between strategic and conventional deterrence. The article is notable also for the contributions of Capt. Roger W. Barnett, USN (Ret.), one of the foremost original architects of the Maritime Strategy.

** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy: Europe and the World Beyond," Naval Forces, No. 5, 1988, pp 28-41. Western naval power, harnessed to a global maritime strategy, argues Gray, is critical to the

successful deterrence and, if necessary, the defeat of Soviet war-fighting objectives in Europe. He exemplifies his case by citing the precedents of World Wars I and II, and suggesting the military advantage over the long haul of a maritime coalition over a continentally-based opponent. Elsewhere in his article, however, Gray at least intimates that it was not so much seapower as the Allies' superior economic and industrial strength that won both wars.

** Gray, Colin S., "The Maritime Strategy in the US/Soviet Strategic Relations," Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 7-18. Geopolitics, not incompatible ideologies, claims Gray, determine the necessity for the United States to offset Soviet power on the Eurasian continent. Geopolitics also dictate that U.S. and U.S.-led strategies are centered on seapower. Only superior maritime power, argues Gray, can serve to exhaust the Soviet Union's superior continental position, produce "domestic unraveling," and ultimately defeat Moscow. The author notes that, over the past 400 years, no maritime-led coalition has ever lost a great war against continental coalitions; others, Paul Kennedy in Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, for instance, would interject that superior *economic* power has been the decisive factor.

** Grove, Eric, "The Future of Sea Power," Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 12-28. Excellent *tour d'horizon*, showing where the Maritime Strategy fits in the context of total world sea power issues today.

Halloran, Richard, "Navy Setting Course for the 21st Century," New York Times, November 11, 1988, p 28. Reports on the Navy's "Quo Vadis" and "Navy 21" studies that seek to project the service's technological "shape" into the 21st century.

** Hartmann, Frederick, A Force for Peace: The U.S. Navy, 1982-1986, (forthcoming in 1988). By a Naval War College faculty member.

Hendrickson, David C., The Future of American Strategy, New York: Holmes and Meiser, 1987. A new and different perspective. Advocates a scaled-back mix of continental and maritime strategies and forces. Sees some U.S. naval forces particularly useful in Third World contingencies, especially carriers, but would cut back on naval, air and ground forces he sees as only useful for highly unlikely forward global operations against the Soviets. Wrongly believes this includes Aegis cruisers and destroyers.

* Hernandez, V. Adm. D.E., "The New Third fleet," Proceedings, July 1987, pp 73-76. Commander Third Fleet on the revitalization of his organization to implement its share of the load in carrying out the Maritime Strategy.

* "Individual Human Beings and the Responsibilities of Leadership," Sea Power, April 1987, pp 81-96. Valedictory interview with Secretary Lehman. See p 85 for his parting views on the Maritime Strategy.

* Inside the Navy, May 8, 1989. Report on the U.S. Navy Secretary-designate Lawrence Garrett confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. A summary of written answers by Garrett to the Senate Armed Services Committee during confirmation hearings in the first week of May 1989. As such, they probably offer the first insight into the new Navy Secretary's views on the maritime strategy. Garrett reportedly defined the latter as a "set of strategic principles" and a "global view of fleet operations, for deterrence and crisis control," as well as a "dynamic concept which both influences and reacts to fleet operations and budgetary issues."

* "Interview: James A. Lyons, Jr., Admiral, U.S. Navy," Proceedings, July 1987, p 67. CINCPACFLT on the importance of the Pacific in the Maritime Strategy, despite media focus on Euro-Central Atlantic theater considerations.

Journal of Commerce, "Navy Dream of 600-Ship Fleet May be Fading," February 18, 1989, p 3. "The U.S. budget crunch and shifting U.S. defense spending priorities are combining to sink the Navy's dream of a 600-ship fleet."

** Kalb, Cdr. Richard, "The Maritime Strategy and our European Allies: Cold Feet on the Northern Flank?" Proceedings (forthcoming). By a former member of the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and contributor to the development of the Maritime Strategy.

** Kaufmann, William W., A Thoroughly Efficient Navy, Washington: Brookings, 1987. The annual Kaufmann broadside, this time designed to influence the congressional votes on carrier construction. See especially Chapter 2, "The Maritime Strategy."

** Keller, Lt. Kenneth C., "The Surface Ship in ASW," Surface Warfare, Jan/Feb 1987, pp 2-3. "Any future ASW conflict, by necessity, will be fought in accordance with the maritime strategy." Another of the new generation of naval officers gets, and passes, the word.

** Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "The Maritime Strategy in a New Environment: Maritime Sufficiency," National Defense, March 1989, pp 10-13. National Defense's maritime editor offers practical suggestions to "stimulate discussion on the parameters of maritime sufficiency" in an era in which "Cold War rhetoric" can no longer suffice to justify American naval strength. His principal proposal is to create an active/reserve naval force structure sized to the dual requirements of (1) day-to-day (active) peacetime naval presence, and (2) emergency (reserve) NATO mobilization and reinforcement.

** Korb, Lawrence J., "A Blueprint for Defense Spending," Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1987, p 34. "The Navy's proper wartime job is...to secure the sea lands necessary to support a ground campaign and to take the Soviet Navy out of the war, not primarily by seeking it out and destroying it, but by bottling it up. For this, a 12-carrier Navy should suffice."

* "Lehman on Sea Power," U.S. News and World Report, June 15, 1987, p 28. "The maritime strategy I've promoted is not new; it is NATO strategy that was never taken seriously, a formula for holding Norway and the Eastern Mediterranean, two high-threat areas."

** Lessner, Richard, "Quick Strike: Navy Secretary's Wartime Strategy is Conteste Legacy," Arizona Republic, March 29, 1987 pp C1+. Comprehensive discussion of the issues, including a lengthy interview with Secretary Lehman on the eve of his departure from office, on his Maritime Strategy opinions. Contributes, however, to the erroneous view running throughout America journalism that the Strategy was solely his creation.

Liebman, Marc, "Soviet Naval Initiatives in the Pacific: 1942 Revisited?" Armed Forces Journal International, April 1987, pp 58-64. On Pacific maritime operations during a global war with the Soviets.

** Lind, William S., and Gray, Colin S., "The Maritime Strategy—1988," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1988, pp 53-61. Two noted strategic commentators debate the "maritimeness" of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. Lind, relying on Mahan and Corbett's classic definition, finds that, "what the Navy has been calling its maritime strategy is, indeed, no such thing," but instead, "merely the naval component of the continental strategy that the United States has followed since the end of World War II. "He advocates expanding the debate and address the issues of a "true maritime strategy." Gray, on the other hand, sounds much more comfortable that the Navy, after 100 years of "strategically undisciplined tracts," has come to fully recognize the benefits and limits of naval power. At sea, he maintains, the offense has historically proven the strongest form of warfare. The long striking range of modern seabased weapons, Gary believes, will force the Soviet fleet to "come out and do battle in the Norwegian Sea."

Linder, Bruce R., "What Happened to the 600-Ship Navy?" Navy International, July/August 1988, pp 382-85. Blames OSD "political expediency" more so than budgetary pressures per se for the Navy's failure to reach the 600-ship goal. Foreseeable of older combatants, reports the author, will not likely be matched by new construction, so

that fleet levels will probably continue to decline, mostly at the expense of amphibious and support forces.

** Luttwak, Edward N., Strategy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987, pp 156-164 and 268. Cursory discussion of the Maritime Strategy as "nonstrategy."

** Lynch, David J., "Maritime Plan A 'Prescription for Disaster' Educator Says," Defense Week, February 23, 1987, p 12. Professor Mearsheimer again, this time at the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Matthews, William, "Lehman's Daring Forward Strategy May Fade Under Webb," Defense News, May 4, 1987, p 25. Headline prompted by Secretary of the Navy James Webb's remark that he saw "nothing new in what is being called the maritime strategy."

Matthews, William, "U.S. Navy's Exercises in Aleutians, Underscore Pacific Interest Concern," Defense News, February 9, 1987, p 25. Reprinted as "Marines, Navy Test Amphibious Skills in Aleutians," Navy Times, February 16, p 27. The Navy and Marine Corps practice cold-weather operations to oimplement the Maritime Strategy in the North Pacific.

Matthews, William, "Webb Downplays 'Forward Strategy' Issue," Navy Times, May 4, 1987, p 33. A new Reagan Administration SECNAV takes over. His first publicly reported statements on the Maritime Strategy.

** Metcalf, Joseph, III, V.Adm., USN (Ret.), "The Maritime Strategy in Transition," paper presented at the Royal Navy Staff College Conference, "Decade of the 90s: Response to Change," Greenwich, UK, February 15, 1989. Discussion by the former Commander Second Fleet of the impact of long-range cruise missiles on the U.S. Navy's strike capabilities, notably the "new dimensions" that have been brought to the "forward" meaning of forward strategy.

Morris, Clark R., "Our Muscle Bound Navy," New York Times Magazine, March 1988. Derides the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy as a "desperate improvisation to justify yearned-for weapons systems," especially the "1,000-foot chunk(s) of floating metal." Invokes the standard litany of objections against large-deck carriers and forward operations, while applauding small carriers and the convoy escort strategy.

** "Naval Strategy: America Rules the Waves?" Science, April 3, 1987, p 24. Another journalist attempts to summarize the debate. A little better than most.

** Navy News & Undersea Technology, "The Navy's Maritime Strategy Has to Evolve...But is it the Right Strategy at All?" August 1, 1988, pp 4-5. Reports the comments made by Capt. James Lynch, USN, member of the Navy's Strategic Think Tank (STT), and William S. Lind of the Military Reform Institute at the 1987 U.S. Naval Institute symposium, "Future U.S. Naval Power" in San Diego, CA. Lynch and Lind agree that the Soviet threat can no longer be the sole object of American maritime strategy, but disagree on the implications for U.S. national security in general, and the Navy's purposes in particular. Lynch maintains that a proliferation of international centers of political, economic and military power heightens the importance of a maritime strategy aimed at the protection of trade, chokepoints, and SLOCs. Lind calls for "re-uniting the West," to include the Soviet Union, against the future specter of a resurgent "East."

** Nelson, Cdr. William H., "Peacekeeper at Risk," Proceedings, July 1987, pp 90-97. On applying the Maritime Strategy to the Persian Gulf region.

** Newell, Ltc. Clayton R., USA, "Structuring Our Forces for the Big Battle," Armed Forces Journal International, July 1987, p 6. Takes on both the U.S. Navy's "vaunted maritime strategy: and the U.S. Army's "large complex corps designed to fight the Soviets in Western Europe." Prefers force structures and strategies enabling the United States to "Apply its military power sparingly in small well-focused engagements in unexpected parts of the world."

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "Nuclear Escalation, Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and the Navy's Forward Maritime Strategy," Washington: Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, February 27, 1987. Especially useful for Navy staff officer views.

** O'Rourke, Ronald, "The Maritime Strategy and the Next Decade," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1988, pp 34-38. The U.S. Naval Institute's 1988 Arleigh Burke prize-winning essay by the Congressional Research Service's leading naval analyst offers the U.S. Navy some salient words of advice on how to keep its reborn strategic awareness from "falling through the cracks." O'Rourke warns that the Navy must take steps to ensure that its maritime strategy is further developed and articulated publicly, and not "tossed out of the window" as a Lehman "artifact" or a meaningless catch-all rubric for any and all routine activities and contingencies.

O'Rourke, Ronald, "U.S. Forward Maritime Strategy," Navy International, February 1987, pp 118-122. Especially good on the "complex, interactive relationship: between the Maritime Strategy and the 600-ship Navy, and on "the issues." Less useful because

occasionally inaccurate in tracing the prehistory and history of the Strategy, probably because of deficiencies in the public record.

** Peppe, Lt. P. Kevin, "Accoustic Showdown for the SSNs," Proceedings, July 1987, pp 33-37. On the effects of "accoustic parity" on the Maritime Strategy. He makes similar points in the July 1987 Submarine Review.

Piotti, R. Adm. Walter T., Jr., "Interview," Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, Vol 5 #2, 1987, pp 14-16. The Commander of the U.S. Military Sealift Command on global wartime planning for sealift.

** Pocalyko, L.Cdr. Michael, "Neutral Swedin Toughens NATO's Northern Tier," Proceedings, March 1987, pp 128-130. By a 1985-86 member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). On the interrelationships among Swedish, Soviet, and NATO strategies and the Maritime Strategy.

** Prisley, Jack, "Submarine Aggressor Squadron—Its Time has Come," Submarine Review, July 1987, pp 83-86. A call for a "Top Fish" program, to enable submariners to better practice what they must do to implement the Maritime Strategy.

** "Push Anti-Mine Work, Navy Urged," Defense Week, March 2, 1987, p 5. R. Adm. J.S. Tichelman, RNLN, argues that emphasis on minesweeping "should go hand in hand with the forward strategy" at a U.S. Naval Institute Seminar on Mine Warfare.

* Reagan, President Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington: the White House, January 1987. The framework within which the Maritime Strategy operates. Clear focus on global, forward, coalition approach, especially vs. the Soviets. See especially p 19: "U.S. military forces must possess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expand the scope and intensity of combat operations, as necessary," and pp 27-30: "Maritime superiority is vital. (It) enables us to capitalize on Soviet geographic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat to the Soviet's interests. It plays a key role in plans for the defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. It also permits the United States to tie down Soviet naval forces in a defensive posture protecting Soviet ballistic missile submarines and the seaward approaches to the Soviet homeland..."

Rostow, Eugene V., "For the Record," Washington Post, June 30, 1987, p A18. Extract from a Naval War College lecture by a former high Reagan Administration Arms Control official: "I can imagine no better antidote for the frustration and irritability which now characterize allied relationships than allied cooperation in mounting successful applications of counter-force at outposts of the Soviet

empire and shifting geographical points around its periphery. The Soviet empire is extremely vulnerable to such a peninsular strategy."

RUSI Newsbrief, April, 1988, "NATO's Challenge on the Northern Flank," pp 29-31. An error-filled "analysis" of the northern thrust of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. Proposes that the maritime strategy must prove successful in a "30-day" European war, that the Soviets "would probably launch their SLBMs rather than have them destroyed by NATO," and that the Walker-Whitworth and Kongsberg-Toshiba affairs have "called into question the credibility of the strategic missile submarine," and have "invalidate(d) the use of Western hunter-killer submarines to close in on Soviet home waters."

Sakitt, Mark, Submarine Warfare in the Arctic: Option or Illusion? Stanford, CA: Stanford University International Strategic Institute, 1988, 93 pp. This monograph considers the tactical and environmental (read accoustic) problems the U.S. Navy can expect to encounter when carrying out a strategic ASW campaign in Arctic waters. Using the results of a series of simple search, attrition and accoustic propagation models, the author concludes that "reasonable expected outcomes for the U.S. Navy do not appear very promising," and that the "Arctic naval game sems to be one in which the defenders, the Soviets can dominate." Tactical and environmental difficulties aside, the book cautions against the risk of unwanted escalation, and recommends that possible naval arms controls might consider a trade-off between U.S. agreement on Soviet SSBN sanctuaries, and Soviet acceptance of a numerical SSN cap.

Sea-War Plan All Wet?" Columbus Dispatch, April 7, 1987, p 10A. A call for a "vigorous review" by the Pentagon of "Lehman's plan," including "aircraft carrier battle groups...sent to the...Barents, (a plan) never...formally approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, or NATO." As has often been the case with public journalistic commentary on the Maritime Strategy, no mention was made of the extent to which the Strategy *reflects* longstanding JCS, SECDEF, or NATO policy and strategy, or of its roots in the naval officer corps.

Smit, E.D., Jr., Capt. USN, "The Main Utility of the Navy," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1988, pp 105-107. Recommends that the strategic purposes of the U.S. Navy in a European conflict be re-directed away from attacking the Soviet SSBN fleet, to sinking the Soviet (general purpose) Navy. The author acknowledges that a successful outcome will contribute little to the events on land, but avers that it is a worthwhile objective on its own merits and with a pay-off that will become evident "after the war is over."

* Smith, Lt. Gen. Keith A., "The Posture of Marine Aviation in FY88 - FY89," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1987, pp 46+. U. S. Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation on Marine aviation requirements to support the national, maritime, and amphibious strategies. A reprint of earlier Congressional testimony.

** Solomon, Richard H., "The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices for American Security," Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 36-43, especially pp 38-39. The Director of the State Department Policy Planning staff updates his June 1986 Naval War College Current Strategy Forum lecture: "We must be prepared to open a second front in Asia."

** Stefanick, Tom A., Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Naval Strategy, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987.

** Stefanick, Tom, "The U.S. Navy: Directions for the Future," F.A.S. Public Interest Report, June 1987, pp 1+. Mostly about the budget, but some discussion of the Maritime strategy, most elements of which the author opposes.

** "The Navy Sails on Rough Seas," Newsweek, June 1, 1987, pp 23-26. A summary of the arguments, pro and con, as influenced by reactions to the Iraqi attack on the U.S.S. Stark in the Persian Gulf.

** Thomas, Capt. Walter R., USN (Ret.), "Deterrence, Defense, Two Different Animals," Navy Times, January 26, 1987, p 23. Critique of John Mearsheimer's Fall 1986 International Security article.

** Trainor, Lt. Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "NATO Nations Conducting Winter Maneuvers in Northern Norway," New York Times, March 29, 1987, p 14. Practicing the reinforcement of North Norway. B.Gen Matthew Caulfield USMC: "Marine reinforcement is part of our maritime strategy." Gen. Fredrik Bull-Hansen RNA: With or without American carriers, northern Norway will be defended.

** Trainor, Lt.Gen. Bernard E., USMC (Ret.), "Lehman's Sea-War Strategy is Alive, But for How Long?", New York Times, March 23, 1987, p 16. Another article in the "Will-the-Strategy-survive-John-Lehman?" vein. General Trainor's understanding of the uniformed navy, joint and allied aspects of the strategy do not appear to be on a par with his understanding of the Marine Corps aspects.

Tritten, Cdr. James J., "Nonnuclear Warfare," Proceedings, February 1987, pp 64-70. By the Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. On the symbiotic nature of nonnuclear and nuclear warfare, at sea and

ashore, under conditions of crisis response, intra-war deterrence, and warfighting.

* "Trost Wants Flexibility in U.S. Thinking, Assessment of Soviets," Aerospace Daily, June 22, 1987, p 462; and "Naval Strategy Must Change Says Admiral Trost," Jane's Defense Weekly, June 27, 1987, p 1345. The Chief of Naval Operations warns against rigid assumptions about Soviet naval options.

* Trost, Adm. Carlisle, "Looking Beyond the Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, January 1987, pp 13-16. Also "Comment and Discussion," July 1987, pp 19-20. Admiral Watkins' successor as CNO briefly reaffirms the Maritime Strategy's fundamentals: deterrence, forward defense, alliance solidarity, the global view, coexistence with other vital components of our national military strategy and, most important, flexibility. Highlights anti-submarine warfare in particular.

* Trost, C.A., Adm., USN, "The Goal and the Challenge," Sea Power, October 1988, pp 13-30. In an interview the CNO acknowledges that the 600-ship goal will not be reached in 1989, but that forward strategy will remain central to the Navy's peace and wartime deployment philosophy. According to Trost, "carriers sailing into the Kola Gulf and lots of other things...are not, nor have ever been, envisioned as part of our forward-based maritime strategy."

* Trost, C.A.H., Adm., USN, "Two Bells Into the Watch," remarks at the annual Submarine League Conference, Washington, DC, July 9, 1987. A future-looking depiction of submarine roles and missions in the 21st century, including the use of "underseas cruisers" for integral fleet support with offensive and defensive anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities.

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Bringing Down the Bird of Thought," speech at the Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 18, 1987. The CNO cautions maritime strategy planners on the risks of "set-piece thinking," and on the need to guard against drawing conclusions about Soviet naval intentions "through their writings or through their military capabilities themselves."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Global Role Demands a 15-Carrier Navy," Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1989, p II-9. Reiterates that 15 is the minimum number of carrier battlegroups necessary to support the Nation's global commitments in war and peace "at a prudent level of risk."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Looking at the Future of the Navy," remarks at U.S. Naval Institute Conference, San Diego, CA,

July 27, 1988. The CNO foresees a 21st century naval threat environment that will differ little from current international conditions, but that will feature important technological changes in all three warfare dimensions—surface, subsurface and air. Even so, reports the CNO, the Nimitz-size aircraft carrier will remain "the centerpiece of naval warfare."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "My Frustration," speech at the New York Navy League, New York, NY, November 14, 1988. The CNO voices his exasperation with critics who claim, "You don't have a strategy."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Requirements Drive Navy Force Levels," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1989, pp 34-38. The CNO warns that a "precipitate rush to dismantle naval forces because of premature optimism over the presumed evolution of the global balance of power could be a most costly misreading of history." Trost projects a future international environment that will be increasingly complex, politically and technologically, and that will, therefore, *heighten* the importance of forward deployed and sustained naval forces, including a minimum of 15 aircraft carriers.

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "This Era and the Next: American Security Interest and the U.S. Navy," speech at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 10, 1989. A plea to preserve a forward-deployed 15-carrier Navy while the West guardedly watches the progress of the "Gorbachev era."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Would You Run Your Company This Way?" Remarks before the Navy League, March 30,1988. The CNO voices his dissatisfaction with recent congressionally-mandated budget and force cut-backs, and Soviet Gosplan-like "mismanagement of the Navy's affairs."

* Trost, Carlisle H., Adm., USN, "In the Sail Left, Thinking of U.S. Seapower," remarks at Military Sealift Command (MSC) Change-of-Command Ceremony, December 19, 1988. The CNO decries the disappearance of America's maritime industry and warns that the country "will lose its identify as a maritime nation..."

** Truver, Scott C. and Thompson, Jonathan S., "Navy Mine Countermeasures: Quo Vadis?", Armed Forces Journal International, April, 1987, pp 7074. An adequate survey of the problems and prospects. No discussion, however, of the primary U.S. mine countermeasures concept of operations embedded in the Maritime Strategy: killing minelayers far forward, in transit, and offshore, *before* they sow their mines. Illustrative of the dangers of discussing any one warfare area in isolation from the total Strategy.

Truver, Scott, "Phibstrike 95 - Fact or Fiction?" Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 102-108. A case study of how the Maritime Strategy has been used as a framework by the Marine Corps to develop an amphibious warfare concept of future operations.

* U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth
** Congress, First Session, Hearings on National Security Strategy, January-April 1987, Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). Testimony by administration civilian and military officials, and by government and non-government defense specialists. Includes much discussion of the Maritime Strategy. See especially testimony by Adm. Lee Baggett, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.

* U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One-hundredth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Washington, DC: USGPO (forthcoming in 1987/8). Prepared annual "posture" statements by SECDEF, CJCS, SECNAV, CNO and other officials. Also hearings repartee, and responses to questions for the record. Maritime Strategy permeates the entire Navy budget legislative process. In addition to those just cited, see especially statements by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Melvyn Paisley, CINCLANTFLT Adm. Frank Kelso, and Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Surface and Air Warfare, V. Adms. Joseph Metcalf and Robert Dunn.

** Van Cleave, William R., "Horizontal Escalation and NATO Strategy: A Conceptual Overview," in E.D. Gueritz et al (eds.), NATO's Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments, Washington: Pergamon - Brassey's, 1987. A leading conservative defense thinker argues that "the Navy's version of Horizontal Escalation," the Maritime Strategy, "fails because it does not come to grips with the nuclear factor; indeed, it seems to attempt ignoring it."

* Webb, James H., Jr., "The Aircraft Carrier: Centerpiece of Maritime Strategy," Wings of Gold, Summer 1987, pp S-2 and S-3. The new Secretary of the Navy on the national military strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the role of the carrier. Continuity of the Reagan-Weinberger-Lehman view of maritime strategy confirmed.

* Weinberger, Caspar., Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1988/FY 1989 Budget and Fy 1988-92 Defense Programs, Washington: USGPO, 1987, p 165. Reconfirms the Maritime Strategy as a component of declared U.S. national military strategy. See also Offley, Ed, and Sanger, S.L. "Backing at Top for Home Port," Seattle Post-Intelligence, April 28, 1987, p 1. SECDEF, in Seattle, "agrees with the Navy's controversial wartime strategy." SECDEF direction and endorsement is no flash in the pan.

** Weltman, John J., "The Short, Unhappy Life of the Maritime Strategy," The National Interest, Spring 1989, pp 79-86. The author reports that the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy under the Reagan Administration was largely the produce of budgetary plenty and the intra-service dominance of the carrier and submarine communities. Both conditions, he claims, have ceased to exist, so that planning and force procurement will shift to a strategy "emphasizing defensive sea control in support of the land battle..." This development, Weltman concludes, "can only strengthen the constraints against any assault upon the Western alliance."

** West, F.J. (Bing), Jr., "The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step," Proceedings, January 1987, pp 40-49. By a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Naval War College faculty member, lead author of Seaplan 2000 and U.S. Marine Corps officer. One of the most imortant analyses of the Maritime Strategy by an outside observer to date. Develops further his 1985 and 1986 views, cited in "Contemporary Naval Strategy" and Section II above, on the relationships between the Strategy and U.S./NATO doctrine. Cf, however, actual statements by allied military leaders in Section V below. See also "Comment and Discussion," March 1987, pp 14-15; July 1987, pp 19-20, and August 1987, pp 31-32.

Wettern, Desmond, "The Paradox of Decline: Are Convoys the Only Alternative?" Sea Power, April 1989, pp 147-159. The writer, a long-time British commentator on maritime affairs, seems to think so. The decline of the West's accoustic advantage, he says, has made the protection of the Atlantic SLOCs by way of a "Ramboesque" forward offensive a doubtful proposition. He concludes that, unless the West successfully develops active towed sonar arrays, alternative ship protection strategies such as "Moving barriers" and patrolled lanes," will probably prove as great a failure as the "patrolled sea lanes" and "hunter-killer" concepts of the two world wars. Accordingly, the one remaining option may well be the re-adoption of the convoy system.

White, David F., "Atlantic Sealife Commander Says Containerization Hurts Readiness," Journal of Commerce, April 7, 1988, p 12B. Reports the concern expressed by the new chief of the Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, Capt. Thomas J. Batzel, USN, that the progressive containerization of merchant fleets will leave his command short of enough breakbulk freighters to carry odd and oversize cargoes such as tanks, trucks and artillery.

** Wilson, George C., "600-Ship Navy is Sailing Toward Rough Fiscal Seas," Washington Post, March 16, 1987, pp A1 and A6. Sees forward anti-SSBN operations as a "Watkins scenario" and forward carrier battle group operations as a "Lehman scenario," with little backing in the officer corps. Cites a "number of (nameless) Navy officers" as

predicting that the latter "Aspect of the forward strategy will start fading as soon as Lehman leaves the Navy Department." This seems doubtful, given the primary role of the officer corps in drafting the Maritime Strategy; time will tell. See also retort by Bennett, Rep Charles E., "A 600-Ship Fleet is What's Needed," Washington Post, April 22, 1987, p 19.

** Wilson, George, "Soviets Score Silent Success in Undersea Race with U.S.," Washington Post, July 17, 1987, p A20. Claims Adm. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "has never been enamored of the forward strategy" and that "other Defense Department officials said the forward strategy started to sink as soon as Lehman left the Pentagon." On the former, see Crowe testimony earlier in 1987, cited above. On the latter, see Mark Twain's cable from London to the Associated Press 1897.

** Winnefeld, Lt. James A., Jr., "Fresh Claws for the Tomcat," Proceedings, July 1987, pp 103-107. On the relationship between the Maritime Strategy, CVBG operations, and hardware requirements. "The F-14D is not just another nice fighter; it offers a significant enhancement of the CVBG's ability to execute the maritime strategy. The aircraft's true worth is apparent only in this light."

Wood, Robert, "The Conceptual Framework for Strategic Development at the Naval War College," Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, pp 4-16. Further development of the views of this Naval War College strategist/faculty member. His focus is now on integrated national military strategy and its teaching and gaming. See also commentary by R.Adm. J. A. Baldwin, President of the Naval War College, pp 2-3.

IV. SISTER SERVICE CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Maritime Strategy fully incorporates U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force and Army contributions to the global maritime campaign. In fact, the case can be made that more thought has been given to actual joint combat operations (as opposed to problems of command relationships or lift) by the Navy and Marine Corps in codifying the Maritime Strategy than by either the Air Force or the Army in developing their own "cornerstone" publications. The open literature on potential Army contributions to maritime warfare, such as air defense batteries based in islands and littoral areas, is particularly weak.

Alberts, Col. D. J., USAF, "U.S. Naval Air and Deep Strike," Naval Forces, No. 1/1986, pp 62-75. The strike warfare elements of the Maritime Strategy from an Air Force officer's point of view.

Atkeson, MG Edear, USA (Ret.), "Arctic Could be a Hot Spot in Future Conflicts," Army, January 1986, pp 13-14. Fanciful proposal for expanded U.S. Army role in helping implement the Maritime Strategy, "An Army air cavalry force, properly tailored for the mission, should be able to locate submarine activity under the ice as well as, if not better than, another submarine."

** Breemer, Jan S. and Hoover, SSG Todd, USAF, "SAC Goes to Sea with Harpoon," National Defense, February 1987, pp 41-45, a history and an update. Cf Chipman and Lay article cited in Section XI below.

** Builder, Carl H., The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat?, Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, October 1986. A study done for the U.S. Army to "try to find out why the Army doesn't seem to do very well in the strategic planing process." Analyzes Army, Navy and Air Force strategic planning, especially the Maritime Strategy. Looks for and, therefore, "finds" differences rather than similarities. To be revised and reissued as a Rand Corporation publication in 1987.

** Chipman, Dr. Donald D., "Rethinking Forward Strategy and the Distant Blockade," Armed Forces Journal International, August 1987, pp 82-88. Argues for joint integrated USN-USAF wartime operations in NATO's Northern Region, the GUIK gap, and the Norwegian Sea. Well in keeping with the Maritime Strategy.

Cooper, Bert H., Maritime Roles for Land-Based Aviation Report No. 83-151F, Washington: Library of congress Congressional Research Service, August 1, 1983. Analyzes recent classified studies, identifies problems and issues, and discusses recent USN-USAF initiatives.

Correll, John T., "The Power Projection Shortfall," Air Force Magazine, August 1988. In October 1987, US sea and airlift capabilities were reorganized under a new unified command, the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). The new organization promised to improve the efficiency and coordination of the Nation's trans-Atlantic reinforcement assets, but the article reports, it has been unable to stop the growing decline in national life resources, especially shipping.

** Estep, Col. James L., USA, "Army's Role in Joint Global Military Strategy," Army, August 1987, pp 11+. Decries "lack of a more global, jointly oriented strategy" by the U.S. Army and applauds the Navy's development of same.

** Fraser, Ronald, "MDZ Mission Defines Coast Guard Wartime Role," Navy Times, October 20, 1986, p 27, on the role of the Maritime Defense Zones.

** Grace, L.Cdr. James A., "JTC^{3}A and the Maritime Strategy," Surface Warfare, July/August 1986, pp 22-24. On the role of the Joint Tactical C^3 Agency in fielding joint and allied programs and procedures to ensure implementation of the Maritime Strategy.

Griggs, Roy A., Maj., USAF, "Maritime Strategy on NATO's Central Front," Military Review, April 1988, pp 54-65. Urges that the United States and its Navy develop capabilities and doctrinal concepts for using the conventional warhead Tomahawk (TLAM-C) in support of the NATO/US Army follow-on forces attack (FOFA) AirLand Battle concepts. Deep-interdiction TLAM-C strikes from disperses surface and subsurface combatants early in a conflict, says the author, would be "one way the maritime strategy could effectively support ground forces on the central front." A key problem still to be solved, concludes the article, is the creation of quick-reaction, on-scence shipboard TLAM strike planning centers.

** Harned, Maj. Glenn, USA, "Comment and Discussion: The Maritime Strategy," Proceedings, February 1986, pp 26-28. Argues U.S. Army suffers from lack of a Maritime Strategy equivalent and from Navy reticence in explaining its operational tactical doctrines.

Hooker, Richard D., Capt., USA, "NATO's Northern Flank: A Critique of the Maritime Strategy," Parameters, June 1989, pp 24-34. An Army officer criticizes, in his words, the "narrow prescriptions called for in the Maritime Strategy," urging that the Navy's sister services "enter and participate in the debate" over the defense of the Northern Flank in particular, and the "tone and substance of the strategic vision that must guide all our forces into the next century." Hooker's specific objections to the maritime strategy's northern flank gambit center on the risk of nuclear escalation, and the concession,

to the Soviets, of important geo-strategic and force-ratio advantages. Also disputed is the maritime strategists' claim that submarine SLOC interdiction has relatively little priority in Soviet Navy planning. The author concludes with the recommendation that options for the defense of northern Europe be "rigorously submitted to the discipline of an articulated and integrated conception of national military strategy," notably consideration of ground and air force equipment pre-positioning in Norway.

** Kennedy, Col. William V., USAR (Ret.), "There Goes the U.S. Navy—Steaming the Wrong Way," Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1986, p 14. Calls for the Navy to refocus on Asia, crediting a U.S. Army "counterattack with having turned the Maritime Strategy from an alleged early Pacific orientation to a current European one. Attempts to drive a wedge between the Navy and Marine Corps, and alleges "only nominal mention of the Army and the Air Force" in the Proceedings "Maritime Strategy" Supplement, charges belied by actually reading the Supplement.

Killebrew, Lt.C. Robert B., USA, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options, Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986. Unique among studies of NATO defense in its attempt at an integrated discussion of U.S. and allied land, sea, and air force. Argues NATO conventional defense is possible. Advocates early employment of naval forces as a defensive barrier "guarding" force. Sees a potential role for carrier air on the Central Front in a protracted war.

Lewis, Kevin N., Combined Operations in Modern Naval Warfare: Maritime Strategy and Interservice Cooperation (Rand Paper #6999), Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, April 1984. See especially for arguments on alleged unique "Navy Planning Style," many of which are belied by the Maritime Strategy.

Ley, Capt. Michael USA, "Navy Badly Needs to Beef Up Land Operations Fire Support," Army, May 1987, pp 12+. Argues for more large-caliber naval guns to support Army operations ashore.

* Pendley, R.Adm. William, "The U.S. Navy, Forward Defense, and the Air-Land Battel," in Pfaltzgraff, Robert, J.r, et al. (eds.), Emerging Doctrines and Technologies, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, forthcoming in 1987. Official views of the Navy's Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60) as of April 1986. Argues that Maritime Strategy and Air-Land Battle doctrine are similar and complementary. Sees both as essential parts, along with nuclear deterrence, of an "essential traid" of U.S. defense strategy. A short summary is on pp 15-16 of Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: Implications for Global and Regional Political-Military Balance: A Conference Report: April 16-18, 1986, Cambridge, MA: Institute for

Foreign Policy Analysis, 1986. Cf Dunn and Staudenmaier May-June 1985 Survival article; March-April 1986 views of V.Adm. Mustin on linkage between the Maritime Strategy and "Deep Strike," cited above; and West German government official views on lack of linkage, cited in Section V below.

Prina, E. Edgar, "The Tripartite Ocean: The Air Force and Coast Guard Give the Navy a Helping Hand," Sea Power, October 1986, pp 32-45. Good update on tri-service contributions to implementing the Maritime Strategy.

U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (JCS Pub.2), Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 1986. Reflecting the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Title 10 and Title 32 U.S. Code, as amended, and DOD Directive 5100.1 (The "Functions Paper"), JCS Pub. 2. governs the joint activities of th U.S. armed forces. See especially Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2-3, charging each Military Department, including the Navy, to "prepare forces...for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war." This responsibility (and not, as some critic charge, a desire to somehow usurp the authority of the JCS or the Unified and Specified Commanders) was the primary impetus and justification for Navy and Marine Corps development, promulgation and discussion of the Maritime Strategy. It is the Navy Department's framework for discharging its responsibilities to "organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea."

U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (AFM 1-1), Washington: Department of the Air Force, March 16, 1984. The "cornerstone" Air Force doctrinal manual and, therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Takes a somewhat narrower view of potential areas of mutual support than does the Navy. See especially the discussion of objectives of naval forces on p 1-3, neglecting projection operations, e.g., strike or amphibious warfare; and pp 2-15, 3-1, and 3-5/3-6, covering possible Air Force actions to enhance naval operations, virtually all of which are incorporated in the Maritime Strategy. Note, however, the lack of mention of any concomitant naval role in enhancing "aerospace" operations, and the lack of discussion of USAF AAW contributions to maritime warfare, a key element of the Maritime Strategy.

U.S. Army, Operations (FM 100-5), Washington: Department of the Army, August 20, 1982. The Army's "keystone warfighting manual" and, therefore, a building block of the Maritime Strategy. Almost no discussion of Army/Navy mutual support, however, e.g., air defense and island/littoral reinforcement. Included on p 17-7 a useful discussion of the importance and essentially maritime nature of the

NATO northern and southern European regions. Superseded in May 1986; distribution now restricted to U.S. government agencies.

Wilkerson, Lt. Col. Thomas, USMC, "Two if by Sea," Proceedings, November 1983, pp 34-39, on important role of the U.S. Air Force in Maritime Strategy by the principal Marine Corps contributor to the Strategy's development.

Yost, Adm. Paul, USCG, "The Bright Slash of Liberty: Today's Coast Guard: Buffeted But Unbowed," Sea Power, August 1986, pp 8-24. See especially pp 11-12 and 21-22, on the Maritime Defense Zones, an important Navy-Coast Guard element of the Maritime Strategy, by the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

V. ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO AND VIEWS ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY

The Martitime Strategy as developed by the U.S. Navy of the 1980s is heavily oriented toward combined (and joint) operations, and this was reflected in the Proceedings January 19867 Supplement, 'The Maritime Strategy." The postwar U.S. Navy had never been "unilateralist." Allied contributions to the global campaign were worked out years ago and then had been continually updated in the drafting aof allied war plans, Memoranda of Agreement, and other documents. They have been routinely discussed at annual Navy-to-Navy staff policy talks and CNO-to-CNO visits, held betwen the U.S. Navy and each of its most important allied associates. thus, most of the hard bargaining and tardeoffs had alreacy been done, and integrating allied efforts with the U.S. Navy component of the Maritime Strategy was not particularly difficult. Once the Maritime Strategy was drafted, it was briefed to key allied CNOs and plannign staffs and to NATO commanders. Allied feedback was considered and utilized in updating revisions to the Strategy, and the process continues today.

Alford, Jonathan, "The Current Military Position on the Northern Flank," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January 1987, pp 601-08. speaking at a May 1986 conference on "Britain and the Security of NATO's Northern Flank," the former deputy director of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) invokes the syllogism, "Who controls the Norwegian Sea depends on who controls the North Norwegian airfields. Who controls those fields depends on who gets there first, and who gets there first depends on who controls the Norwegian Sea." Alford concludes that the growth in strategic importance of NATO's northern region has turned Great Britain in "at least as much as a flank country as (a) central" alliance member. Accordingly, for Britain the maritime vs. continental alternative "falsifies and obscures the issue." If British military capabilities must be cut, they should fall on the Central Front.

Archer, Clive, Britain's surface Fleet: How Little is Enough? Centrepiece Paper No. 13, Aberdeen, Scotland: University of Aberdeen, Centre for Defense Studies, Summer 1988, 28 pp. Reports that national and allied security requires that Britain reverses the numerical decline of its surface fleet, and take a more active role in the defense of the North Atlantic. Early Royal Navy forward deployment in the Norwegian Sea, says Archer, would serve these purposes: (1) demonstrate allied solidarity and deter precipitated Soviet action, (2) "hold the fort" and (3) "sanitize" the South Norwegian and North Seas in preparation of the arrival of U.S. Navy reinforcements, and (4) influence possible naval arms control negotiations. On the latter, the author notes that the European voice in matters will be "relatively proportionate to their naval strength."

** Arkin, William M. and Shallhorn, Steve, "Canada Even More Under U.S. thumb in Sub Plan," Globe and Mail (Toronto), July 17, 1987, p 7. Decries the Maritime Strategy, the new Canadian defense policy and the linkage between the two.

Armitage, Richard, "The U.S./Japan Alliance," Defense/86, July-August 1986, pp 20-27. Reagan Administration defense policy vis-a-vis Japan, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The context of the Maritime Strategy in Northeast Asis and the Northwest Pacific. See also his "Japan's Defense Program: No Cause for Alarm," Washington Post, February 18, 1987, p A18.

Auer, Cdr. James, USN (Ret) and Seno, Cdr. Sadao, JMSDF (Ret.), "Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force," Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 178-190. Stress on the diffusion of labor between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force in the Northwest Pacific and on the deterrent value of same.

Ausland, John C., "The Heavy Traffic in Northern Seas," International Herald Tribune, September 16, 1986, on some effects of the Maritime Strategy in Norway.

Barresen, Jacob, Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "U.S. Carrier Operations in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea." Paper presented at the International Comparative Workshop on Soviet Seapower, Sortland, June 1988, 24 pp. This paper takes aim at the conventional wisdom that the forward deployment of carrier battlegroups into the Norwegian Sea will amount to a charge-of-the-light brigade. Capt. Barresen concludes instead that a two or three-carrier battlegroup, provided it is afforded adequate land-based AAW and ASW support, can establish sea control north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and possibly "profoundly change the correlation of forces on NATO's northern flank." Such a force, he reports, will increase allied air defense and anti-submarine capabilities in the North by factors of five and five-to-ten, respectively.

Bjarnason, Bjorn, "Iceland and NATO," NATO Review, February 1986, pp 7-12. By one of Iceland's leading journalists. "It is crucial that in any defense of sea routes between North America and Western Europe, ...the Soviet fleet is confined as far north towards its home base at the Kola Peninsula as possible...the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap...is not an adequate barrier; instead, NATO envisages a forward defense in the Norwegian Sea." Includes update on the defense debate in Iceland.

** Boerresen, Capt. Jacob, RNN, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy," Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 14-15, by the military secretary to the Norwegian Minister of Defense. "During the 1970s, NATO and

the USA expressly limited their carrier operations...to the waters in and south of the GIUK gap, Norway...found this situation rather uncomfortable...The official Norwegian reaction to (forward deployment of CVBGs) has been positive, (but) Norway is...sensitive to all developments that it fears may threaten the low level of tension."

Boerresen, J., Capt. Royal Norwegian Navy, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy," Naval Forces. When this article was published, the author was military secretary to Norway's Minister of Defense Johan J. Holst. The views expressed can, therefore, be read as a reliable statement of Norway's defense preferences. In this case, Boerresen stresses his country's "reluctant embrace" of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. Occasional forward deployments of American carrier battlegroups, he says, are desirable, but not as permanent presence. The writer also has misgivings with an anti-SSBN strategy, and he worries over the "well-known phenomenon that American commitments fluctuate over the years." He cautions his American readers that they should not presume that permission to station their carriers inside Norway's territorial waters will be timely and automatic.

Bouchard, Lt. Joseph, and Hess, Lt. Couglas, "The Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes Defense," Proceedings, March 1984, pp 88-97. On the concurrent Japanese Maritime Strategy debate. See also Lehrack, Lt. Col. Otto, "Search for a New Consensus," same issue, pp 96-99.

Breemer, Jan S., "The Euro-Atlantic Dimension." Paper presented at the Dalhousie University Conference on"The Undersea Dimension of Maritime Strategy," Halifax, N.S., Canada, June 23, 1989. Summarizes the Western European perspective on maritime security in the North Atlantic as codified in the evolving "European Maritime Concept 2010" studies, notably the "Sub-Concept's" plan for creating extra-NATO decision-making mechanisms that would permit the early and timely forward "crisis-deployment" of an all-European task force into the Norwegian Sea.

** Breemer, Jan S., "The Maritime Strategy: One Ally's View," Naval War College Review, Summer 1988, pp 41-46. Discusses the (official and unofficial) views within the Dutch Navy on the possible implications of the U.S. Navy's "new strategic thinking" for Dutch and Western European maritime planning. Highlights NATO-European planning toward early "Phase I" crisis response operations in the Norwegian Sea.

British Atlantic Committee, Diminishing the Nuclear Threat: NATO's Defense and New Technology, London: February 1984. A group of retired British generals and others rail against the "practicality" and "very purpose" of the NATO reinforcement

mission, given their assumptions of a short conventional war phase in Europe and overwhelming surface ship vulnerability. See also Mitchell, Lt. I.G., RN., "Atlantic Reinforcement—A Re-Emerging Debate," Armed Forces, September 1986, pp 399-400.

Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, "Arms Control and the Defense White Paper," Arms Control Bulletin, June 18, 1987. Condemns Canada's nuclear submarine acquisition plan as providing involuntary support for the U.S. Navy's "Forward Maritime Strategy," which the authors imply is provocative and destabilizing rather than a deterrent.

Caufriez, Chaplain G., "Comment and Discussion: Plan Orange Revisited," Proceedings, March 1985, pp 73 & 79. From Home Forces Headquarters, Belgium, a plea for Norwegian Sea vice GIUK Gap defense, lest "at one go, the northern flank would have crumbled."

Challenge and Commitment: A Defense Policy for Canada, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1987. June 1987 official Canadian Ministry of Defense "White Paper," the first since 1971. Current Canadian contributions to allied Maritime Strategy and future plans. See especially maps pp 13, 52, 64 and discussion of proposed changes in Canadian policy, which will increase the requirements for USN and USMC forces in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere, but which should help improve other elements needed to carry out the Strategy.

Chichester, Michael, "The Western Alliance: Politics, Economics and Maritime Power," Navy International, January 1987, pp 4-6. While warning that the U.S. naval largesse on behalf of Western Europe's maritime security may not outlast the Reagan Administration, Chichester repeats his call for the creation of a "European maritime pillar," organized under the umbrella of the EEC or Western European Union (WEU), and headed up by Great Britain, "the leading maritime power in Europe."

Chichester, Michael, "NATO's Maritime Power: Its place in a New Strategy," Navy International, August 1986, pp 504-06. Between the U.S. Navy's global (over) commitments, the possibility that the Soviet Union will re-direct its expansionary appetite away from the Central Front, and European desires for a louder voice in Western coalition strategy, the time has come, says the author, for a "combined European maritime defense policy" that will take charge of the security of the eastern Atlantic.

Chichester, Michael, "Towards a European Maritime Policy," Navy International, November 1988, pp 538-40. One of the most vocal spokesmen for the creation of a European "maritime pillar" deplores the failure by the Western European Union (WEU) to translate the

recent dispatch of Western European flotillas to the Persian Gulf into a "European standing naval force" for use "outside the NATO theatre."

Childs, Nick, "The Royal Navy: Which Way Forward?" Navy International, April 1989, pp 169-71. Proposes that perhaps only significant (including British) arms reductions on the European Continent will "save" the Royal Navy's surface fleet from declining below the stated force objective of "about 50" destroyers and frigates. Still, child's questions if it may not be wiser to "balance" the fleet in favor of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft as opposed to surface combatants if the Royal Navy, in concert with its European allies, intends to "hold the ring" preparatory to the arrival of American reinforcements. Given the Royal Navy's weakness in air defense capabilities, concludes Childs, doing so effectively "must be considered fanciful."

Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M. (eds.), Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. See especially Col. Jonathan Alford, BA (Ret.), "The Soviet Naval Challenge," pp 43-56, and Lt. Gen. Heinz von zur Gathen, FRGA (Ret.), "The Federal Republic of German's Contribution to the Defense of Northern Europe," pp 57-82. The former sees forward U.S. operations in the Norwegian Sea as unlikely, and argues that the Royal Navy should, therefore, concentrate on the Channel, the North Sea, and the Norwegian Sea, rather than either "unspecific flexibility" or "keeping open the sea lines of communication to the United States," options that parallel those discussed in the concurrent U.S. Maritime Strategy debates. The latter discusses the increasing West German role in Baltic, North, and Norwegian Sea defense. Both authors base their arguments for enhanced European naval power on the premise that the U.S. Navy will not be available, at least not in strength, in the Norwegian Sea early in a war.

Cremasco, Maurizio, "Italy: A New Definition of Security?" in Kelleher, Catherine M. and Mattox, Gale A. (eds.), evolving European Defense Policies, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987, pp 257-272. On the Italian military policy debate and Italian Navy views on strategy.

Crickard, F.W., R.Adm., RCN (Ret.), "The U.S. Maritime Strategy—Should Canada Be Concerned?" See entry under Yost, William J.

Crickard, R.Adm. F.W., CN, "Three Oceans—Three Challenges: The Future of Canada's Maritime Forces," Naval Forces, V/1985, pp 13-27. On complementary Canadian strategy, especially area ASW in the North Atlantic SLOC.

** Crickard, R.Adm. Frederick, "The Canadian Navy—New Directions," Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 78-87. Sees the Maritime Strategy as forcing hard choices on Canadian naval planners. Cf his views of a year earlier, cited above.

De Savornin-Lohman, J.P., "De Nederlandse Politieke Benadering van het 'Out-of-Area' Probleem ("The Dutch Political Approach to the 'Out-of-Area' Problem"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 192-198. Synopsis of the Dutch Government's policy on NATO "out-of-area" issues, which includes: (1) rejection of a NATO out-of-area "strategy" per se in favor of preparations to deal with situations on an ad hoc basis, (2) a preference for political solutions through international forums such as the United Nations, (3) a rejection of - out-of-area military operations under NATO auspices, and (4) an emphasis on indirect contributions in support of the direct contributions by the larger NATO members, e.g., the provision of transit facilities or force compensations. The article includes a useful discussion of the Dutch decision to send mine warfare forces to the Persian Gulf. Note is also made of existing NATO plans to protect shipping outside the treaty area in the event of a crisis with the Soviet Union.

Defense Agency (Japan), Defense of Japan; 1986. Includes latest official Japanese defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp 99 and 154. Outlines agreed division of labor between the Maritime Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Navy in the event of an attack on Japan, as understood by the Japanese government. The Maritime Strategy was developed in full accordance with these concepts.

Delaere, Martijn, "Dutch Seek Naval Specialization," Jane's Defense Weekly, June 3, 1989, p 1059. Reports on the jointly British-Dutch-West German produced "Sub-Concept for the Northern Maritime Region 2000-2010" plan for the creation, in time of a Norwegian Sea crisis, of an integrated northern European naval force-in-being. According to Delaere, the Dutch Navy is seeking to translate this plan into an argument for mission specialization. He is wrong.

Department of Defense (Australia), The Defense of Australia; 1987, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, March 19, 1987. The first official Australian Defense "White Paper" since 1976 ensures continued RAN cooperation within the Maritime Strategy. "In the remote contingency of global conflict...our responsibilities would include those associated with the Radford-Collins Agreement for the protection and control of shipping. Subject to priority requirement in our own area the Australian Government would then consider contributions further afield...for example, our FFGs...are capable of effective participation in a U.S. carrier battle group well distant from Australia's shores."

Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's Defense Capabilities, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986. Against Australian involvement with United States and other allied contingency planning for global war. Claims that Radford-Collins Agreement "convoying and escort connotations which extend more than 2000 nautical miles west of Australia to the mid-Indian Ocean suggest a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources to activities which may be only marginally related to our national interest and capabilities." An input to the March 1987 government White Paper on defense.

Diehl, David, "Norwegian Admiral Watns Maneuver Limits," European Stars and Stripes, September 17, 1988, p 3. V.Adm. Torolf Rein, NATO's allied commander northern Europe, comments on exercises "Teamwork '88," and proposes that, while he is pleased with the Alliance's new forward strategy, Norway's resources "can't go on to exercises of this type a year."

Dunn, Michael Collins, "Canada Rethinks Its Defense Posture," Defense and Foreign Affairs, November 1985, pp 12-19. Discusses Canadian ground and air contributions to NATO's Northern Front and naval contribution to Atlantic ASW and Arctic defense.

Ebata, Kensuke, "Ocean Air Defense Japanese Style," Proceedings, March 1987, pp 98-101. On Japanese AAW concepts and programs, essential elements of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific.

Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN, "Defending the Atlantic Connection," in Till, Geoffrey, (ed.), The Future of British Sea Power, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984, pp 146-150. See especially for frank overview of four Royal Navy tasks in the Atlantic.

** Eberle, Adm. Sir James, RN, "Editorial," Naval Forces, IV/1986, p 7. By a former top Royal Navy and NATO Commander-in-Chief. "The New Maritime Strategy is to be welcomed as a brave effort to bring some much needed clarity into the filed of maritime strategic thinking. but it is more likely to be welcomed in Europe by naval officers than it is by political leaders."

Espersen, Morgens, The Baltic—Balance and Security, Copenhagen: The Information and Welfare Service of the Danish Defense Ministry, 1982, 71 pp. A very useful Danish portrayal of the historical evolution and contemporary security and international legal status of the Baltic Sea and Danish Straits. Includes a valuable summary of Soviet Warsaw pact naval activities and exercises along the seaward flank of NATO's Central Front.

Federal Minister of Defense (Federal Republic of Germany), White Paper 1985: The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed

Forces. Includes latest official West German defense policy and strategy views. See especially pp 27-29, 76-77, 111, and 211-216. Declares unequivocal German support for "forward defense at sea in accordance with the NATO commanders' maritime concept of operations, which "calls for countering the threat far from friendly sea routes and shores. Interdiction of enemy naval forces should be effected immediately in front of their own bases." Differentiates clearly, however, between such use of naval (and air) forces and "aggressive forward defense by ground operations in the opponent's territory," which "NATO strategy rules out."

Gann, L.H. (ed.), The Defense of Western Europe, London: Croom Helm, 1987, surveys all the defense forces of all the Western European nations. Particularly useful is Nigel de Lee's "The Danish and Norwegian Armed Forces," pp 58-94, which examines in some detail their wartime sea and air concepts of operations in the Norwegian Sea, the Baltic approaches, the Baltic itself and inshore waters. These concepts are well integrated into the Maritime Strategy. As regards Denmark, de Lee notes: "Plans for naval action are based on aggressive tactics in depth, and this entails a forward defense." Particularly useless is the highly parochial chapter by Col. Harry Summers USA (Ret.), allegedly on "United States Armed Forces in Europe," which should have been styled "The U.S. Army in Germany."

Garrod, Sir Martin, Lt. Gen., Royal Marines, "Amphibious Warfare: Why?" The RUSI Journal, Winter 1988, pp 25-30. A useful reminder by the Commandant General of the British Corps pf Marines of the "Basics" of amphibious warfare. Garrod's specific "target audience" are those within the British Ministry of Defense and Government who question the contemporary relevance of the "sea soldiers." But his quotation of Liddell-Hart's observation how "amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses," has perhaps even greater relevance for the amphibious component of the American maritime strategy.

Greenwood, David, "Towards Role Specialization in NATO," NATO's Sixteen Nations, July 1986, pp 44-49. Argues against a significant Eastern Atlantic naval role for Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany and Denmark. This translates out as largely an attack on the existence of the Dutch Navy, one of the world's best.

Grimstvedt, R.Adm. Bjarne, RNN, "Norwegian Maritime Operations," Proceedings, March 1986, pp 144-149. By the Norwegian CNO. Stresses Norwegian Navy intent and capabilities to defend North Norway, including same Vestfjorden area that focused COMSECONDFLT/COMSTRIKEFLTLANT's attention in 1985 and 1986.

Grove, Eric J., "After the Falklands," Proceedings, March 1986, pp 121-129. Questions and wisdom of the Royal Navy functioning primarily in conjunction with Striking Fleet Atlantic and USN SSNs in the Norwegian Sea. Would prefer RN focus to return to Naval Control and Protection of Shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel.

Grove, Eric J., "The Convoy Debate," Naval Forces, No. III/1985, pp 38-46. Update of classic post-war Royal Navy pro-convoy/anti-forward ops arguments by a leading British civilian naval analyst.

** Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy and Crisis Stability," Naval Forces, No. 6, 1986, pp 34-44. Excellent discussion of how the Soviet Union and the West might agree on a set of formal or informal "rules" for routinizing the periodic forward deployment of NATO naval forces in the Norwegian Sea without upsetting the "Nordic balance." Were such "normal times" rules to be broken, says Grove, this would serve as a "tripwire" for the West to initiate the maritime strategy's "Phase I" crisis reinforcement.

Grove, Eric, "The Maritime Strategy," Bulletin of the Council for Arms Control (UK), September 1986, pp 5-6. Regards the Strategy as "self-consciously offensive" and "self-consciously coalition-minded, yet, another example of the growing difference in mood between the two sides of the Atlantic." Challenges fellow Europeans to inject amendments reflecting their own "interests and fears." The "difference in mood" he sees, however, may well be more between military leaders and some political writers on both sides of the ocean than between Americans and Europeans.

Hackett, Gen. Sir John, BA (Ret.), McGeoch, V.Adm. Sir Ian, RN, (Ret.), et al, The Third World War: The Untold Story, New York: MacMillan, 1982. Fiction. Sequel to The Third World War: August 1985 (1978). A British vision, stressing the war at sea and on the northern front, and all but ignoring the Mediterranean and Pacific. "Swing" and carrier strikes on the Kola understood (as in 1978) as normal NATO *modus operandi*. Cf Clancy's 1986 Red Storm Rising, and Hayes et al American Lake, Chapter 19, cited in Section II above.

Haesken, Ole, et al, Confidence Building Measures at Sea, FFI Rapport-88/5002, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, November 10, 1988. An exhaustive study of the desirability/feasibility of 14 different types of possible confidence building measures (CBMs) at sea for the Nordic region. The study finds 5 possible measures "clearly promising" (e.g., notification of exercises, incidents-at-sea agreements), 6 with "uncertain value" (e.g., limitation of exercises, exchange of shipboard exercise observers), and 3 "clearly unsuitable." Each of the latter would entail the creation of "permanent zones" of naval exclusion, e.g., limited

presence, weapons (SLCM) limitations, and limited base access. This is requisite reading for anyone concerned with the possible impact of maritime CBMs on operations efficiency, deterrence, and forward naval planning generally.

Heginbotham, Stanley, J., "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic Europe," Naval War College Review, November/December 1985, pp 19-27. Notes that U.S. Navy's maritime strategy means different things to different people, and that the European allies will accept or reject the strategy, depending on their particular interpretation (e.g., "deployment doctrine" vs. "horizontal escalation doctrine"). The author concludes that, "it is important to bear European sensitivities in minds and to shape a strategy in ways that are most likely to draw European support rather than opposition."

Heginbotham, Stanley, "The Forward Maritime Strategy and Nordic Europe, Naval War College Review, November-December 1985, pp 19-27.

Holst, Johan Jorgen, "Arms Control and Security on NATO's Northern Flank," NATO Review, October 1988, pp 10-16. A comprehensive statement of the Norwegian position on European arms control objectives, including the need for limiting or (preferably) prohibiting nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Holst, Johan Jorgen, et al. (eds.), Deterrence and Defense in the North, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985. See especially authoritative chapters by high Norwegian government officials and Hunt, Kenneth, "The Security of the Center and the North," pp 66-76: "The Stronger the North, the Stronger the Center."

Holst, Johan Jorgen, "The Security Pattern in Northern Europe: A Norwegian View," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/ January 1987, pp 622-33. Excellent discussion by Norway's defense minister of his country's "security calculus," including, in particular, the country's relationship with the Soviet Union based on the "trade-off between considerations of deterrence and reassurance." Most treatments of the linkage between the Central Front and the Northern flank focus on the first as the"dependent variable." Holst reminds the reader that this relationship is much more synergistic: "The size and topography of North Norway would require a would-be attacker to commit fairly large forces which would then not be available for allocation to the central front or the Baltic region...and...NATO's ability to hold the central front is vital, therefore, also from the point of view of constraining Soviet options for diverting forces to the Nordic area." Holst is less than sanguine about some of the declaratory aspects of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy. He specifically cautions against putting the Soviet SSBNs at risk, against using Norwegian territory for "horizontal escalation,"

and against a U.S. Navy "permanent naval presence in the Norwegian Sea." By contrast, he does support the idea of a "reasonable frequency of presence...in order to emphasize the American commitment to the defense of Norway."

Howlett, Gen. Geoffrey, BA., "Interview," Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, September 1986, pp 13-16, NATO Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe rejects a GIUK Gap maritime defense line. Advocates forward defense on land and sea in North Norway and the Baltic, and containment of the Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets in their home waters.

** Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA, "The Threat from the North—Defense of Scandinavia," NATO's Sixteen Nations, October 1986, pp 26-32. The former NATO International Military Staff Director's endorsement of the Maritime Strategy as "making a more effective contribution to deterring the Soviet Northern Fleet from any adventurism in the Norwegian Sea, and Soviet aggression in general," with the caution that it "not go beyond what is essential for deterrence and defense."

Huitfeldt, Lt. Gen. Tonne, RNA, NATO's Northern Security, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, September 1976, by the retired Director of the NATO International Military Staff. "United States maritime strategy is in harmony with the agreed NATO strategy." Good coverage of the 1981 NATO concept of Maritime Operations, a major building block of the Maritime Strategy.

Huldt, Bo, "The Strategic North," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, pp 99-109. Reviews the evolution of the Nordic area from a regional "buffer zone" to a central area in *global strategy*. The Swedish author suggests that, given the transition of the region from being a flank area to "being perhaps directly in the line of fire," a renewed Danish and Norwegian interest in NATO's nuclear deterrent "should not be ruled out as totally inconceivable."

Hunter, Robert, (ed.), NATO—The Next Generation, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984. See especially, and unexpectedly, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force role in closing off Far Eastern straits and protecting Western Pacific sea lines of communication in chapters by Jun Tsunoda and Shunji Taoka.

Jane's NATO & Europe Today, May 3, 1989, "NATO Votes New Navy War Rules," p 3. Reports the adoption by NATO of new roles of naval engagement, defining when naval commanders may open fire against potential adversaries. Does not spell out whether ROEs have been tightened or liberalized.

Jansson, C. Nils-Ove, Cdr., Royal Swedish Navy, "The Baltic: A Sea of Contention," Naval War College Review, pp 47-61. Notes that the Baltic Sea is a "backwater maritime theater" no longer due to three key developments: (1) the forwardness of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy, (2) NATO's FOFA concept, and (3) the rejuvenation of the Soviet TVD system. The article goes on to postulate a wide range of possible Soviet offensive and defensive scenarios for the region.

"Japan, U.S. Map Out Sea Defenses," Washington Times, December 1, 1986, p 6. On the wartime division of labor between the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Kampe, V.Adm. Helmut, FGN, "Defending the Baltic Approaches," Proceedings, March 1986, pp 88-93, by the NATO Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches. Complementary German and Danish naval strategies: "In the Baltic Sea, forward defense begins at the Warsaw Pact ports."

Kawaguchi, Hiroshi, "Japan's Evolving Defense Policy," NATO's Sixteen Nations, April 1989, pp 21-24. An explanantion of how Japan's decision, in January 1987 to repeal the one percent of GNP ceiling on defense expenditures will provide for a robust defense and will not likely be reversed despite the prospect of regional detente. In the area of Far East maritime security, Kawaguchi (a research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University in Washington, DC) suggests that a START agreement will likely result in the elimination or at least important reduction of the Soviet SSBN fleet in the Sea of Okhotsk. The result may be that the Soviet Pacific Fleet, relieved of its task of SSBN protection, "would have more room for other activities."

King-Harman, Col. Anthony, BA, "NATO Strategy—A New Look," RUSI, March 1984, pp 26-29. By a former long-time member of the International NATO Staff. Alleges and decries a NATO "lack of political direction in the maritime sphere. It has been largely left to SACLANT himself to develop and implement a maritime strategy for deterrence...There is also a Tri-MNC concept of operations again carrying no political endorsement." Calls for a new NATO "strategic review," one result of which, he anticipates would be a finding that "reinforcements...would only need the minimum of maritime protection."

Leenhardt, Adm. Yves, FN, "France—The Need for a Balanced Navy," NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 41-46. Rowing to the beat of a different drum. Authoritative statement by the French CNO. Heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis prevention and control, and allied cooperation. Minimal discussion relating to global or regional forward conventional operations against

the Soviets, however, in contrast to U.S.Maritime Strategy and other allied writers.

Longbottom Squadron Leader S.P., RAAF, "Maritime Strike Strategy for the Royal Australian Air Force," Defense Force Journal, March/April 1987, pp 5+. Argues for increased RAAF attention to mine warfare.

Mabesoone, Capt. W.C., RNLN, and Buis, Cdr. N. W.G., RNLN, "Maritime Strategic Aspects of the North Sea," RUSI, September 1984, pp 12-17. Dutch Navy view of North Sea operations. Complements the Maritime Strategy. Stresses need for land-based air forces in air defense and possibility of SSN TLAM-C support of Central Front operations. Emphasis on barrier vice close-support Naval Protection of Shipping operations.

** Mackay, Cdr. S.V., RN, "An Allied Reaction" Proceedings, April 1987, pp 82-89. Concludes that a peacetime USN Norwegian Sea CVBG presence is required with concomitant "greater commitment from Norway," and "a firm and agreed-upon line...on ROEs. There are clear indications from recent exercises that this Maritime Strategy is the way ahead for U.S. maritime forces and not solely to support the cause for a 600-ship Navy...the supporting maritime nations in NATO must follow the lead. (But) We in Europe must be sure that the Maritime Strategy is a genuine U.S. policy for the future and not just a product of the current administration." See also "Comment and Discussion," July 1987, pp 19-20.

Margolis, Eric, "Will Canadian Waters Become the Next Maginot Line?" Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1986, p 23. A Canadian call for increased U.S./Canadian ASW capabilities in the Arctic.

Matsukane, Hisatomo, "Japan and Security of the Sea Lanes," Global Affairs, Spring 1989, pp 49-64. The director of the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies and a former lieutenant general in the Japanese army warns that the Soviet Pacific Fleet threat is aimed mainly at the Pacific sea lines of communications. to prevent the Soviet fleet from breaking out into the open ocean, the author makes three main recommendations: (1) a change from "passive to active defense" by Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces, including teaming up with U.S. forces for "coordinated strikes on regional Soviet facilities," (2) tighter integration of U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities, and (3) the creation of a "well-articulated regional defense, involving far-reaching cooperation and collaboration" between the United States, Japan, and other regional Far East-Pacific nations.

** Nakanishi, Terumasa, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987, pp 81-97, especially pp 84-85 and

p 90. The Maritime Strategy in the context of the overall military situation in Northeast Asia. "The new 'Full-Forward' strategy of the U.S. Pacific Fleet...is certainly in the interest of Japan's conventional security." He is less sanguine regarding Japan's nuclear security, however.

Nathan, James A., "How's the Strategy Playing With the Allies?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1988, pp 57-62. The author asserts that American's overseas allies, especially in the Pacific region, are skeptical about the intent, manageability, and wherewithal of the U.S. Navy's "global" maritime strategy. Fearing that Pacific Fleet carriers may need to be "swung" to the Atlantic, countries such as Japan and Australia are allegedly reluctant to join with the United States in early forward operations and perhaps be left to "hold the bag."

** Naval Forces, No. 7, 1986, "Norway and the U.S. Maritime Strategy," pp 14-15. An anonymous, but presumably Norwegian, author explains the "reluctant Norwegian embrace of the maritime strategy." While acknowledging Norway's "uncomfortable" security situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the article expresses worry nevertheless that a heightened U.S. military profile in northern waters could negate Norway's past efforts to strike a balance between "deterrence and reassurance." Cited are these specific concerns: (1) an American submarine campaign against Soviet SSBNs might trigger nuclear escalation, as well as serve to denude the Norwegian Sea-deployed carier battlegroups of their own SSN protection; (2) the Soviet Union could counter U.S. forward deployment with its own increase in force levels, the latter could become a permanent feature of the Nordic "strategic landscape," whereas the U.S. presence may turn out to be a passing phenomenon; and (3) there is no guarantee that U.S. Navy forces will arrive in time and at places of Norwegian choosing.

Netherlands Advisory Committee on Peace and Security, Burden Sharing: A Political Task, The Hague, May 1989. Report prepared for the Dutch ministries of defense and foreign affairs. Concludes that the American perception (real and imagined) of an inequitable Alliance defense burden should be re-dressed less through higher European defense expenditures than by way of a broader "European" responsibility for its own security. The revival of the Western European Union (WEU), and the dispatch of European naval units to the Persian Gulf are reported as "signals" to the United States that "Europe" is indeed prepared to share burdens outside the Atlantic treaty area. The Report acknowledges that a "united Western Europe" may not always make itself heard to U.S. liking, and must guard against living up to the fears of some Americans that "1992" will inaugurate a "fortress Europe."

Newman, Peter C., "Business Watch: About-Face in Defense Strategy," Maclean's Magazine, January 12, 1987, p 28. Naval aspects of the defense debate in Canada on the eve of publication of the 1987 "White Paper."

Nishihara, Masashi, "Maritime Cooperation in the Pacific: The United States and its Partners," Naval War College Review, Summer 1987, pp 37-41. "The U.S. strategy of horizontal escalation by which the United States would open up armed tensions in different parts of the world, in order to force the Soviets to disperse their forces, may not meet Japanese interests."

Okazuki, Hisahiko, Japan's National Security Strategy, Maryland: Abt Books, 1986. Ambassador Okazuki presents persuasive arguments why Japan could not stay out of large or small conflicts involving its interests.

** Olsen, Edward R., "The Maritime Strategy in the Western Pacific," Naval War College Review, Autumn 1987, pp 38-49. A reminder that U.S. perceptions of what-needs-to-be-done in the "American lake," i.e. Western Pacific, are not always shared by the regional states. Most nations in the area, says Olsen, fully appreciate the maritimeness of their geo-strategical and economic circumstances; however, they have so far failed to "co-sign" the American estimate of the Soviet danger, and remain uncertain of how exactly an American maritime strategy would cope with this danger.

Oseald, Sir Julian, Adm. Royal Navy. "Maritime Concepts of Operations: New Thinking," The RUSI Journal, Summer 1988, pp. 10-14. NATO's Commander-in-Chief, Channel and Eastern Atlantic considers how emerging maritime technologies will help keep the allied "forward maritime concept" affordable.

Price, Alfred, Air Battle Central Europe, New York: The Free Press, 1986. See Chapter 14, "Guardians of the Baltic Shore," on Federal German Naval Aviation forward air-to-surface warfare concepts in the Baltic, and Chapter 15, "Protecting the Lifeline," on air defense of the seas surrounding the United Kingdom.

Pruijs, A., Capt., RNLN, "De verdediging van de Noordflank is meer dan de verdediging van Noord-Noorwegen" ("The Defense of the Northern Flank is More Than the Defense of Northern Norway"), Marineblad (The Hague), April 1987, pp 96-107. A review of the importance of the Nordic region to the security and defense of Central Europe. A maritime forward defense, says this serving officer in the Dutch Navy, is codified in the 1982 NATO Defense Planning Committee-approved Concept of Maritime Operations (CONMAROPS). Western European navies and amphibious forces

must be prepared to respond to a crisis quickly and in force, pending the arrival of the U.S. carrier reinforcements.

Richey, George, Britain's Strategic Role in NATO, London: MacMillan, 1986. Argues for Britain's return to a classic Maritime Strategy, as Ambassador Robert Komer, Senator Gary Hart and William Lind (but not the U.S. Navy) use the term.

Riste, Olav and Tamnes, Rolf, The Soviet Naval Threat and Norway, Oslo: Research Center for Defense History (FHFS), National Defense College Norway, 1986. See especially pp 18-22. Two Norwegian defense specialists see recent U.S. naval and other efforts as providing "from the Norwegian point of view...a considerably improved probability that the supply lines to Norway will be kept open." See also Tamnes' "Integration and Screening," (also FHFS 1986), on Norwegian attitudes in the 1970s and 1980s.

"Royal Navy Edges Closer to Kola," Defense Attache, 4/1985, pp 9-10. On actual complementary contemporary Royal Navy North Norwegian Sea strategy.

Schlim, V.Adm. A.J.P., BN, "Mine Warfare in European Waters," NATO's Sixteen Nations, February-March 1986, pp 20-28. By the Belgian CNO. How NATO plans to use mines and mining against the Soviets. Excellent complementarity with the Maritime Strategy.

Secretary of State for Defense (UK), Statement on the Defense Estimates 1986: 1, London: HMSO, 1986. See especially pp 29, 34, and 60-61. "...enemy attack submarines are successfully to be held at arm's length from the critical Atlantic routes. Defense against these submarines would begin when they sailed; the availability of U.S. ships in the Eastern Atlantic at the outbreak of hostilities cannot be assumed; U.S. and European navies are continuing...to ensure the preservation of an essential margin of allied maritime superiority in key ocean areas."

Secretary of State for Defense (UK), Statement on the Defense Estimates 1987: 1, London: HMSO, 1987. See especially p 25 for reaffirmation of previous year's policy statements and commitment to Royal Navy "forward deployment operations in the Norwegian Sea."

Shadwick, Martin, "Canada's Commitments to NATO: The Need for Rationalization," Canadian Defense Quarterly, Summer 1985, pp 22-27. The range of options for future Canadian deployment strategies, any of which would affect the Maritime Strategy.

Small, Adm. William N., "The Southern Region: The Key to Europe's Defense," Armed Forces, January 1986, pp 12-13. By the NATO

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. NATO's plans for defense of its Southern Region, including allied and U.S. Navy Sixth Fleet/STRIKEFORSOUTH Mediterranean operations and Turkish Black Sea operations.

Sokolsky, Joel J. "Canada's Maritime Forces: Strategic Assumptions, Commitments, Priorities," Canadian Defense Quarterly, Winter 85/86, pp 24-20. By a leading Canadian civilian defense and naval specialist. See especially pp 28-29, regarding similarities between the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s and NATO naval strategy of the 1950s. Also see Francis, David R., "Canada Ponders Major Shift in Defense Policy," Christian Science Monitor, February 4, 1987, p 9, for update of Sokolsky's views.

** Sokolsky, Joel, "The U.S. Navy and Canadian Security: Trends in American Maritime Strategy," Peace and Security, Spring 1987, pp 10+. Sees the Maritime Strategy as creating problems for Canada. Advocates a Canadian Naval build up.

Stavridis, Cdr. James, "The Global Maritime Coalition," Proceedings, April 1985, pp. 58-74. Also "Comment and Discussion," October 1985, p 177. On role of allies in Maritime Strategy by a former OP-603 staffer.

Stryker, Russell F., "Civil Shipping Support for NATO," NATO Review, February 1986, pp 29-33. By a U.S. Maritime Administration official and member of the NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. On the shipping that i to use the North Atlantic SLOC.

Teitler, G., "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan de bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy: Challenge for the Allies"), Marineblad (The Hague), June 1986, pp 332-38. One of the most astute Dutch commentators on international maritime affairs advises the Royal Netherlands Navy to answer the "challenge" of the American maritime strategy, and make up its minds whether to "sign on," or maintain its preoccupation with the "southerly defense" of the Atlantic SLOCs. Without active participation in the maritime strategic debate, warns Teitler, the Dutch Navy is likely to find itself relegated to "specialized" tasks such as sweeping mines in the North Sea and English Channel. See also the commentary by Veassen and Van Waning in the September 1986 issue of Marineblad.

The North Atlantic Assembly, NATO Anti Submarine Warfare: Strategy, Requirements and the Need for Cooperation, Brussels: 1982. Good survey of the issues, with a call for resolution of the debate over mission priorities.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (10th and subsequent editions), Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981 and

subsequently. The basic official public document of NATO policy and strategy. See especially latest (1984) edition, pp 108-111, 143-144 and 380. "The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic area by guarding the sea lands and denying their use to an enemy, to conduct conventional and nuclear operations against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR. NATO's forces (have) roles of neutralizing Soviet strategic nuclear submarines, safeguarding transatlantic sea lines and in general preventing the Warsaw Pact from gaining maritime supremacy in the North Atlantic."

Thorthon, T.E., Lt. Cdr. RN, "Have We Really Got It Right? Reflections on NATO's Naval Strategy," Armed Forces (London), August 1987, pp 349-50. A British naval officer warns that NATO is without enough grey hulls to afford the risk of an early forward offensive and should, therefore, plan on "establishing the strongest possible blockade in the vicinity of the GIUK gap."

** Till, Geoffrey, "Maritime Power: The European Dimension," Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 88-104. Excellent and comprehensive survey by a European of how European naval power complements the Maritime Strategy in supporting overall NATO Maritime Strategy. A partial antidote to Bing West's concerns.

Tokinoya, Atsushi, The Japan-U.S. Alliance: A Japanese Perspective (Adelphi Paper #212), London," IISS, Autumn 1986.

Tonge, David, "Exposure Troubles NATO's Northern Commanders," Financial Times, October 27, 1982, p 3. Reports NATO Northern Region ground commanders' concerns that carrier battle groups may not arrive in the Norwegian Sea early enough.

Toyka, Cdr. Viktor, FGN, "A Submerged Forward Defense," Proceedings, March 1984, pp 145-147. Complementary German Maritime Strategy for the Baltic.

Train, Adm. Harry, "U.S. Maritime Power," in Coker, Christopher, U.S.Military Power in the 1980s, London: MacMillan Press, 1983 pp 107-114. SACLANT provides details on the 1981 NATO Maritime Concept of Operations (CONMAROPS), one of the building blocks of the Maritime Strategy.

Ulman, Neil, "Defending NATO's Northern Flank," Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1982, p 29. One reporter's impression of Norway and Sweden's perception of the Nordic threat.

** Urban, Mark, "New Navy Plan to Attack Soviet Subs Near Bases," The Independent (London), April 14, 1987. Commander-in-Chief of

the British Fleet, Adm. Hunt, on forward Royal Navy and NATO submarine, including anti-SSBN operations.

Vaessen, Jules J., "Defensie van de Noordflank is meer dan de verdediging van Noord Noorwegen" ("Defense of the Northern Flank Means More Than the Defense of Northern Norway"), Marineblad, (The Hague) December 1986/January 1987, pp 609-21. Compares the Soviet and Western stakes in Europe's northern region. Includes a discussion of NATO's plans for a "defense-in-depth" of Denmark and the Danish Straits.

Vaessen, Jules, J., Capt., RNLN, "The Maritime Strategy en de bondgenoten" ("The Maritime Strategy and the Allies"), Commentary on Teitler's "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan de bondenoten," Marineblad (The Hague), September 1986, p 471. Writes that the American maritime strategy's emphasis on threatening the Soviet flanks is a move in the right direction, away from NATO's myopia with defense on the ground in Europe's center. If it does not want to find itself a minor partner to the British Navy, warns Vaessen, his service had better take an active role in the development of a new Atlantic maritime concept.

Van Eekelen, W.F., "De Noordflank van NAVO" ("The Northern Flank of NATO") Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/January 1987, pp 599-600. The Dutch defense minister takes note that the 'Nordic Balance" is a political concept in need of a military balance, including an allied naval presence. Van Eekelen supports the Norwegian position that the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone (NFZ) cannot be isolated from a much broader agreement on European de-nuclearization.

Van Reijn, J.A. and Teitler, G., "Maritieme stragegie in the 20e eeuw: een conceptie in beweging." ("Maritime Strategy in the 20th Century: An Evolving Concept"), Marineblad (The Hague), Vol. 99:3, March 1989, pp 103-109. The authors find that naval forces are the instrument par excellence for war prevention, conflict management, and coercive diplomacy.

Van Reijn, J.A., Lt. Col., Royal Netherlands Marines, "De Koninklijke Marine naar het jaar 2000" ("The Royal Navy Toward the Year 2000"), Spiegel, Vol. 22, No. 87, 1987, pp 11-25. This article in the quarterly journal of the Royal Netherlands Naval Institute offers a prognosis of the domestic and international factors that the author believes will shape the roles, missions, and capabilities of the Dutch fleet during the final decade of the 20th century. Norway and the Norwegian Sea are labeled "the key to Europe's security." Confirmed is the Dutch Navy's northern "tilt." The author voices his belief that Dutch naval plans will be influenced increasingly by an emerging "European pillar" within NATO. Uncertainty about the continued

pre-eminence of Europe in U.S. thinking, the questionable longevity of the U.S. Navy fleet build-up, and certain geographic considerations imply these European naval tasks in the Norwegian Sea: (1) a permanent peacetime presence, (2) crisis control and deterrence through increased presence, and (3) acting as the first-line-of-defense pending the appearance of U.S. reinforcements. On the out-of-area "problem," the writer emphasizes that, "it can hardly be maintained in the future that NATO's security interests...are limited to the Atlantic treaty area." The American plans for "horizontal escalation," he says, signify that US/Soviet out-of-area confrontation is not likely to leave Europe untouched, and that this alone is sufficient reason for the Europeans to participate in out-of-area crisis decision-making and deployments.

Van Rooyen, Jules J.J., Cdr. Royal Netherlands Navy, "A Dutch View of Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1988, pp 46-48. Cdr. Van Rooyen is the deputy head of the Royal Netherlands Navy strategic planning division, and a key participant in the NATO Eurogroup's "European Maritime Concept 2010" series of regional maritime security studies. His article should, therefore, be read as an authoritative portrayal of his Navy's view of the strategic demands for crisis management and deterrence in the North Atlantic Region. That view holds that a credible NATO deterrent depends as much on "a relationship of greater (US/European) understanding," as on military capabilities per se. Allied solidarity and the adverse time-distance relationship between NATO's northern arena and American reinforcements dictate that a maritime strategical response to an evolving crisis rely initially on the forward movement of the European navies.

Van Waning, J.J., Capt. RNLN, "The Maritime Strategy: Afhankelijk van de bijdrage van bondschappelijke marines" (The Maritime Strategy: Dependent on the Contribution of the Allied Navies"). Commentary on Teitler's "The Maritime Strategy: Uitdaging ook aan de bondgenoten," Marineblad (The Hague), September 1986, pp 472-77. Disagrees with Teitler's contention that the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy is a plan for going-it-alone. Cites extensively from the U.S. Naval Institute's "White Paper" of January 1986 to "prove" the strategy's coalitional intent.

Veassen, Jules J., Capt., RNLN, "De maritieme expansie van de Sovjet Unie: Schoolvoorbeeld van geintegreerd maritiem beleid: ("The Maritime Expansion of the Soviet Union: Textbook Example of an Integrated Maritime Policy"), Marineblad (The Hague), March 1987, pp 56-65. Voices strong support for the U.S. Navy's plans to defend NATO's northern flank through a forward offensive. National and coalition interests mandate that the Dutch Navy team up with its British and possibly West German sister services, and join the U.S.

maritime strategy, and, in the event of a crisis, act as a European "gap filler" force preparatory to the arrival of the U.S. battlegroups.

Wemyss, R.Adm. Martin Lat., RN, "Naval Exercises 1980-81," Jane's Naval Annual, 1981, pp 151-158. Highlights problems in interallied naval cooperation resulting from U.S. Navy communication and intelligence systems advances.

Wemyss, R.Adm. Martin Lat., RN, "Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations for the Uninitiated," RUSI Journal, September 1981, pp 22-27. Restatement of classic Royal Navy arguments for focusing allied ASW efforts around expected afloat targets, instead of US Navy-spearheaded forward operations.

Wettern, Desmond, "Maritime Strategy: Change or Decay?" Navy International, May 1986, pp 304-08. Speculating that Gorshkov's successor, Admiral Chernavin, may shift Soviet Navy Strategy to planning for a massive U-boat style Atlantic tonage campaign, Wettern urges that the European NATO navies must choose between a large increase of convoys escort forces or joining the American preference for forward strategy. If the latter course is chosen, he concludes, the Europeans must ipso facto prepare to join in "global strategy," including active participation in -out-of-area hostilities.

Wettern, Desmond, "NATO and Maritime Strategy," Navy International, December 1987, pp 472-75. Questions the apparently discrepant NATO reinforcement and resupply shipping requirements as variously reported by CINCHAN, SACLANT, and the 1986 NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS). Quotes the outgoing CINCHAN, Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, to the effect that Allied maritime forces share the U.S. Maritime Strategy's intent to "operate forward defense...behind enemy lines in enemy waters."

Woodward, Sir John, V. Adm., RN, "Strategies, Concepts, and Their Maritime Implications," The RUSI Journal, June 1986, pp 11-14. The commander of the British task force during the Falklands war reports that the existing mix and quality of the Royal Navy's capabilities is just about the right one, that can and must be maintained with proper management and in spite of a zero-growth defense budget. Since Britain cannot cut back on its maritime commitments in the NATO area and elsewhere, its naval planners must emphasize a greater rationalization of effort, including longer production runs, standardization of equipments, closer international collaboration, etc.

Yost, William J., Ed., In Defense of Canada's Oceans, Ottawa, Canada: Conference of Defense Associations Institute, 1988, 59 pp. This is a collection office essays, first presented at a January 1988 seminar, sponsored by the Canadian Conference of Defense

Associations in the wake of the country's recently-published White Paper on Defense, which included the announcement of Canada's controversial nuclear submarine buying plan. Individual contributors include: General P.D. Manson, Chief of Defense Staff, W. Harriet Critchley of the University of Calgary, Derek Blackburh, MP and Defense Critic for the New Democratic Party, Rear Admiral F.W. Crickard, former Deputy Commander of Maritime Command, and Rear Admiral A.P. Gay, a retired French naval officer. Most relevant to the American maritime strategy is Crickard's "The U.S. Maritime Strategy—Should Canada Be Concerned?" Crickard's answer is "yes," and he notes that, "At the navy-to-navy level, there was neither prior consultation with the US on its maritime strategy nor, to my knowledge, has there been any organized naval or defense assessment of it in Canada."

Young, Thomas-Durell, "Australia Bites Off More Than the RAN Can Chew," Pacific Defense Reporter, March 1986, pp 15-17. See also his "Self-Reliance and Force Development in the RAN," Proceedings, March 1986, pp 157-161, and "Don't Abandon Radford-Collins," Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1986, p 16. On Australian and New Zealand ASW and Naval Control/Protection of Shipping roles in the Indian and Southwest Pacific Ocean.

VI. SOVIET STRATEGY AND VIEWS

U. S. and allied Maritime Strategy is not a game of solitaire. The Soviet threat, along with U.S. national and allied interests and geo-political realities, is one of the fundamental ingredients of that strategy. No attempt can be made here, however, to recount the considerable literature that exists on Soviet naval affairs. The focus in the relatively few works listed below is how the Soviets view their own maritime strategy as well as ours, and how correctly we have divined their views. A critical issue is which missions they see as primary and which they see as secondary, for their navy and for those of the west, and whether these priorities will change soon. Much material on the Soviets also can be found in other entries in this bibliography.

** Balev, B., "The Military-Political Strategy of Imperialism on the World Ocean," World Economics and International Relations, April 1986, pp 24-31. A Soviet perspective on the Maritime Strategy—"novaya morskaya strategiya." The three national phases restyled as "Keeping Oneself on the Verge of War, Seizing the Initiative," and "Carrying Combat Operations into Enemy Territory."

** Breemer, Jan, "U.S. Maritime Strategy: A Re-appraisal," Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 64-76. discusses the background behind and the issues surrounding current U.S. Navy thinking on Soviet naval strategy.

Bystrov, R.Adm. Yu., "U.S. Games in the World Ocean," Literaturnaya Gazeta, September 4, 1985, p 14. Soviet public reaction to exercise Ocean Safari 85 and other forward exercises.

Christman, Timothy J., "Sen. Quayle Favors Exploiting Soviet Weaknesses," Defense News, May 11, 1987, p 31. Reports the inclusion in the 1988 authorization bill of the requirement of SECDEF to report on progress and implementation of the "competitive strategies" concept.

Dalaere, Martijn, "De Verbetering van de Russische Onderzeeboottechnologie en de Amerikaanse Maritieme Strategie" ("The Improvement of Soviet Submarine Technology and the American Maritime Strategy"), Marineblad (The Hague), October 1988, pp. 419-27. This Dutch author argues that a U.S. strategic ASW campaign against the Soviet SSBN bastions is no longer credible in light of recent Soviet advances in submarine quieting, and urges that the United States and its allies turn instead to protecting the Atlantic SLOCs by means of barrier and escort strategies. Yet, having concluded on the improbability of a successful anti-SSBN campaign, the writer then turns around to warn how American success could trigger a Soviet use-them-or-lose-them strike!

** Daniel, Donald C.F., "The Soviet Navy and Tactical Nuclear War at Sea," Survival, July/August 1987, pp 138+. The Director of the Naval War College's Strategy and Campaign Department concludes, inter alia, that Soviet decision makers will use nuclear weapons at sea only if they have already been used ashore, or if NATO uses them at sea first.

** Elliott, Frank, "Soviets Knew of Maritime Strategy Before Lehman, Watkins Publicized It," Defense Week May 4, 1987, p 5. Reports on important Seminar on Soviet views of the Maritime Strategy. See also Seminar transcript, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1987.

** Falin, Valentine, "Back to the Stone Age," Izvestia (Moscow), January 24, 1986. Condemns the U.S. Navy for planning to use forward deployment as a means for "taking any dispute to a global level," and using "non-nuclear means against the other side's nuclear forces and thus improving its own nuclear position." American naval planners, says Falin, do not expect the Soviet Union to respond with nuclear means, but he asks, how would the United States react if Soviet Navy forces were to apply "naval and air pressure in the spirit of Watkins' concept against American ships, bases and territory?" The author provides his own answer: "They (American decision makers seize on nuclear weapons in response not even to a threat to their arsenals, but to minor inconveniences for U.S. Policy." Highlights opposing arguments by Barry Posen. See also commentary by Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: The Soviet Union Reacts," Proceedings, April 1986, p 111.

Fitzgerald, Capt. T.A., "Blitzkrieg at Sea," Proceedings, January 1986, pp 12-16. Argues Soviets may use their Navy as a risk fleet for a "Blitzkrieg," and not for sea-denial. A view shared by many U.S. Navy operators.

** Friedman, Norman, "Soviet Naval Aviation," Naval Forces, No. 1/1986, pp 92-97. Sees Soviet Naval Aviation as perhaps the greatest threat to NATO navies.

** George, James L., (ed.), The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. An outstanding collection of papers from a 1985 CNA-sponsored conference of top experts in the field, including several references to the Maritime Strategy. See especially Brad Dismukes' discussion of the contending views on Soviet Navy missions; the authoritative judgments of R.Adm. William Studeman, R. Adm. Thomas Brooks, and Mr. Richard Haver, the nation's top naval intelligence professionals; and the contrasting views of Adm. Sylvester Foley and Adm. Harry Train, two former "operators." Wayne Wright's "Soviet

Operations in the Mediterranean" is especially good on the interplay of Soviet and U.S. Maritime Strategy. The excellent paper by Alvin Bernstein of the Naval War College and the paper by Anthony Wells have also been reprinted elsewhere: the former in National Interest, Spring 1986, pp 17-29; the latter in National Defense, February 1986, pp 38-44.

Gorshkov, R.Adm. Serge G., The Sea Power of the State, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979. See especially pp 290 and 329. "The employment of naval forces against the sea-based strategic systems of the enemy has become most important in order to disrupt or blunt to the maximum degree their strikes against targets ashore...."

** Komenskiy, Captain First Rank V., "The NATO Strategic Command in the Atlantic" and "Combat Exercises of the Combined NATO Forces in 1985," Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, April 1986, pp 47-53 and August 1986 pp 45-51. Includes discussion of roles and missions of NATO naval forces in the context of the Maritime Strategy. See also Rodin, Colonel V. "The Military Doctrines of Japan," August 1986, pp 3-9.

Leighton, Marian, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan," Survey, Autumn-Winter 1983, pp 112-151. Sees "striking and disquieting similarities" between recent "patterns of Soviet coercion against northern Europe and Japan."

** Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: More Than Meets the Eye," Proceedings, February 1987, pp 117-118. Sophisticated analysis of October 3/4, 1986 Red Star article on potential changes in Soviet doctrine, strategic thinking and planning that, if adopted, will have important implications for Soviet response to the Maritime Strategy.

** Manthorpe, Capt. William, USN (Ret.), "The Soviet View: RimPac-86," Proceedings, October 1986, p 191. The Soviets see linkages between the Maritime Strategy and allied exercises.

Mayer, Charles W., Jr., Cdr., USN, "Looking Backwards into the Future of the Maritime Strategy, Are We Uncovering Our Center of Gravity in the Attempt to Strike at Our Opponent's?" Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 33-46. Citing the "lessons" the Soviets have presumably learned from the U-boat wars of World Wars I and II, the author warns that the wartime practice of Soviet Naval Strategy may be much more offensive than the planners of the maritime strategy seem to anticipate. Recommends that U.S. naval planners be prepared with the Soviet Navy's *capability* to stage a massive submarine onslaught against the Atlantic sea routes.

MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.), Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, Washington: Bookings, 1987. Individualistic, iconoclastic and debatable.

MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.), "Soviet Military Objectives," World Policy Journal, Fall 1986, pp 667-695. Adapted from his book, cited below. Much that goes against the grain of contemporary informed conventional wisdom regarding Soviet intentions, including the naval threat. Mediterranean seen as particularly important. See especially pp 676-680.

McConnell, James M., "The Soviet Shift in Emphasis From Nuclear to Conventional," Vols I and II, Alexandria, VA, Center for Naval Analyses, CRC 490, June 1983. Includes alternative views of Soviet Naval Strategy.

** Mozgovoy, Aleksandr, "For Security on Sea Routes," International Affairs (Moscow, 1/1987, pp 77-84, 103. See especially p 83, on the Maritime Strategy as "an unprecedentedly impudent document, even given the militaristic hysteria reigning in Washington today."

Norwegian Atlantic Commission, "The Military Balance in Northern Europe," Marineblad (The Hague), December 1986/ January 1987, pp 655-77. A thorough listing of the NATO-Warsaw Pact order of battle, including reinforcement plans and capabilities, in the Northern region.

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Fifth Edition), Washington: USGPO, 1985. Latest in a series of official U.S. Navy handbooks on the Soviet fleet. See also critique by Norman Friedman in Proceedings, November 1985, pp 88-89.

Perov, I., Lt. Gen. Soviet Army, "Aggressive Essence of New U.S., NATO Concepts," Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No. 2, February 1988. Detailed appraisal of NATO's alleged plans to integrate emerging technologies (ETs) and "more aggressive concepts of warmaking" into "air-land" (Air-Land Battle, FOFA) and "air-sea" (Maritime Strategy) "operations." Central to the new American "sea strategy," says the writer, are plans for "mass employment of cruise missiles against naval and coastal targets together with deck-based tactical and strategic aviation." Perov is evidently painfully aware of the SLCM "revolution" at sea.

Petersen, Charles C., "Strategic Lessons of the Recent Soviet Naval Exercise," National Defense, February 1986, pp 32-36. A leading strategy analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses sees Soviets' strategy threatening U.S. ports and SLOCs in addition to defending SSBNs close to their homeland. Urges USN strategic homeporting,

mine warfare, and shallow-water ASW initiatives, in addition to "carrying the fight to the enemy."

Rabe, Heinz, Lt. Col., Volksarmee of the German Democratic Republic, "U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Norwegian Sea?" Volksarmee (GDR), No. 32, 1986. East German condemnation of the American "illusion of limiting war in Europe and being able to keep their own territory away from counterstrikes," while creating the "murderous concept" of a "Sixth Fleet" in the Norwegian Sea.

Ries, Tomas and Skorve, Johnny, Investigating Kola: A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite Photos, Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institute, 1986. See especially pp 21-49, on the place of Fenno-Scandia and adjacent waters in the context of overall Soviet strategy.

Rosenberg, David Alan, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse" Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy," Naval War College Review, Summer 1988,p 69-105. Excellent summary and interpretation of Soviet commentary on U.S. maritime strategy between 1986 and 1988. Principal findings include: (1) the Soviets do not appear to have acknowledged the maritime strategy as a "doctrine" or "strategy" of national standing but instead as an example of "naval art" designed to perhaps influence U.S. national policy; (2) Soviet discussions of the U.S. Navy's "new strategy" are used mostly to highlight the U.S. Navy's capabilities and not the strategy's strategic significance; and (3) the maritime strategy may have generated or accelerated a heightened Soviet interest in naval arms controls.

Rumyantsev. R.Adm. A., "The Navy in the Plans of the Pentagon's New Military Strategy," Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 1982, pp 59-64. Soviet public interpretation of Reagan Administration naval policy, including Norwegian Sea Battle Group operations and Arctic SSN anti-SSBN operations. Soviets fully expectant of a USN anti-SSBN campaign.

Schandler, Herbert Y., "Arms Control in Northeast Asia," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1987, pp 69-79. Wide-ranging article which gives the context within which the Maritime Strategy operates in the Pacific. Highlights "the ever-looming nightmare of a two-front war" as gaining in credibility for the Soviet Union. "This two-front threat is enormously important to Soviet psychology and provides the United States with a major pressure point on Soviet leaders."

Sharpe, Richard, Capt. RN (Ret.), "Will We Have the Forces With Which to Counter Soviet Naval Strategies?" Navy League of the United States, The Almanac of Seapower 1989, Arlington, VA, January 1989, pp 28-42. The editor of Jane's Fighting Ships voices skepticism with the accepted Western view of the Soviet Navy as a

"defense" force that, in time of war, will be preoccupied with the protection of its SSBN bastions.

"Soviet Naval Activities: 1977-1984," NATO Review, February 1985, pp 17-20. A series of charts reflecting recent Soviet exercise activity in the North Atlantic.

Stalbo, V.Adm. K., "U.S. Ocean Strategy," in Morskoy Sbornik, November 10, 1983, pp 29-36. The Soviet Navy's leading theoretician writes in its official journal. Reaction to the Proceedings October 1982 issue on the Soviet Navy, and to statements by the Secretary of the Navy. Criticizes the "new U.S. Naval Strategy" for its geopolitical roots, its global scope, and for its aims of "isolating countries of the Socialist community from the rest of the world."

Strelkov, Captain First Rank V., "Naval Forces in U.S. Direct Confrontation Strategy," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 5, 1983, pp 78-82. Highlights maritime roles of allies and sister services as well as USN.

Sturua, G., "Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare," USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, February 1985. Strategic ASW viewed as a primary USN mission.

Sturua, G.M., "The United States: Reliance on Ocean Strategy," USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, November 1982. A prominent Soviet civilian defense analyst's views on the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy. He sees it as primarily a nuclear counter-force strategy, employing submarine and carrier-launched nuclear weapons.

Tritten, Cdr. James J., Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare: Weapons, Employment and Policy, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. By the acting Chairman of the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Examination of Soviet Naval missions, including implications for U.S. Naval Strategy. Anticipates Soviet Navy wartime bastion defense, anti-carrier warfare, strategic anti-submarine warfare, and, controversially, anti-SLOC operations. See also his "Defense Strategy and Offensive Bastion," Sea Power, November 1986, pp 64-70.

Trofimenko, Genrikh, "The Blue Water Strategy," excerpt from The U.S. Military Doctrine, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986, pp 193-99. A prolific Soviet commentator on U.S. National Security Policy, Trofimenko claims that, until the 1979s, U.S. Navy policy had been dominated by the twin goals of bolstering the threat of its SSBN fleet, and the projection of power in the Third World. Since then, it has paid increasing attention to "domination of the high seas," including the control of chokepoints and the projection of "general purpose" power against the shores of the Soviet Union. "Of course," says the

author, "The U.S. military cannot fail to understand that any direct attack by a US naval vessel against a Soviet ship entails the risk of this isolated incident escalating to a conflict between the two nations."

Trofimenko, Ginrikh, The U.S. Military Doctrine, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986. See especially pp 34-36 on Mahan, geopolitics, and restraining Russia; and pp 193-201 on the alleged "Blue Water Strategy" of today.

* U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Current Intelligence Issues," Washington: Department of Navy Office of Information, March 1987. See especially pp 1-4 on the anticipated employment of Soviet naval forces in wartime.

U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session. Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY84: Part 6, Washington, GPO, 1983, pp 2935 and 2939. R. Adm. John Butts, new Director of Naval Intelligence, gives authoritative U.S.Navy view of Soviet Navy Strategy, April 1983. See also updates in Butts testimony of 1984 and 1985.

Van Tol, Robert, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-1985," Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 18-34. Most useful in its discussion of the interactions between NATO and Soviet Strategies and between NATO and Soviet exercises.

Watson, Cdr. Bruce W., and Watson, Susan M., (eds.), The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Liabilities, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. See especially chapters by Richard Fisher, "Soviet SLOC Interdiction," and Keith Allen, "The Northern Fleet and North Atlantic Naval Operations," which see SLOC interdiction as more likely than most other knowledgeable experts expect, since Soviet thinking is seen as evolving toward greater consideration of protracted conventional conflict.

* Weinberger, Caspar, Soviet Military Power 1987, Washington: USGPO, March 1987. More extensive analysis of Soviet strategy and operational concepts than in previous editions.

Yashin, R.Adm. B., "The Navy in U.S. Military-Political Strategy," International Affairs (Moscow), #2, 1982. Sees "new U.S. Naval Strategy" of Secretary Lehman as deriving from the "ocean strategy" of Admirals Zumwalt and Turner.

VII. PEACETIME, CRISES, AND THIRD WORLD CONTINGENCIES

Most of the above works deal principally with use of the Navy in general war. What follows are books and articles of the 1970s and 1980s discussing the uses of the U.S. Navy in peacetime, crises, and "small wars" (the "Violent Peace" of the Maritime Strategy). Many of these derive from the increased discussion of peacetime presence as a naval mission engendered by Admirals Elmo Zumwalt and Stansfield Turner in the early 1970s. Thus, the contemporary era of U. S. Navy thought on peacetime presence operations began about five years prior to that on forward global wartime operational concepts. Both bodies of thought, however, have built on the earlier literature of the late 1950s and 1960s on the role of the U.S. Navy in limited war.

While most of the items listed below focus on the U.S. Navy, some of the most important elements on the peacetime/crisis/"small war" activities of the Royal Navy and the Soviet Navy have also been included. In addition, certain of the "White Papers" and "Defense Reports" published by various defense ministries around the world routinely highlight the peacetime operations of their naval forces. Especially notable in this regard are the annual British "Defense Estimates" and Canadian "Annual Reports."

Allen, Capt. Charles D., Jr., USN (Ret.), The Use of Navies in Peacetime, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980. Excellent short analysis, with typology. Focus on postwar U.S. Navy and on escalation.

Arnott, Cdr. Ralph E. and Gaffney, Cdr. William A., "Naval Presence: Sizing the Force," Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp 18-30. Seeks to develop a rational structured approach to choosing a force tailored to respond to a particular crisis, so as to achieve the desired outcome with minimum effect on scheduled fleet operations.

Baker, Caleb, "Retired Admiral Complains of Lack of Realization in Navy," Defense News, September 19, 1988, p 45. The Navy's former (1973-78) Fiscal and Budget Director, Rear Admiral Stanley Fine, USN (Ret.) criticizes the Navy's alleged preoccupation with the Soviet threat in force and strategy planning as symptomatic of a "lack of realization." Fine believes that if the Soviet periphery must be attacked, it can be done easier with land-based airpower than carrier aviation, and concludes that the service's most likely preoccupation in the future will be the same that has been the main business since World War II, i.e. deterrence and crisis control in the Third World.

Barnett, Capt. Roger W., "The U.S. Navy's Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism," Terrorism, Vol 6, No 3, 1983, pp 469-480. A primary architect of the Maritime Strategy argues that while the U.S. Navy is well prepared against attacks on its own ships and

installations, its role in deterring terrorist attacks on U.S. merchant ships or overseas facilities "cannot be suggested to be a large one."

Bentinck, M.R.O., "NAVO's Out-of-Area Problematiek" ("NATO's Out-of-Area Problems"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 185-191. Good discussion of the complexity of NATO solidarity on the "out-of-area" issue. According to the author, permanent yet manageable dilemmas are (1) the diverseness of interests and vulnerabilities of the member states, (2) different expectations among the allies on the need and/or obligation for consultation, and (3) the obligation of allies to compensate for the out-of-area efforts of one ally.

Blechman, Barry M., and Kaplan, Stephen S., Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. Utility of USN vs. other U.S. armed forces.

Booth, Ken, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. Peacetime naval strategy and the Law of the Sea, and much more. Rebuts Elizabeth Young arguments of a decade earlier, pp 66-68.

Booth, Ken, Navies and Foreign Policy, London: Croon Helm, 1977. Magisterial treatment.

Bull, Hedley, "Sea Power and Political Influence," in Power at Sea: I, The New Environment, Adelphi Paper Number 122, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp 1-9. "The period we are now entering will be one in which opportunities for the diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be severely circumscribed."

Bush, Ted, "Sailors Spending More Time at Home Under PersTempo," Navy Times, February 9, 1987, p 3. On naval presence and morale. The U.S. Navy tries to balance conflicting requirements. See also Philpott, Tom and Burlage, John, "Stepped Up Operations May Cut Home Port time," Navy Times, June 22, 1987, pp 1+8; and Burlage, John, "CNO Trost: No Retreat on OpTempo." Navy Times, July 13, 1987, pp 1+26.

Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force, New York: Praeger, 1970. First of a spate of useful books seeking to list, classify and describe peacetime uses of navies. Surveys 20th century activities of all major navies. Updated in 1981.

Cable, Sir James, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," Proceedings, August 1986, pp 36-41. Forcefully argues that the days of gunboat diplomacy are by no means over. Denigrates those who have said otherwise.

Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag," Proceedings, April 1984, pp 59-63. The utility of ship visits.

Cable, Sir James, "Showing the Flag: Past and Present," Naval Forces, No. III/1987, pp 38-49. Update of Cable's thought on this particular aspect of peacetime naval operations. Cf his views in the April 1984 Proceedings, cited above.

Cohen, Raymond, International Politics: The Rules of the Game, London, Longman, 1981, pp 41-48. One of the few general works on international relations by an academic political scientist to deal in any depth with the peacetime and crisis uses of navies. Navy force movements seen as part of the "vocabulary of international politics."

Congressional Budget Office, "U.S. Naval Forces: The Peacetime Presence Mission," Washington: 1978. How it could allegedly be done with fewer CVs.

Coutau-Begarie, Herve, "The Role of the Navy in French Foreign Policy," Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 36-43. By probably the most important contemporary French writer on naval strategy. The recent French global experience, one not often discussed in an English-language literature dominated by U.S., British, and Soviet examples.

Daniel, Donald C., and Tarleton, Gael D., "The Soviet Navy in 1984," Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1985, pp 90-92, 361-364. Snapshot of one year's Soviet global peacetime activity. See subsequent Naval Reviews for updates.

Dismukes, Bradford and McConnell, James M., (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy, New York: Pergamon Press, 1979. Comprehensive surveys and analyses.

Eldredge, Capt. Howear S., "Nonsuperpower Sea Denial Capability: The Implications for Superpower Navies Engaged in Presence Operations," in Ra'anan, Uri et al (eds.), Arms Transfers to the Third World, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978, pp 21-64. Argues that growing sea denial arsenals of littoral nations are complicating the risk calculations of the superpowers in using naval forces to further their interests. Focus on anti-ship missiles and submarine torpedoes.

** Elliot, Frank, "Battleships Assume Some Carrier Duties," Navy Times, March 31, 1986, pp 25, 28. Role of Battleships vis-a-vis carriers in the presence mission.

Etzold, Thomas H., "Neither Peace Nor War: Navies and Low-intensity Conflict," in Ullman, Harlan K., and Etzold, Thomas H.,

Future Imperative: National Security and the U.S. Navy in the Late 1980s, Washington: CSIS, 1985. Argues low-intensity USN contingencies and peacetime operations are on the increase.

Harris, Cdr. R. Robinson, and Benkert, L.Cdr. Joseph, "Is That All There Is?" Proceedings, October 1985, pp 32-37. Contrasts peacetime and global war strategy requirements, with focus on surface combatants.

Hickman, L.Cdr. William J., "Did it Really Matter?" Naval War College Review, March-April 1983, pp 17-30. By a future OP-603 staffer. On limitations and misuses of USN naval presence operations. Indian Ocean case study is useful counterpoint to McGruther article a decade earlier, above.

Hill, Capt. J.R., RN, "Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea," Survival, March/April 1975, pp 69-72. Takes issue with Young's article. Suggests that "in the turbulent future, maritime forces are likely to be more rather than less in demand both at home and away."

Hill, R.Adm. J.R., RN, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986. Chapter 6, "Normal Conditions," pp 88-110, describes the various roles of navies, especially those of medium sized countries in peacetime. Chapter 7, "Low Intensity Operations," pp 88-131, covers operations somewhat higher up on the scale of violence.

Howe, Cdr. Jonathan, Multicrisis: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1971. The 1967 Mideast Crisis, the 1958 Quemoy crisis, and the effectiveness of conventional naval forces as foreign policy instruments by a future flag officer and political-military affairs sub-specialist. Argues for a strong global naval posture especially in the Mediterranean.

Howe, R.Adm. Jonathan T., "Multicrisis Management: Meeting an Expanding Challenge,": in Uri Ra'anan and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., (eds.), Security Commitments and Capabilities: Elements of An American Global Strategy, Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1985, pp 125-137. Reflections on America's ability to manage "multicrises," through naval as well as other means, by the U.S. naval officer who popularized the term 15 years earlier.

James, Lawrence, "Old Problems and Old Answers: Gunboat Diplomacy Today," Defense Analysis, December 1986, pp 324-327. On its limitations, past and present.

Joint Senate/House Armed Services Subcommittee. Ninety-First Congress, Second Session. Hearings on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier,

Washington: USGPO, 1970, pp 162-165. Listing of uses of USN in wars/near-wars 1946-1969; takes negative view of same.

Jordan, Col. Amos A., USA (Ret.), "A National Strategy for the 1990s," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1987, p 15. The president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies sees Third World peoples as increasingly uncowed by "gunboat diplomacy and other similar kinds of hollow threats."

Kaplan, Stephen S., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. Does for the Soviets what Blechman and Kaplan did for the U.S.

Lehman, John F., Jr., "An Absolute Requirement for Every American," Sea Power, April 1985, p 13. SECNAV argues high USN peacetime operating tempo is partly self-generated. See also Washington Post, October 6, 985, p A12, and Virginia Pilot/Ledger Star, October 27, 1985, p A1.

Levine, Daniel B., Planning for Underway Replenishment of Naval Forces in Peacetime (CRM 85-77), Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1985. Much more than underway replenishment. Examines U.S. Navy fleet exercises, crisis response and surveillance operations. Analyses them by ocean area, frequency, and number/types of combatants used.

Luttwak, Edward N., The Pentagon and the Art of War, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, pp 222, 247-248. Sees diminishing value of peacetime deployments.

Luttwak, Edward N., The Political Uses of Sea Power, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Short treatment sponsored by V.Adm. Turner. Typology and analysis based on concept of "suasion." focus on the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean.

Madison, Cdr. Russell L., "The War of Unengaged Forces—Superpowers at Sea in an Era of Competitive Coexistence," Naval War College Review, March-April 1979, pp 82-94. Thoughtful piece seeking to integrate naval peacetime and wartime missions into one framework: the "Theory of Unengaged Force Warfare."

Mahoney, Robert B., Jr., "U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955-1975," Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977. Survey of USN crisis operations and summaries of incidents and responses.

Mandel, Robert, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy," International Studies Quarterly, March 1986, pp 59-76. "The most effective gunboat diplomacy involves a definitive, deterrent display of

force undertaken by an assailant who has engaged in war in the victim's region and who is militarily prepared and politically stable compared to the victim."

Martin, Laurence, "The Use of Naval Forces in Peacetime," Naval War College Review, January -February 1985, pp 4-14. A lecture summarizing many contemporary themes on the subject.

MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.) and McDonnell, John (eds.), Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, New York: Praeger, 1977. See especially chapters by MccGwire, Booth, Dismukes and Kelly.

MccGwire, Cdr. Michael, RN (Ret.), "Changing Naval Operations and Military Intervention," in Stern, Ellen P., The Limits of Military Intervention, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977, pp 151-178, and reprinted in Naval War College Review, Spring 1977, pp 3-25. Sees numerous constraints now in place on the "almost casual use of force which used to be the norm" in military intervention by sea.

McGruther, L.Cdr. Kenneth, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp 3-20. Part of the initial Zumwalt-Turner new look at USN "Naval Presence" mission. Includes Indian Ocean case study and a "cookbook" by a future OP-603 staffer.

McNulty, Cdr. James, "Naval Presence—The Misunderstood Mission," Naval War College Review, September-October 1974, pp 21-31. Another reflection of the initial Zumwalt-Turner focus on presence. See also Turner, V.Adm. Stansfield, "Challenge," pp 1-2 in the same issue.

Moore, Capt. J.E., RN, "The Business of Surveillance," Navy International, June 1974, pp 9-10. Rationale for peacetime surveillance operations at sea.

Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K., "The Evolution of International Order and the Future of the American Naval Presence Mission," Naval War College Review, Fall 1977, pp 37-59. Sees political and technological changes as necessitating revision to contemporary thinking on naval presence, just when that thinking had begun to solidify.

"Navy Cuts Carrier Presence in Mediterranean, Gulf Areas," Washington Times, November 24, 1986, p 4-D. On adjustments to U.S. Navy routine forward presence posture to enhance Navy flexibility and reduce individual ship OPTEMPO.

Neutze, Cdr. Dennis R., JAGC, "Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridical Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy," JAG Journal, Summer 1982, pp 81-158. By the legal advisor to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. Very comprehensive examination of the lawfulness of the political uses of U.S. naval power in terms of domestic and international law, going back to the framers of the Constitution. Sees such political uses as expanding in the future.

New York Times, September 12, 1988, "The Naval Gap in the Persian Gulf," p A-18. Lead editorial that acknowledges the Navy's "critical role in ending the Iran-Iraq war," but that criticizes the service for what is called its failure to build a "balanced fleet" suitable for contingencies other than war with the Soviet Union on the high seas. See also Adm. Trost's rebuttal in the October 8, 1988 issue of the New York Times.

Parritt, Brigadier Brian, Violence at Sea: A Review of Terrorism, Acts of War and Piracy, and Countermeasures to Prevent Terrorism, Paris: ICC Publishing, 1986. See especially Paul Wilkinson's "Terrorism and the Maritime Environment," pp 35-40, on the role of navies in combating terrorism and the kinds of naval force required.

Pyle, Richard, "Persian Gulf Taught U.S. Navy Important Lessons," Dayton Daily News, November 13,1988, p 18. Reports the Gulf "learning experience" for a fleet "whose strategies are built on long-range ocean warfare."

Smith, Edward Allen, Jr., "Naval Confrontation: The Intersuperpower Use of Naval Suasion in Times of Crisis," Phd Dissertation, American University, 1979. Examination of U.S. and Soviet use of their navies in six postwar crises. Heavily influenced by Luttwak's concept of naval suasion."

Taylor, Col. William J., Jr., USA (Ret.), and Cottrell, Alvin J., "Stability, Political Decay, and Navies," Orbis, Fall 1982, pp 579-592. Limitations of naval interventions.

* Trost, C.A.H., Navy's Strategic Victory in the Gulf," New York Times, October 8, 1988, p 26. Rebuts the Times editorial of September 12, 1988, claiming that the Gulf war "validated the Navy's choices at the lower end of the spectrum in the most demanding and realistic environment—combat."

* Trost, Carlisle A.H., Adm., USN, "Naval Chief Disputes Columnist," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 18, 1989, p 8. The CNO rejects criticism by columnist Richard Reeves in the January 21, 1989 edition of the Inquirer that the 600-ship fleet build-up has been "unbalanced"

at the expense of sufficient mine countermeasures and sealift capabilities.

Truver, Scott C., "New International Constraints on Military Power: Navies in the Political Role," Naval War College Review, July-August 1981, pp 99-104. Sees regular employment of major naval combatants and large-deck carriers as becoming less tenable in Third World areas for the remainder of the century, for a variety of reasons.

* U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal year 1986, Part 8, Washington: USGPO, 1986, pp 4409-4448. V.Adm. James A. Lyons on "Global Naval Commitments," February 28, 1985. The official policy enunciated by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06).

** Vlahos, Michael, "The Third World in U.S. Navy Planning," Orbis, Spring 1986, pp 133-148. By a former Naval War College faculty member. Argues the U.S. Navy has recently refocused its attention on its contributions to a global allied campaign against the Soviets, to the detriment of planning for more likely and qualitatively different Third World contingencies.

Wright, Christopher C., III, "U.S. Naval Operations in 1982." Proceedings/Naval Review, May 1983. Excellent survey and analysis. Includes general introduction to USN concepts of operations, deployment patterns, tempo of operations, as well as review of actual deployments. See also annual updates in subsequent Naval Reviews.

Young, Elizabeth, "New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," Survival, November-December 1974, pp 262-267. Forecasts the demise of naval diplomacy.

Zakheim, Dov S., "Maritime Presence, Projection, and the Constraints of Parity," in Equivalence, Sufficiency and the International Balance, Washington: National Defense University, August 1978, pp 101-118. Argues for a combined arms approach, vice solely naval focus, re: U.S. maritime presence.

Zelikow, Philip D., "force Without War, 1975-82," Journal of Strategic Studies, March 1984, pp 29-54. Updates Blechman and Kaplan book. Also provides listing of incidents when USN was used.

VIII FLEET BALANCE: ATLANTIC VS. PACIFIC VS. MEDITERRANEAN

Geographic flexibility is one of the great strengths of naval power. Yet, the U.S. Navy's global posture since World War II has often looked like a series of hard-and-fast theater commitments, more appropriate to less flexible land-based types of forces. The articles and letters below illustrate current problems of implementing a balanced global Maritime Strategy with limited naval forces in the face of competing regional demands. They were selected because of their focus on the need for hard choices by the Navy regarding fleet balance; articles merely trumpeting the importance of an area or discussing regional priorities solely at the geopolitical level are omitted.

Babbage, Ross, "The Future of the United States Maritime Strategy and the Pacific Military Balance." Paper presented at the Conference on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, May 19, 1988, 33 pp. This paper considers a number of "wild cards" that, according to the Australian author, might upset some of the key assumptions that underlie the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy for the Pacific theater. Those assumptions concern the likelihood of nuclear escalation, Soviet avoidance of a two-front (Atlantic and Pacific) war, the collaboration of America's Pacific allies, and the future of American superiority in ASW. Based on his conversations with Chinese officials, Babbage reports that China might choose the"kick-in-the-door" option, and launch an assault against the Soviet Far East if the Soviet Union were to lose a conflict badly and its disintegration appeared likely. In any case, concludes Babbage, Soviet fear of such an eventuality could exert "substantial war-termination leverage."

* Baggett, Lee, Jr., Adm. USN, "NATO at Sea: Future Maritime Power," The RUSI Journal, Autumn 1988, pp 5-8. SACLANT describes the Soviet maritime threat to the North Atlantic Alliances as a "double envelopment" of self-serving naval arms control proposals on the one hand, and continued qualitative improvements of seagoing capabilities on the other. Both, says Baggett, are aimed at surrounding "our strategy, closing off all avenues of maneuver and leaving us with nothing but unacceptable options." As far as SACLANT's capabilities for war are concerned, reports Baggett, a shortage of forces to simultaneously support the Northern flank and directly defend Atlantic shipping, compels an early forward offensive. NATO presently possesses a large enough pool of shipping to support Re/Re and economic shipping needs, but the trend continues downward.

Booth, Ken, "U.S. Naval Strategy: Problems of Survivability, Usability, and Credibility," Naval War College Review, Summer 1978, pp 11-28. Argues for withdrawal of Sixth Fleet.

Borg, James C., "New Significant of the North Pacific," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 10, 1988, pp 1483-89. Report on the increased tempo and scope of U.S. Navy exercises in the northern Pacific.

Breemer, Jan S., "De-Committing the Sixth Fleet," Naval War College Review, November-December 1982, pp 27-32.

Cole, Cdr. Bernard, "Atlantic First" Proceedings, August 1982, pp 103-106. Also "Comment and Discussion:" December 1982, pp 86-87.

Desh, Michael C., "Turning the Caribbean Flank: Sea-Lane Vulnerability During a European War," Survival (London), November/December 1987, pp 528-51. The author warns that a judiciously timed Cuban entry into a NATO-Warsaw Pact war could impose an intolerable strain on allied resupply and reinforcement capabilities, and even "tip the balance decisively in favour of the Warsaw Pact." The article posits a "menu" of alternative Cuban Caribbean SLOC interdiction scenarios, and potential U.S. counter options. The author concludes that the most credible and least resource-diverting U.S. response would be a combination of "defensive" SLOC protection, backed up by the withheld threat of retaliatory *nuclear* TLAM strikes.

Deutermann, Capt. Peter, "Requiem for the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings, September 1982, pp 46-49. Also "Comment and Discussion:" November 1982, p 14; January 1983, pp 17-20; February 1983, pp 80-81; March 1983, pp 12-17; July 1983, p 89.

Dismukes, Bradford, and Weiss, Kenneth G., "Mare Mosso: The Mediterranean Theater," in James L. George (ed.), The U.S. Navy: The View From the Mid-1980s, Boulder, CO.: Westview. On timing reductions in U.S. Navy Mediterranean forces.

Etzold, Thomas, "From Far East to Middle East: Overextension in American Strategy Since World War II," Proceedings/Naval Review 1981, May 1981, pp 66-77. On the need to make hard strategic choices, especially between the Pacific and Indian Ocean.

* Foley, Sylvester, R., Adm., USN, "Strategic Factors in the Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1985, pp 34-38. The CINCPACFLT reviews the main international political "strategic factors" he believes will dominate the efficiency of his forces and war plans in the Pacific-Indian Ocean region. They are" (1) the ability of the National command Authorities (NCA) to respond promptly to

ambiguous crisis indicators, (2) the stability of the U.S. relationship with Japan, China, and the Philippines, (3) the necessity for an Indian Ocean presence, and (4) the security of the Aleutian "rear area." Foley wonders whether the Soviet Pacific Fleet will restrict its operations to a defensive naval campaign on behalf of SSBN bastion waters.

** Gray, Colin S., "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: Implications for NATO," Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 8-19. A geo-political analysis and forecast of the US/Soviet/China-Japan triangular relationship in the Pacific and the implications thereof for US/NATO strategic planning in the European theater. Argues that the U.S. commitment to NATO ought to shift from reliance on nuclear threats to preparations to confront the Soviet Union with a protracted (maritime) two-front war. Suggests that the United States must hold-the-line in the Pacific pending the emergence of a China/Japan strategic condominium.

Hayward, Tomas, B., Adm., USN (Ret.), and Hays, Ronald J., Adm., USN (Ret.), "It is in the Interest of the West to Make *Percestroika* Work Throughout the Pacific," Navy League of the United States, The Almanac of Seapower 1989, Arlington, VA, January 1989, pp 44-58. A former CNO and VCNO team up to urge that future roles of U.S. Naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans be dominated by the twin goals of (a) seeking strategic stability among the maritime aspirations of the regional nations (mainly India and Japan), and (b) "easing tensions" with the Soviet Union. The authors specifically call for a U.S./Soviet dialogue on the possible adoption of naval confidence-building measures, including perhaps a re-consideration of the U.S. Navy's practice of fleet exercises close to Soviet shores.

Heppenheimer, T.A., "Victory at Sea?" Science Digest, September 1985. A journalistic account of how the United States intends to safeguard the Atlantic SLOCs in the event that, "for the third time in a century, the world is at war."

Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "Reviewing the Conventional Wisdom," Proceedings, July 1983, pp 22-28. Also "Comment and Discussion," December 1983, p 26. On refocusing the Atlantic Fleet from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic.

* Jane's Defense Weekly, "NATO's Southern Strategy Outlines," December 17, 1988, p 1547. CINCUSNAVEUR, Adm. James Busey, USN is quoted to the effect that NATO's maritime strategy on the Mediterranean flank will seek "strategic leverage" by taking the initiative at an "early stage" and "using NATO strength against Warsaw Pact vulnerability."

Jordan, Robert, "The Maritime Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance," The RUSI Journal, September 1987, pp 45-54. A somewhat rambling account of the linkage between SACEUR's "regional" responsibilities on the ground, and the "global" thrust of the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy.

Kennedy, William V., "Moving West: The New Theater of Decision," Naval War College Review, Winter 1989, pp 19-32. Expands upon former NAVSEC Webb's theme that U.S. interests and military commitments ought to be re-focused from Western Europe to the Far East. Kennedy believes that the United States can best deter the Soviet Union from aggression, and, come war, achieve a favorable outcome, by exploiting its comparative military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet military position in the Far East. He calls for a "North Pacific Strategy" that, with the help of 15 (1) carriers, and possibly in conjunction with China, would aim at no less than the occupation of the Siberian periphery, the defeat of Soviet power east of the Urals, and the post-war reconstitution of a Soviet "progressive government that could abide the opening of the entire Soviet Union to the free interchange of ideas, labor and investment."

Kolodziej, Edward A., "The Southern Flank: NATO's Neglected Front," AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol 6 No 2, 1986, pp 45-56, especially pp 48-50. A leading political scientist endorses Capt. Deutermann's views on re-orienting U.S. naval concentrations from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

Komer, Robert W., "A Credible Conventional Option: Can NATO Afford It?" Strategic Review, Spring 1988, pp 33-38. A "continentalist's" solution for strengthening NATO's conventional war-fighting posture that calls for a build-up of up to 30 days of war reserves, the creation of additional reserve formations, and greater reliance on "deep strike capabilities."

Kurth, James R., "The United States and the North Pacific," paper presented at the Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, The Australian National University, August 1987. Evaluates the"dilemma of deterrence vs. provocation" that the author claims is part and parcel of a maritime strategy based on the forward deployment of naval forces during a US/Soviet crisis. Kurth recommends that the United States can limit the risk of premature crisis escalation and Soviet pre-emption by forward converging its naval and marine forces at locations within closing range of their intended targets, yet still at the limit of the Soviet Union's pre-emptive strike potential. Concludes that the "Reagan version" of the maritime strategy will probably change in form and in shape, but that naval forces will become an increasingly important element in Western defense planning.

** Lee, Ngoc and Hinge, L.Cdr. Alan, RAN, "The Naval Balance in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region," Naval Forces, II/1987, pp 150-175. Views the U.S. Navy as under strength for warfighting in the Atlantic-Mediterranean threats, and over strength in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Essentially an update of Hinge's August 1986 article, cited in Section II above.

* Lehman, John, "Successful Naval Strategy in the Pacific: How We Are Achieving It, How We Can Afford It," Naval War College Review, Winter 1987, pp 20-27. Asserts that the Regan Administration's "common sense" approach to Pentagon and Department of the Navy management and procurement has resulted in more band-for-the-buck, thus permitting the Navy to meet national commitments in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters with sufficient assets *simultaneously*.

Linn, Thomas C., Maj., USMC, "Amphibious Shipping Shortfall Undermines Maritime Strategy," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1989, pp 54-58. Makes a convincing case that current trends point to a widening gap between the U.S. Navy's strategic requirements for amphibious lifts, and the maritime strategy's programmatic goals. The author reports a strategic war-fighting need for two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—one each for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but fears that actual capabilities will soon fall short of even the 1983 program goals of one MEF-plus-MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade). The article also urges various technological steps to make future amphibious lift forces less vulnerable.

* Lucas, Hugh, "Webb Calls for U.S. Defense Review," Jane's Defense Weekly, January 23, 1988. p 101. Reports on SECNAV Webb's advocacy, at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, of a "total review of U.S. defense security commitments," including a reduced "continental" involvement in Europe and a heightened military profile in the Pacific. American conventional forces should be re-structured away from a "static" theater orientation, and emphasis instead globally deployable (read Navy) "maneuver forces."

Maiorano, Lt. Alan, "A Fresh Look the Sixth Fleet," Proceedings, February 1984, pp 52-58. Also "Comment and Discussion," July 1984, pp 28-33. On reducing the USN Mediterranean commitment, with USAF and allied forces filling any gaps.

McGruther, L.Cdr. Kenneth R., "Two Anchors in the Pacific: A Strategy Proposal for the U.S. Pacific Fleet," Naval Review 1979/Proceedings May 1979, pp 126-141. On re-orienting the Pacific Fleet primarily northward for wartime operations, and secondarily westward, for peacetime presence, by a former OP-603 staffer.

Ortlieb, Cdr. E.V., "Forward Deployments: Deterrent or Temptation." Proceedings, December 1983, pp 36-40. Also "Comment and Discussion," February 1984, p 22. On reducing the Sixth and Seventh Fleets while increasing the Second and Third.

Pay, David J., "The U.S. Navy and the Defense of Europe," Naval Forces, No. 1, 1988, pp 28-35. Good critique of maritime strategic critics whose arguments and reservations, says the author, "seem to be based on a mistaken choice between maritime and continental forces and a rather strange assessment of nuclear risk." Disagrees that the U.S. maritime strategy and 600-ship fleet build-up have come at the expense of the American NATO commitment. The maritime strategy, concludes Pay, may be a "symptom" of a U.S. re-assessment of global priorities away from Western Europe, but it is hardly the cause.

Sestak, L.Cdr. Joseph, "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," Proceedings, January 1986, pp 64-71.

Snyder, Jed C., "Strategic Bias and the Southern Flank," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, pp 123-42. A critique of NATO's Central Region-oriented "prism" addressing the Mediterranean basin, the author concludes that a multiplicity of crisis points, the growth of local Soviet naval power, and the lack of political and military cohesion, have brought about an area where "NATO is weak where the Soviet incentive to strike may be strongest."

Till, Geoffrey, and King, Richard, "A Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters?" Naval Forces, No. 5, 1987, pp 16-18. NATO must prevent Soviet naval power in the Norwegian Sea from becoming a "kind of perceived maritime dominance" by default. In order to counter such a development, Till and King believe that the idea of a Standing Naval Force for Northern Waters (STANAVFORNOR), patterned after STANAVFORLANT, is worth thinking about.

Train, Harry, Adm., USN (Ret.), "Maritime Strategy in the Mediterranean, " Adelphi Paper (London), No. 229: "Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean," Part 1, Spring 1988, pp 49-60. Excellent account of the strategical interconnectedness between the Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters, and, as a consequence, the inter-theater wartime flexibility of U.S. naval forces on forward deployment in the Mediterranean. Train believes that, with the possible exception of the Mediterranean's easternmost portion, NATO command of the Mediterranean is virtually guaranteed even if COMSTRIKFORSOUTH's battlegroups may need to be swung into the Atlantic. Also a good overview of NATO's naval command hierarchy in the Mediterranean area.

Van der Meulen, J.W., "Zuid-Afrika's Strategische Betekenis voor het Westen" ("South Africa's Strategic Significance for the West"), Marineblad (The Hague), May 1988, pp 214-22. Excellent overview of the Western interest, past and present, in South Africa as a potential military-strategic partner. The author concludes that neither South Africa's military potential, nor the country's importance as a source of strategic minerals (or for that matter, the nature of the Soviet threat) warrant a closer association with the Pretoria Government.

IX. WAR GAMING

As is well discussed in previous sections, U.S. and allied navies, other services, and joint and allied commands have a variety of means at their disposal in peacetime to test the wartime validity of aspects of the Maritime Strategy, besides debate and discussion. They actually participate in fleet exercises, advanced tactical training, and "real world" peacetime and crisis operations, and they conduct extensive operations analyses and war games. Most of these avenues are generally inaccessible to the public, however, save one: gaming. There are over a half-dozen commercial board and computer games now available that can provide players with insights into modern maritime strategic, operational, and tactical problems and potential solutions, and thereby further enhance players' understanding of the Maritime Strategy. Like all simulations, however, they each have their limitations, and even built-in inaccuracies (as the various reviews point out). Thus, they cannot by themselves legitimately be used to "prove" validities or demonstrate "outcomes." Nevertheless, playing them is the nearest many students and theorists of Maritime Strategy can even come to actually "being there," and, therefore, is an activity that can only be encouraged.

** Balkoski, Joseph, Second Fleet, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Plamer, Proceedings, March 1987, pp 160-162. "Those of us without access to the War College's computers can test the waters north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap and gain insight into the problems and opportunities inherent in the application of the Maritime Strategy." Can be played simultaneously with Sixth Fleet, with forces shifted from one set of maps to the the other, in a simulation of war in both Northern and Southern European waters and adjacent areas.

Balkoski, Joseph, Sixth Fleet, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Plamer, Strategy and Tactics, January-February 1986, pp 51-52. "The inclusion of random elements into the system, the addition of logistic rules, and the key role of Soviet naval aviation made the Sixth Fleet game an excellent operational level naval wargame."

Connors, L.Cdr. Tracy D., USNR, "Gaming for the World," Proceedings, January 1984, pp 106-108. On the Naval War College's Global War Game series, a principal research tool for identifying critical Navy, joint, and allied Maritime Strategy issues. See also Murray, Robert J., "A War-Fighting Perspective," Proceedings, October 1983, pp 66-81; and Eulis, Cdr. James, "War Gaming at the U.S. Naval War College," Naval Forces, 1985/V, pp 96-103.

Grigsby, Gary, North Atlantic '86, Mountain View, CA: Strategic Simulations Inc., 1983 (Apple Computer Game. Reviewed by John

Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings, July 1984, pp 116-117. Entering premise in the initial failure of NATO, U. S., and the Maritime Strategy: "The great war in Europe is over. As expected, Russia won' it now controls all of Germany and Norway. Its next plan: complete domination of the North Atlantic through the isolation of Great Britain."

Herman, Mark, Aegean Strike, New York: Victory Games, 1986 (Board Game). Reviewed by U.S. Naval History Center historian Michael A. Plamer, Strategy and Tactics, (forthcoming in 1987). The eastern Mediterranean. "Few, if any, games...better integrate the strengths and weaknesses of land, air, and naval assets."

Nichols, W. J., Fifth Escadra, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1984 (Apple Computer Game). Soviets vs. NATO in the Mediterranean. Five levels of conflict ranging from rising tensions to global nuclear war.

Nichols, W.J., Grey Seas, Grey Skies, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1983 (second edition forthcoming in 1987) (Apple Computer Game). Reviewed by Hohn Gresham and Michael Markowitz, Proceedings, July 1984, pp 116-117. Seven "pre-built" scenarios, including Japanese destroyers versus Soviet submarines in the Kuril Islands, a Soviet amphibious group versus West German forces in the Baltic, U.S. versus Soviet carrier battle groups off the North Cape, and similar clashes in the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean. Focus is more tactical than the other games listed here.

Nichols, W.J., Seventh Fleet, Bridgewater, Nova Scotia: Simulations Canada, 1985 (Apple Computer Game. Soviets vs. U.S. and Japan. Includes Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan and South China Sea operations.

** Perla, Peter C., "Wargaming and the U. S. Navy," National Defense, February 1987, pp 49-53. By a leading Center for Naval Analyses war gamer. "The Navy is continuing a process of using wargaming, exercises, and analysis to address the aspects of major issues fo which they are best suited...a classic example of this process can be seen at work in the 2nd Fleet. Taking the promulgated maritime strategy as his starting point, the commander, 2nd Fleet, proposed a concept for operating the NATO Striking Fleet in the Norwegian Sea. A wargame was held at the Naval War College to explore this concept, and analysis was undertaken to quantify some of the issues raised by the game. Then an exercise was held in the area of interest, which confirmed some assumptions and raised new questions. A new series of games and analysis was capped by a second major exercise, as the process continues." See also his "What Wargaming is and is Not," co-authored by L.Cdr. Raymond T. Barrett, Naval War

College Review, September-October 1985, pp 70-78 and "In My View..." commentary, Naval War College Review, Autumn 1986, pp 105-108; and "War Games, Analyses, and Exercises," Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, pp 44-52; and endorsement by former CNO Adm. Thomas Hayward, USN (Ret.), in August 1987 Proceedings.

X. ANTECEDENTS

The general and historical literature on naval strategy is admittedly vast. What is presented here are only books that describe earlier strategies, conceptualized, planned and/or implemented, which are analogous to key aspects of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy today. The materials are generally listed chronologically, by historical period covered.

** Breemer, Jan S., "The American Origins of the Maritime Strategy," Marineblad (The Hague), November 1987, pp 410-15. Reviews the recent (mid-1970s to early 1980s) historical antecedents to the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy, and concludes that it is up to the European navies to clarify which parts of the maritime strategy meet with their approval and which not.

Callwell, Major C.E., BA, The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns Since Waterloo, Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1897, especially pp 178-182 and 196-197); Barker, A., J., The War Against Russia, 1854-1856, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970; Curtiss, John Shelton, Russia's Crimean War, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979; and Rich, Norman, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale, Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985, especially pp 124-126, 136-137, 158-159, 178, 201-202, 206-209. Successful maritime global forward coalition strategy against Russia 130 years ago, with operations in Barents, Baltic, and Black Seas, and off Kuriles and Kamchatka. Component of a larger military strategy, which blocked subsequent Russian expansion for over 20 years.

Cave Brown, Anthony (Ed.), Dropshot, The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957, New York: Dial Press, 1978. 1949 JCS study: good example of early post-war strategic thinking. See especially pp. 161-165, 206-211, 225-235. Not to be read without examination of review by David Rosenberg and Thomas E. Kelly III, Naval War College Review, Fall 1978, pp 103-106.

Comptroller General of the United States, Implications of the National Security Council Study "U.S. Maritime Strategy and Naval Force Requirements" On the Future Naval Ship Force (PSAD-78-6A), Washington: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 7, 1978. Discusses in detail, and in highly unsympathetic terms, the classified 1976 NSC study often cited by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman as triggering his thinking on U.S. naval strategy and force levels. See also Rumsfeld, Donald, "Which Five-Year Shipbuilding Program?", Proceedings, February 1977, pp 18-25.

Defense/Space Daily, "Findings of Sea Plan 2000," April 4 through 7, 1982 issues. Four part summary of the "Sea Plan 2000" Carter Administration progenitor to the Maritime Strategy, including the

idea of a "second-front" Pacific strategy aimed at relieving Soviet pressure in Central Europe, and safeguard the allied SLOCs.

Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad (Vol. I) and The Road to Berlin (Vol. II), Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. See especially Vol. I, pp 14, 55-57, 218, 237-240, 271-272, 295; Vol. II, pp 43, 132, 156. Effect of Far East operations, or lack thereof, on Central/East Europe Front in World War II.

** Friedman, Norman, The Postwar Naval Revolution, London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986. See especially Chapter 10 "Epilogue," pp 212-218. On allied naval developments in the first post-World War II decade, including relationships to the Maritime Strategy developed three decades later.

Gordon, Michael R., "John Lehman: The Hard Liner Behind Reagan's Navy Buildup," National Journal, October 3, 1981, pp 1763-66. Profiles the then newly-appointed SECNAV's previous careers with the National Security Council staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and predicts that Lehman's views on the Navy's needs have "the makings of a harmonious relationship with the Navy.

Gough, Barry M., "Maritime Strategy," The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power," The RUSI Journal, Winter 1988, pp 55-62. A comparison of the two premier Anglo-American theorists of seapower with reference to their respective contributions to the understanding of (a) the relationship between naval power and global power, and (b) the significance of historical "lessons" for contemporary maritime strategy. The author finds that neither Mahan or Corbett, nor their modern-day successors, can always provide the correct answers to naval strategic problems, but that history can provide a framework for asking the "right" questions about the objectives of naval force in both peace and in war.

Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimland, and the Technological Revolution, New York: Crane Russak, 1977. Analyzes and updates geopolitical grand theory. Stresses maritime aspects of the Western alliance and global nature of Western security problems.

Huntington, Samuel P., "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," Proceedings, May 1954, pp 483-93. Clearly foreshadows the basic outline of the Maritime Strategy. An analysis generally as relevant today as then.

Keegan, John, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare, New York, NY: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1988. Patterned after his highly acclaimed The Face of War, Kegan's The Price of

Admiralty is a brilliant evocation of how the maritime strategies of the past have been fought at the strategical, tactica, material and, most important, human levels. The author narrates four critical naval battles of the past—Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the Atlantic U-boat campaign, each representing contemporary "capital" naval technology—the ship-of-the-line, the dreadnought, aircraft carrier, and submarine. The description of how the crews that fought at Trafalgar alone is worth the book's reading. No doubt, many readers will find Keegan's most controversial observation in the final chapter, "The Empty Seas," which predicts that the future of seapower rests with the submarine.

Lehman, John, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978. Codification of Lehman's thought on naval strategy before become SECNAV. Much more than carriers, especially Chapter II. See also his March 1989 testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Hearings on National Defense: Alternative Approaches to the U.S. Defense Program, Washington: USGPO, 1980, pp 208-253.

Love, Robert B., Jr. (Ed.), The Chiefs of Naval Operations, Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. See sections on post=World War II CNOs' views on strategy, especially Rosenberg piece on Arleigh Burke.

** Mahan, Capt. Alfred Thayer, "The Problem of Asis," in his The Problem of Asis and Its Effect Upon International Politics, Cambridge, MA: University Press, 1900, pp 1-146. Mahan on "Restraining Russia," the central problem of the Maritime Strategy: "The Russian centre cannot be broken. It is upon and from the flanks...that restraint, if needed, must come," p 26; "Hence ensues solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the United States," p 63. See also Trofimenko in Section VI above, and Crowl, Philip A., "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp 444-477, especially p 477. A Naval War College professor emeritus asserts the Maritime Strategy is antithetical to Mahan's teaching, especially as regards the role of other services, in a book which otherwise, and to its detriment, pays scant attention to makers of modern maritime strategy. Trfimenko gets the linkage between Mahan and the Maritime Strategy right. Crowl gets it wrong.

Marolda, Edward J., "The Influence of Burke's Boys on Limited War," Proceedings, August 1981, pp 36-41. By a prominent Navy Department historian on the influence of the Navy officer corps on national strategy a generation ago. "Between 1956 and 1960, the Navy added its considerable influence to the intellectual campaign within

the national defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy."

** Miller, Edward S., War Plan Orange, 1897-1945: the Naval Campaign Through the Central Pacific, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming in 1988. History's most successful pre-war plan, with lessons for the complex problems of naval strategic planning of the 1980s. See also Dyer, V.Adm. George C., On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Retired), Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973, Chapter XIV: "War Plans"' and Shelton, Cdr. Michael W., CEC, "Plan Orange Revisited," Proceedings, December 1984, pp 50-56; and "Comment and Discussion," March 1985, pp 73 and 79. Draws false parallels between the Western Pacific in 1941 and the Norwegian Sea today, i.e. between a purely naval, unilateral, theater problem and one portion of a joint, allied, global problem. Advocates ceding the Norwegian Sea, Norway, and Iceland to the Soviets. Bad history and worse strategy.

Nimitz, F.Adm. Chester, "Future Employment of Naval Forces," Vital Speeches, January 15, 1948, pp 214-217. Also, in Brassey's Naval Annual: 1948, and Shipmate, February 1948, pp 5-6+, as "Our Navy. It's Future." Argues for a projection strategy and a Navy capable of land attack early in a war.

Palmer, Alan, The Gardeners of Salonika, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. See especially pp 226-247. Southern Flank Maritime Strategy in action. WWI allies advance to the Danube from beachhead in Greece in 1918 knocking Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey out of the war. Gallipoli concept vindicated.

** Palmer, Michael A., Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade, Washington: Naval Historical Center (fothcoming in 1988). An important discussion of the similarities and differences in U.S. naval strategic thought between the first and fifth postwar deceased, the two postwar eras most characterized by U.S. Navy concern with problems of naval warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union itself.

** Reynolds, Clark G., "The Maritime Strategy of World War II: Some Implications?" Naval War College Review, May/June 1986, pp 43-50. Prescribes certain "principles" of maritime strategy learned from World War II, but cautions that, "in strategy making, the greater danger than a complete ignorance of history is its misapplication."

Rosenberg, David, "American Postwar Air Doctrine and Organization: The Navy Experience," in A.F. Hurley and R.C. Ehrhart, et al. Air Power and Warfare, Washington: USGPO, 1970.

Antecedent naval postwar air strike strategies by a leading historian of U.S. Navy postwar strategy.

Rosenberg, David, Arleigh Burke and the United States Navy, Vol I: War and Cold War, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, (forthcoming in 1988). By a Naval War College faculty member. "Maybe it would help us sell the Navy's case if we could make a presentation on how the Navy could function in the first 90 days of a war, and keep that presentation up-to-date," R.Adm. Burke in 1952 after relieving as OP-30, now Op-60.

** Rosenberg, David, U.S. Navy Long-Range Planning: A Historical Perspective, Washington: USGPO (forthcoming in 1988.

Roskill, Stephen W., Naval Policy Between the Wars, Volume I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919-1929, New York: Walker, 1968. Chapter III: "The War of Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920"; and Dobson, Christopher, and Miller, John, The Day They Almost Bombed Moscow: the Allied War in Russia, 1928-1920, New York: Atheneum, 1986, pp 42-47, 72-73, 247-266, and 274-276. Poorly devised global, allied, forward maritime operations against the Soviets 70 years ago. which, however, did achieve independence for the Baltic states.

Ryan, Capt. Paul USN (Ret.), First Line of Defense, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. Mainstream USN perspectives on post-war defense policies through the Carter Administration.

Schilling, Warner R., "Admirals and Foreign Policy, 1913-1919," Phd. dissertation, Yale University, 1954. "Maritime Strategy" of the 1980s was not first time this century U.S.Navy developed a coherent preferred strategy.

Spykman, Nicholas John, The Geography of the Peace, New York: Harcouurt, Brace, 1944. Basic geopolitical reference. See especially maps, pp 50-54.

Starr, Chester G., The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989, 105 pp. This is a fascinating small volume that throws much light on the interaction between a land and seapower in the Mediterranean world of antiquity. It is so in particular because the findings and conclusions sharply contradict the author's starting premise. The latter takes issue with Mahan's claim that the power and wealth of the classical thalassocracies (Greece, Rome, Carthage) were historical "proof" of the decisive influence of seapower on history. Not so, says Starr. The rise and fall of the classical empires originated on land. Ironically, however, the author finds that the Greek and Carthaginian maritime empires fell because at the same time that both permitted

their fleets to decline, their continental opponents (Sparta and Rome, respectively) made the conscious choice to build up naval power. Similarly, as long as Rome possessed the world's first "standing fleet" the empirial sealines of communications and coastlines were secure. The later empire's vulnerability to barbarian raids and invasions can be blamed perhaps as much by the decline of that fleet as by the overextension of the legions on land. One is tempted to draw this lesson: a maritime power may not be able to overcome a strong landpower, but the reverse is certainly true if the continental opponent takes to the sea as well.

Teitler, G., "De slagvloot en de SLOCs" ("The Battlefleet and the SLOCs"), Marineblad (The Hague), October 1986, pp 521-25. Relates the offensive thrust of the U.S.Navy's maritime strategy to the Navy's Pacific war experience, the Mahanian philosophy of the "big battle," and, indirectly, the British Navy's tradition of securing the SLOCs by "indirect" means, i.e., seeking out and defeating the opponent's battlefleet. The British tradition on "indirect" defense is contrasted with the Dutch tradition of "direct" defense, i.e. the protection of shipping by way of escort strategies. The author concludes that even a 600-ship U.S. fleet will make an early forward offensive against the center of Soviet military strength in the North a high-risk substitute for reliance on a mix of direct and indirect SLOC defense strategies.

Teitler, G., "Van de Krim naar Kola: Algemene en Bijzondere Beschouwing over Maritime Strategie" ("From the Crimea to Kola: A General and Special Consideration of Maritime Strategy," Marineblad (The Hague), June 1988, pp 261-67. The 19th century Crimean War is used to illustrate the essence of grand and maritime strategy as the exploitation of assymetries, including *assymetries* in timing (surprise), space (maneuver), and escalation (e.g., the "second front option"). The key to NATO's strategic success, says Teitler, will be to offset the Soviet Union's assymetrical advantage on the Central Front with the West's (maritime) ability to (a) deny the Soviets a "short war," (b) threaten Moscow's vulnerabilities outside the European area, and (c) threaten to regain nuclear dominance by placing the Soviet SSBNs at risk. Teitler reminds his readers, however, that few assymetrical advantages come at no cost. Excellent article.

Till, Geoffrey, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, (Second Edition), New York: St. Martin's, 1984. Basic one-volume historical and topical survey.

** Turner, Adm. Stansfield, USN (Ret.), "Victory at Sea: Bull Halsey at Leyte Gulf." Washington Post Book World, December 15, 1986, pp 1 and 13. Review of E.B. Potter's Bull Halsey. Draws analogies to today's military problems, especially regarding "the offense and the defense." Of a piece with Turner's other writings.

U.S. Navy, Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study (Unclassified Executive Summary), Washington, DC: March 18, 1978. A progenitor of the Maritime Strategy. Whereas the latter stresses the role of the Navy in a global conventional war with the Soviets, however, the former tended more toward emphasizing the extent of the range of potential uses of naval power.

** Vlahos, Michael, "Wargaming, an Enforcer of Strategic Realism: 1919-1942," naval War College Review, March-April 1986, pp 7-22. By a former Naval War College faculty member. How wargaming prepared the U.S. Navy for war in 1941, and how it is doing so again today, including linkage between gaming and planning.

Wylie, Capt. J.C., "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor," Proceedings, August 1957, pp 811-817. By the Navy's leading public strategist of the 1950s and 60s. Remarkably similar to the views expressed in the Maritime Strategy a generation later.

Wylie, R.Adm. J. C., Military Strategy, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Codification of views of USN's most prominent post-war strategic theorist.

XI. MAKING MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: INFLUENCES

Barlett, Henry C., "Approaches to Force Planning," Naval War College Review, May-June 1985, pp 37-48. By a Naval War College faculty member. Provides eight approaches to Force Planning, but each such "approach" can, and does apply to the drafting of Strategy as well. They are presented by the author as pure types, stark alternatives, but in actual practice (for example, in the development of the Maritime Strategy) their influence on the strategist is often simultaneous to a greater or lesser degree. His list of approaches: "top-down, bottom-up, scenario, threat, mission, hedging, technology and fiscal." The first four were probably the most important influences on the Maritime Strategy of the late 1940s/early 1950s and the 1980s; "Mission" and "hedging" were relatively more important from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s. "Threat" influences tended to be driven more by preceived *capabilities* in the 1940s through the 1970s and more by perceived *intentions* in the 1980s. Critics tend to focus on "technology" and budget" influences. There is actually also a ninth approach, "historical/academic" approach, which tends to focus the strategist on "lessons of history" and/or the great classics of military thought. All these approaches coexist with the organizational and psychological influences on war planning identified by Jack Snyder. The remaining citations in this section give examples, drawn primarily from the Maritime Strategy debates.

** Froggett, Cdr. S.J., "The Maritime Strategy: Tomahawk's Role," Proceedings, February 1987, pp 51-54; Williams, R.Adm. J.W., Jr., "In My View...Corss Training," Naval War College Review, March-April 1985, pp 96-97; and Chipman, Dr. Donald D., and Lay, Maj. David, USAF, "Sea Power and the B-52 Stratofortress," Air University Review, January-February 1986, pp 45-50. Good examples of the "technology" approach to strategy. Focus is on one system, in these cses the cruise missile, the nuclear submarine, and the land-based heavy bomber; and arguments on strategy are built around it. But cf Taylor, Philip A., "Technologies and Strategies: Trends in Naval Strategies and Tactics," Naval Forces, VI/1986, pp 44-55. "The consensus among senior military officers is that ...technology...has not, nor is it likely to determine military strategy."

Holloway, Adm. James L., III, USN (Ret.), "The U.S. Navy—A Functional Appraisal," Oceanus, Summer 1985, pp 3-11. Focus on "Mission" by the 1974-78 CNO: "The organization of fleet battle strategy reflects the mission, functions, roles, and deployment of the U.S. Navy." See also Williams, Cdr. John A. "Jay," USNR, "U.S. Navy Missions and Force Structure: A Critical Reappraisal," Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1981, pp 499-528; and Bryron, Cdr. John, "Sea Power: The Global Navy," Proceedings January 1984, pp 39-33. Alternative views of the Navy's "Missions" by two officers who later contributed to the Maritime Strategy's development. Also see

"Commentary," Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1982, pp 682-684 for official Navy response to Williams on the eve of Maritime Strategy development, and Williams' rejoinder. Williams' updated views are in th"The U.S. and Soviet Navies: Missions and Forces," Armed Forces and Society, Summer 1984, pp 507-528.

Hughes, Capt. Wayne P., USN (Ret.), "Naval Tactics and Their Influence on Strategy," Naval War College Review, January-February 1986, pp 2-17. The strategy-tactics interface. The bottom-up" view of strategy-building. See also his Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, cited in Section II above; and Hill, R.Adm. C.A. "Mark," Jr., USN (Ret.), "Congress and the Carriers," Wings of Gold, Spring 1987, pp 6-8. But cf "In My View...: Tactical Skills," Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, p 91, "The best plans are not those developed through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Strategists and tacticians need to keep in mind that the road to sound planning is a two-way, not one-way thoroughfare."

Jampoler, Capt. Andrew, "A Central Role for Naval Forces? ...to Support The Battle," Naval War College Review, November-December 1984. By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group at Newport. Argument is distilled from a "scenario" approach. See also fictional treatments by Clancy, Hackett and McGeoch et al, and Hayes et al, cited in Sections I and II above.

Johnson, Capt. W. Spencer, "Comment and Discussion Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs," Proceedings, September 1984, p 107. One of the initial drafters of the Maritime Strategy elaborates on the necessity, utility and existence of a national military strategy from which the Maritime Strategy is derived. The "top-down" view of strategy-building written in response to McGruther's "threat-based" approach, cited below. See also "Comment and Discussion," Proceedings, April 1984, p 31.

Jordan, Frank E. III, "Maritime-Continental Debate: A Strategic Approach," National Defense University, Essays on Strategy V. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988, pp 205-234. An excellent Clausiwitzian critique of what the author contends is the artificiality of the "Mahan vs. Mackinder" framework of the contemporary maritime-continental debate over American national security goals and means. The appropriate U.S. strategy, concludes Jordan, is one that "is neither purely continental nor purely maritime, but rather one of global (yet strategically limited) integrated naval and land campaigns directed toward preserving the critical US center of gravity." The latter includes the Eurasian rimlands and narrow seas, and the capabilities, naval and otherwise, needed to protect their security. Conversely, the Soviet center of gravity encompasses the Soviet regime and its war-making mechanism, mainly the Red Army and strategic nuclear forces; the

necessity for escalation control demands that U.S. strategy exclude a direct attack against this Soviet center of gravity.

McGruther, Cdr. Kenneth R., "Strategy: Ours vs. Theirs." Proceedings, February 1984, pp 344-39. By a former member of the Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Calls for a strategy based on defeating Soviet strategy, a "threat-based" approach. Unlike Barlett, however, McGruther's approach is rooted in intentions as well as capabilities. Cf Vlahos chapter, cited in Section I above.

Moodie, Michael, and Cottrell, Alvin J., Geopolitics and Maritime Power, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981. A good example of "hedging" focus. Regards Lehman's "Major change" as not enough. Also wants greater naval activity in the Carribean, periodic visits to the South Atlantic, an enhanced fleet in the Western Pacific and continuing large-scale activity in the Indian Ocean. See also Sea Plan 2000, cited in Section X above.

Nailer, Peter, "The Utility of Maritime Power: Today and Tomorrow," The RUSI Journal, September 1986, pp 15-21. Discusses the changes in the elements that have characteristically made up "maritime power" (fighting fleet, a trading fleet, bases). Changes such as increasing warship cost and complexity, and the internationalization of merchant shipping, says Nailer, are making it progressively more difficult to convincingly state-the-naval-case.

Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, New York: The Free Press, 1986. Seeks to focus decision-makers/users of the "historical" approach. Has direct relevance for strategists, a sub-category of "decision-makers." For example, the "cases" highlighted in Section VIII of this addendum and in its predecessor, The Crimea, Salonika, the Russian Intervention, World War II, etc., can all be profitably examined using the Neustadt-May methodology.

Peter Swartz, Capt., USN, "Floating Bases Moving Out to Sea?" NATO's Sixteen Nations, April 1989, pp 65-69. A "founding father" of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy proposes a variety of alternative basing schemes for solving the prospective gap between U.S. global commitments and the dwindling number of readily accessible foreign host-country gases. Concludes that no single technological or political option is likely to answer the case, so that the future American overseas basing infrastructure will probably be a mix of facilities on foreign soil, complemented by novel floating base concepts, fast sea and airlift, and space-based systems.

Sagan, Scott D., "1914 Revisted: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security, Fall 1986, pp 151-175. An excellent piece. Takes issue with literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the

Offensive. Offensive military doctrines are needed not only by states with expansionist war aim, but also by states that have a strong interest in protecting an exposed alley." See also Synder, Jack and Sagan, Soctt D., "Correspondence: The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce," Winter 1986-87, pp 187-198.

Snyder, Jack, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. Chapter I. On how military strategy gets made and why. Geopolitical, bureaucratic, and personal factors. View military as predictably and unfortunately biased toward offensive strategies. See also his "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914," in Robert Jervis, et al. (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp 162-164. Summarizes the literature on the alleged "Military Bias for the Offensive."

** Ullman, Cdr. Harlan K., USN (Ret.), "Gramm-Rudman: A Fiscal Pearl Harbour," Naval Forces, II/1986, pp 10-11. Congressional budget actions seen as potentially disastrous for both 600-ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy. Exhibits all pitfalls of a solely "fiscal" approach. See also Ullmn, Harlan, U.S. Conventional Force Structure at a Crossroads, Washington: Georgetown University CSIS, 1985; and the annual volumes issued by the Brookings Institution and the Committee for National Security, cited in Sections I-III above.

* Webb, James H., Jr., "For a Defense That Makes Sense," New York Times, May 21, 1989, p 38. Calling the post World War II retention of large U.S. military forces in Europe and South Korea a "historical anomaly," the former SECNAV appeals for an end to "our strategic rigidity" and a return instead to the country's "historical role as a maritime nation." Webb insists that, even while all the parties involved, including the Europeans and the United States, agree that a European war is extremely unlikely, institutional conservatism and "rice bowls" paralyze U.S. decisionmakers from undoing the heavy financial and security burden on the Continent. He concludes that the key element to the future deterrence of a Soviet attack against Western Europe ought to be the American retaliatory threat of second-front operations in the Pacific.

* Webb, James H., Jr., Untitled remarks at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, January 13, 1988. Calls for the United States "to take a fresh look at the world and our place in it, and to seriously debate the posture of the U.S.military in that context." Maintains that post-World War II shifts in the global economic and military balance dictate a re-allocation of U.S. military forces away from "static" positions in NATO-Europe, and in favor of globally mobile naval and amphibious "maneuver" forces.

XII. MAKERS OF MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY: PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS

The Maritime Strategy was originally drafted primarily, although certainly not exclusively, by U.S. naval officers for U.S. naval officers. Not only were agreed national, joint, and allied intelligence estimates and concepts of operations utilized as fundamental "building blocks," but great importance was also attached to long-held views of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps leadership, to the concepts of operations of the fleet commanders-in-chief, and to the views of thinkers in uniform (active duty and reserve) at the Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses.

Much of what is in the Maritime Strategy is hardly new, and would be especially recognizable to naval officers who developed U.S. and allied naval warfighting concepts in the late 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, elements from key strategy products of naval officers and civilian thinkers of the late 1970s, e.g. the 1976 National Security Council Maritime Strategy study, naval reservist John Lehman's 1978 Aircraft Carriers, and the Navy's 1978 Sea Plan 2000 and Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (NWP 1, Rev.A), are also evident in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.

Much of what is new in the Maritime Strategy is the linked, coherent discussion of (a) global warfare, rather than separate service and theater operation; (b) warfare tasks, e.g. anti-submarine, anti-air, anti-surface, strike, amphibious, mine and special warfare, rather than traditional "platforms" or "unions"; (c) the specific geopolitical problems facing the U.S. Navy, and other maritime elements of the 1980s; and (d) the current conventional wisdom regarding Soviet Navy capabilities and intentions. This approach was largely driven by the primacy of the need for the Strategy to satisfy current global operational requirements of fleet and other force commanders, over the future requirements of competing bureaucracies in Washington. Its effect in fostering common reference points for all portions of the contemporary officer corps, especially junior officers, is already being felt.

While much of the robustness of the Maritime Strategy derives from its roots thoughout the U.S. Navy and Marine Crops and elsewhere, both over space and over time, it owes a high degree of its current utility to its initial approval and promulgation by successive Chiefs of Naval Operations in Washington and to its codification by their staffs (OPNAV). These include especially the successive Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06), heads of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603), and staff officers in that branch. OPNAV is the one organization tasked to focus on maritime strategy, and to view it not only in a balanced global manner but also within the bounds of actual current national military planning parameters.

OPNAV's capabilities in this endavor are due in part to the existence of the Navy Politico-Military/Strategic Planning subspecialty, education, screening, and utilization system. This personnel system, while somewhat imperfect, has been identifying, training, and using naval officers in a network of strategists, in Washington, Newport, the Fleet, and elsewhere, for over a decade and a half.

Nevertheless, despite the clear postwar historical roots of the Maritime Strategy and its codification in and dissemination from Washington by some of the best minds in the national security affairs community today, a number of publications appeared in the last decade decrying a lack of strategic training and thinking in the Navy, past and present, and ignoring or misunderstanding the critical role in strategy development of naval officers in staff positions. This literature, as well as some counters to it, is briefly outlined below.

A. The Public Debate: Criticisms and Kudos

"413 Named as Proven Subspecialists," Navy Times, September 9, 1985, p 58. The Navy system for identifying the "pool" of naval strategists. Results of the *seventh* biennial U.S. Navy selection board that identifies "proven" subspecialists for further mid-and high-level assignments in the eight fields of naval Political-Military/Strategic Planning. Earlier lists appeared in Navy Times back into the 1970s. Includes many of the builders of the Maritime Strategy. Note that these names constitute not only the "Corps of Naval Strategists," but also the Navy's Politico-Military and Regional Affairs experts.

Brooks, Captain Linton F., "An Examination of Professional Concerns of Naval Officers as Reflected in Their Professional Journal," Naval War College Review, January/February 1980, pp 46-56. A future primary contributor to the development and articulation of the Maritime Strategy decries the paucity of articles on strategy in the Navy professional literature of the late 1960s. This era was admittedly dominated by Vietnam and an internal professional view of the Navy as primarily an infinitely flexible limited war fire brigade, but it did, however, also see the publication of R.Adm. J.C. Wylie's Military Strategy, R.Adm. Henry Eccles' Military Concepts and Philosophy and Adm. Joseph J. Clark's coauthored Sea Power and Its Meaning.

Bruins, Berend D., "Should Naval Officers Be Strategists?" Proceedings, January 1982, pp 52-56. Also "Comment and Discussion," March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20; May 1982, p 17. The Proceedings throws three more retirees and an active-duty non-strategist into the public fray. Meanwhile, fleet plan staffs, the Strategic Studies Group at Newport, and the one intelligence officer and nine line officers (six with PhDs) assigned to OP-603 were at the time actively laying the groundwork for the Maritime Strategy. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of actual naval strategic *thinkers* before 1982-83.

Buell, Cdr. Thomas B., USN (Ret.), "The Education of a Warrior," Proceedings, January 1981, pp 40-45. Also "Comment and Discussion," February 1981, p 21; March 1981, p 15; April 1981, pp 21-23; June 1981, pp 77-79; July 1981, pp 78-80; August 1981, pp 71-75;

November 1981, pp 84-87; January 1982, p 76; March 1982, p 27; April 1982, p 20. Posed the questions, "Where will we get our future strategists?" Implied that the Navy had no real answer to the question, a view shared by most of the eight commenters and discussants chosen for publication by Proceedings, only one of whom was familiar with actual Navy practice in this area. Illustrative of the limited public visibility of true U.S. Navy strategic *thought* before 1981-82.

** Burdick, Capt. Howard, "Sons of the Prophet: A View of the Naval War College Faculty," Naval War College Review, May-June 1986, pp 81-89. On the Naval War College, its faculty, and the Maritime Strategy, by the Dean of Academics at the Naval War College.

** Bush, Ted, "Libyan Exercise Exemplifies New Navy Strategy," Navy Times, February 10, 1986, pp 45-46. OPNAV strategists illuminate a variety of aspects of the Maritime Strategy and its origins. Note that, unlike open-literature authors, actual practicing strategists usually remain nameless to the general public. This hardly means, however, that they are somehow less important.

** Clark, Charles S., "In Person: Fred H. Rainbow: Charting a Course for the Navy's Debates," National Journal, February 21, 1987, p 435. On the role of the Proceedings in orchestrating "some heated forensics over the Navy's trumpeted Maritime Strategy (while) similar Air Force and Army journals often reflect the blandness of official restraints." The Institute has come a long way in just a few short years. Like the Naval War College and the Naval War College Review, the Naval Institute and the Proceedings are clearly at the cutting edge of maritime strategy debate today.

** CNA Annual Report: 1985, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1986, especially pp 7-12 and 29-30. On CNA's contribution to the development of the Maritime Strategy and on its use of that strategy in planning its research programs. Also, CNA analysts' views on Soviet maritime strategy.

Crackel, Lt. Col. Theodore J., USA (Ret.), "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels," Public Interest, Summer 1984, pp 18-30. "The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all." He is especially hard on War College faculties, including the Naval War College: "None of the war college faculties is in the forefront of development in any of the military disciplines they teach." Actually, no group has been more in the "forefront of development in the "discipline" of Maritime Strategy (SECNAV, the CNO, the OP-06 organization, and the Strategic Studies Group aside) than the Naval War College faculty, as is evidenced by their prominence in this biography. Crackel is a military historian by training with little apparent experience in actual strategy or policy-making, and with an

almost exclusively U.S. Army-oriented academic and operational record. Unlike most practicing U.S. naval strategies, he has apparently self-fulfilled his prophecy and "discovered that the think-tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial environment."

Davis, Capt. Vincent, USNR (Ret.), "Decision Making, Decision Makers, and Some of the Results," in Cimbala, Stephen, (ed.), The Reagan Defense Program: An Interim Assessment, Wilmington, DE, Scholarly Resources, 1986, pp 23-62. A somewhat anachronistic characterization of the contemporary Navy as one with "too few thinkers," driven by acrimonious debates among factions of naval officers. "Rancorous disputes simmer among its 'big three unions—the carrier, submarine and surface-warfare admirals." Thus, the seminal thinker and writer on naval strategy and bureaucratic politics of the 40s, 50s and 60s sees no essential change in the Navy of the mid-80s, despite conscious Navy efforts to take his earlier counsel to heart in its development of a transcendent Maritime Strategy. Cf articles by V.Adms Demars, Schoultz, and Dunn, leaders of the submarine and air warfare communities, and by Lts. Winnefeld, Peppe and Keller, the rising generation, cited in Sections II and III above.

Gallotta, Capt. Richard USN (Ret.), et al, Assessment of Maritime Strategy Education and Training in the Department of the Navy, McLean, VA: The BDM Corporation, December 31, 1986. A comprehensive balanced survey, with recommendations.

Hanks, R.Adm. Robert J., USN (Ret.), "Whither U.S. Naval Strategy?" Strategic Review, Summer 1982, pp 16-22. An outstanding OP-60 of the 1970s challenges the U.S. Navy to develop a coherent strategy, an activity being vigorously pursued even as the article was published.

Hattendorf, John, Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984. Chronicles the important supporting role of the Naval War College in the development and dissemination of U.S. Navy strategic thought. See especially pp 201-202, 237, 312-219.

** Hearding, L.Cdr. David, "A Requiem for the Silent Service," Submarine Review, July 1987, pp 73-78. An important article stressing the need for broader integration of U.S. Navy submarine officers into the Navy as a whole, in part as a result of the advent of the Maritime Strategy.

Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr., "Naval Strategy for the Next Century: Resurgence of the Naval War College as the Center of Strategic Naval Thought," National Defense, April 1983, pp 27-30. Covers the

resurgence of the Naval War College, although without describing the linkages between that institution and the strategic planners in Washington, through which Naval War College thinking is actually translated into Maritime Strategy elements. Also see 1983 Murray article cited in Section I above.

Lehman, John F., Jr., "Thinking About Strategy," Shipmate, April 1982, pp 18-20. SECNAV's charge to the officer corps.

** Leibstone, Marvin, "US Report," Naval Forces, II/1986, p 94. Alleges "an unusually large number of naval officers do not recognize fully the switch from 'defense' to 'offense' that the Navy's high command believes is necessary." But cf "The United States Navy: On the Crest of the Wave," The Economist, April 19, 1986, p 49 cited above: "What is certain is that an entire generation of junior and middle-grade naval officers now believes that the first wartime job of the Navy would be to sail north and fight the Russians close to their bases."

* Marryott, R.Adm. Ronald F., "President's Notes," Naval War College Review, November/December 1985, pp 2-4. By the 1985-86 President of the Naval War College and 1983-84 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (OP-60), the Navy's principal global strategist. On development of the Maritime Strategy, and the Naval War College's vital supporting contribution.

** Metcalf, V.Adm. Joseph, "Metcalf Speaks Out: On the Navy's New Offense, Ship Design and Archimedes," Navy News and Undersea Technology, July 18, 1986, p 2. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare views Maritime Strategy as of little concern to Navy junior officers. Not a common view.

Milsted, L.Cdr. Charles E., Jr., "A Corps of Naval Strategist," Masters Degree Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983. Based on the somewhat skewed open literature available during this period. As with Bruins, above, "strategy" and "long-range planning" not well differentiated. Proposed establishment of a network of specifically educated and trained naval strategists responsible for long-range planning. Following his own model, Milsted was subsequently assigned to OP-603 from 1983 to 1985, where he became a key contributor to the codification of the Maritime Strategy. Cf U. S. Navy, First Annual Long Range Planners' Conference cited in Section I above.

Murray, Williamson, "Grading the War Colleges," National Interest, Winter 1986/7, pp 12-19. Antidote to Crackel. "The best of the war colleges, the Naval War College at Newport, sets the standard by which the other war colleges should be measured. The strategy and policy curriculum has justifiably acquired a reputation as the premier course in the United States, if not the Western world, for the

examination of strategy. So high is the Naval War College's reputation, that over the course of the past few years it has attracted a number of the best young military historians and political scientists in national security affairs to Newport."

** Stavridis, L.Cdr. Jim, "An Ocean Away: Outreach from the Naval War College," Shipmate, November 1985, p 8, on the role of the Naval War College in contributing to OP-603's codification of the Maritime Strategy and in "getting the word out" to mid-grade naval officers. By a former OP-603 member.

** Tritten, Cdr. James, "New Directions," Naval War College Review, Spring 1987, p 94. By the Chairman of the Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Department and a former OP-60 staffer. On the revitalization of Naval history and strategy studies at the "PG School."

** Wirt, Robert T., "Strategic ASW," Submarine Review, July 1986, pp 50-56. Calls for a comprehensive ASW plan, driven by submarines to support the Maritime Strategy. Unionism is not quite dead yet.

Woolsey, R. James, "Mapping U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s," International Security, Fall 1981, pp 202-207. By the 1977-1980 Under Secretary of the Navy. "The other side of the coin." A call to bring the "American academic intellectual establishment" and the military establishment more in touch with each other by focusing the efforts of the former on the actual "defense policy" problems of the latter, vice exclusively on "(a) the politico-military situation in the four corners of the globe and (b) nuclear and arms control theology." For similar disconnects that have occurred even within the field of "nuclear theology" itself, see Rosenberg, David, "U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Theory vs. Practice," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1987, pp 20+. "Theorists and consultants have had little impact on the development of nuclear weapons policies. Rather, strategic planning should be seen as a governmental process, carried out largely by military officers and civilian bureaucrats."

B. The Public Record: OP-603

From 1982 to the present, the primary U.S. Navy organization charged with codifying, refining, and articulating the consensus in the Navy regarding the Maritime Strategy has been the OPNAV Strategic Concepts Group (OP-603). Organized by V.Adm. William J. Crowe (then OP-06) and R.Adm. Robert Hilton (then OP-60) in 1978, OP-603 evolved into an office of about a dozen post-graduate educated, trained, professional operator-strategists, including U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Central Intelligence Agency officers.

Almost invisible to the general and national security affairs academic publics, especially when contrasted to the Secretary of the Navy,

the Chief of Naval Operations, OP-06 and OP-60, the operational commanders, the Strategic Studies Group and the Naval War College, these officers have nevertheless been those principally responsible for the development of the Maritime Strategy as a unified, coherent, global framework and common U.S. and allied naval vision.

As with war planners, but unlike war college faculties, their output is largely classified. Nevertheless, they, and their superiors, OP-60 and OP-60B, have also achieved respectable open publication records. Typically, their writings prior to assignment to OP-60/603 reflect their diverse operational and academic interests and achievements; their publications during and after their assignment as strategists usually reflect their work on the Maritime Strategy. For the latter, see the entries cited earlier in this bibliography by R.Adms. Hanks, Maryott, and Pendley; Capts. Barnett, Brooks, Johnson, McGruther and Swartz; Cdrs. Hickman, Kalb and Milsted, and L.Cdrs. Pocalyko and Stavridis. For the former, see the entries below. They represent, admittedly, only a portion of the record, limited only to the products of those officers who were specifically and principally assigned to codify the Maritime Strategy, generally the Op-603 "Branch Heads" and "Maritime Strategy Action Officers" serving from 1982 through 1986. They are provided only to illustrate the breath of experience and depth of thought members of the U.S. Navy's current, functioning "Corps of Naval Strategists" bring with them when they report for duty.

Barnett, Capt. Roger W., "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy," in Currie, Maj. Kenneth M. and Varhall, Maj. Gregory, "The Soviet Union: What Lies Ahead? Military Political Affairs in the 1980s, Washington: USGPO, 1985, pp 581-605. The operator and Sovietologist as future strategist. A 1980 paper by the 1983-84 OP-603 Branch Head. See also his "Their Professional Journal" (with Dr. Edward J. Lacey), Proceedings, October 1982, pp 95-101.

Daly, Capt. Thomas M. and Myers, Cdr. Albert C., "The Art of ASW," Proceedings, October 1985, pp 164-165. Operators and warfare specialists as strategists. The 1985-86 OP-603 Branch Head and his primary Maritime Strategy Action Officer discuss their primary warfare specialty. See also Daly Proceedings articles on the Iran-Iraq ar, July 1984 and May and July 1985, and on the Bikini A-Bomb tests, July 1986.

** Hattendorf, John B., "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to 1987," Naval War College Review, Summer 1988, pp 7-26. Excellent and insightful discussion of the institutional origins of the U.S. Navy's strategical thinking that resulted in the development, "for the first time in many decades," in a "concept of national maritime strategy," and that the Navy's leadership agreed could be a "reasonable basis upon which to plan and prepare for a possible future war with the Soviet Union..." A "must" reading.

Parker, L.Cdr. T. Wood, "Thinking Offensively," Proceedings, April 1981, pp 26-31; "Theater Nuclear Warfare and the U.S. Navy," Naval War College Review, January/February 1982, pp 3-16; and "Paradigms, Conventional Wisdom, and Naval Warfare," Proceedings, April 1983, pp 29-35. The operator and War College student as future strategist. Three prize-winning essays by the 1984-85 principal OP-603 Maritime Strategy Action Officer.

Seaquist, Cdr. Larry, "Memorandum for the Commander. Subject: Tactical Proficiency," and "Tactics to Improve Tactical Proficiency," Proceedings, July 1981, pp 58-61 and February 1983, pp 37-42. The operator and tactician as future strategist. By a member of the 1983-84 Strategic Studies Group and 1984-85 OP-603 Branch Head.

Weeks, L.Cdr. Stanley B., "United States Defense Policy Toward Spain, 1950-1976, unpublished PhD dissertation, American University, 1977; and Johnson, L.Cdr. William S., "Naval Diplomacy and the Failure of Balanced Security in the Far East—1921-1935, and "Defense Budget Constraints and the Fate of the Carrier in the Royal Navy," Navy War College Review, February 1972, pp 67-88 and May-June 1973, pp 12-30. Operators and international relations specialists as future strategists. By the OP-60 co-drafters of the initial 1982-1983 U.S. Navy Maritime Strategy briefings and testimony.

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